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Abstract 
Collaboration on resource sharing advocates a joint usage of resources by multiple 
parties (actors) to attain mutual benefits. Resource sharing becomes vital when 
resources under consideration are scarce, challenging, and expensive to attain; as 
well when they are idle or underutilized. In collaborative logistics, resource sharing 
entails the joint usage of the physical and non-physical assets. Shared assets include 
the transportation vehicles (trucks), warehouses, distribution centers, information, 
on-demand staffing, and logistics services offered under cloud computing. Through 
sharing, collaborating partners in logistics can reduce costs and harms to the 
environment, but also improve the efficiency of logistical functions. Although 
collaborative sharing is beneficial, still many difficulties impede its uptake. The 
difficulties include how to choose partners, establish and maintain trust among 
partners involved. Indeed, in both academia and industry, low-level trust inhibits the 
collaboration critically on sharing logistics resources. To this end, the present 
dissertation addresses the trust problem encountered by collaborating partners when 
they are sharing logistics resources. It deals with the trust problem by developing 
the Trust Mechanism (TrustMech) concept. The primary role of the TrustMech is to 
help logistics stakeholders acquire the far-reaching understanding about the 
trustworthiness of prospective networks of sharing they configure, before advancing 
them to an implementation stage. 
The TrustMech stands on a mitigation approach that focuses on estimating outcomes 
of trust uncertainties – rather than – their sources. Henceforth, this dissertation 
advances on estimating outcomes of trust uncertainties to answer the following 
central Research Question (RQ): how can collaborating partners acquire the far-
reaching understanding about the trustworthiness of prospective networks of sharing 
they configure? An approach to the research problem, which as well answers the RQ 
proceeds as follows. The first steps involve establishing behavioral factors and 
parameters, which influence trust in collaborative sharing of logistics resources. The 
second stage entails establishing a conceptual framework that depicts and guides 
trust-based interaction of collaborating partners. The third step comprises 
developing the TrustMech concept, validating it in both the conceptual and 
operational aspects, and demonstrating its application by carrying out controlled 
(simulation) experiments in Multi-Agent Systems. In particular, the proposed 
TrustMech concept characterizes fundamental logical processes that account for 
trusting decisions, actions, and reactions of collaborating partners to reinforce 
emergent trusting outcomes. 
The core contributions of this dissertation are the general-purpose TrustMech and 
the operational TrustMech. The operational TrustMech is customary for 
collaborative sharing of logistics resources. Regarding its application, the 
operational TrustMech provides logistics managers and stakeholders the ability to 
  
IV 
forecast how a configured network of sharing may, in respect of trustworthiness, 
function upon its implementation. To clarify further, the operational TrustMech 
scrutinizes many issues. For example, it scrutinizes trustworthiness of the configured 
network regarding possible strengths and pitfalls and provides pathway explanations 
underlying such foreseen strengths and pitfalls. Secondly, the operational TrustMech 
scrutinizes effects which such strengths and pitfalls can generate. Moreover, the 
operational TrustMech estimates an extent to which behavioral factors influence the 
trustworthiness of the individual partner and entire resource sharing network. Future 
research works include extending the TrustMech and replicating the study using 
system data. Additional future work consists of adjusting the design and settings 
used, as well as incorporating additional predictor and response variables into the 
operational TrustMech. 
Abstract in German 
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Abstract in German 
Das Teilen d.h. das gemeinsame Nutzen von Ressourcen ist vor allem dann 
vielversprechend, wenn die aktuell betrachteten Ressourcen knapp und teuer sind, 
nur aufwändig zu beschaffen sind, oder wenn diese nicht ausreichend genutzt 
werden. In einer durch  Kollaboration geprägten Logistik (collaborative logistics) 
führt Ressourcenteilung zur gemeinsamen Nutzung der materiellen und nicht 
materiellen Vermögenswerte. Zu den gemeinsam genutzten Vermögenswerten 
zählen u.a. Transportfahrzeuge (LKWs), Warenlager, Vertriebszentren, 
Informationen, aber auch das zur Verfügung stehende Personal und IT-basierte 
Logistikdienstleistungen, die im Rahmen von Cloud Computing angeboten werden. 
Durch das gemeinsame Nutzen von Ressourcen können in der Logistik sowohl 
Kosten und Umweltschäden reduziert, als auch die Effizienz von logistischen 
Aufgaben verbessert werden. Auch wenn das gemeinsame Nutzen von 
Logistikressourcen viele Vorteile verspricht, bestehen noch immer viele 
Herausforderungen, die der Umsetzung einer kooperativen Nutzung von Ressourcen 
entgegenstehen. Zu diesen Herausforderungen zählen sowohl die Identifikation und 
die Auswahl geeigneter Partner als auch der Aufbau und die Erhaltung von Vertrauen 
unter den beteiligten Partnern. Ein zu geringes Maß an Vertrauen verhindert 
letztendlich die Zusammenarbeit der beteiligten Partner und so auch das Teilen von 
logistischen Ressourcen.  
Die vorliegende Dissertation befasst sich mit den verschiedenen Dimensionen von 
Vertrauen, das bei Kooperationspartnern auftritt, wenn diese logistische Ressourcen 
teilen. Die Arbeit behandelt das Thema Vertrauen durch die Entwicklung des 
Konzepts Trust Mechanism (TrustMech). Die Hauptaufgabe von TrustMech besteht 
darin, den Akteuren in der Logistik dabei zu helfen, ein weitreichendes Verständnis 
über die Vertrauenswürdigkeit in den künftigen Netzwerken zu erwerben, die von 
ihnen konfiguriert und gemeinsam genutzt werden, bevor diese Netzwerke in die 
Implementierungsphase wechseln. Das Konzept TrustMech basiert auf einem 
sogenannten Abschwächungsansatz (mitigation approach), der darauf fokussiert, die 
Folgen von fehlendem Vertrauen (d.h. die Vertrauensunsicherheit) zu bewerten.  
Die zentrale Forschungsfrage der Arbeit lautet: Wie können die in einem logistischen 
Netzwerk kooperierenden Unternehmen ein angemessenes Verständnis über die 
Vertrauenswürdigkeit des Netzwerkes entwickeln. Der Aufbau der Arbeit ist wie 
folgt: Im ersten Schritt werden verhaltensbezogene Faktoren und Parameter 
identifiziert, die einen Einfluss auf das Vertrauen bei der gemeinsamen Nutzung von 
logistischen Ressourcen haben. Im zweiten Schritt wird ein Rahmenkonzept 
entwickelt, welches eine vertrauensbasierte Interaktion von Kooperationspartnern 
beschreibt und erklärt. Darauf aufbauend wird im dritten Schritt das TrustMech-
Konzept entwickelt und anschließend mit Hilfe eines Multi-Agenten –Systems 
implementiert. 
Abstract in German 
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Die Hauptbeiträge dieser Dissertation sind einerseits das allgemeingültige 
TrustMech Konzept (General-Purpose TrustMech) und andererseits dessen 
Umsetzung (Instanziierung) im Kontext der gemeinsamen Nutzung logistischer 
Ressourcen (Operational TrustMech to Logistical Functions). Vor allem beschreibt 
das TrustMech-Konzept fundamentale logistische Prozesse, die vertrauensvolle 
Entscheidungen, Aktionen und Reaktionen von Kooperationspartnern bedingen, um 
das Entstehen von vertrauensvollen Ergebnissen zu fördern. Aus 
Anwendungsperspektive bietet das TrustMech Konzept den verschiedenen Akteuren 
aus der Logistik die Möglichkeit zu prognostizieren, wie sich ein konfiguriertes 
(bzw. zu konfigurierendes) Netzwerk bei der gemeinsamen Nutzung in Bezug auf 
den Aspekt der Vertrauenswürdigkeit verhalten wird. Das TrustMech-Konzept wird 
sowohl hinsichtlich seiner konzeptionellen als auch operationellen Aspekte mit Hilfe 
eines Multi-Agenten-Systems implementiert und experimentell  bewertet 
(simuliert). Im Rahmen der Anwendung des TrustMech Konzeptes werden 
verschiedene Aspekte genauer betrachtet. Zum Beispiel untersucht das Konzept die 
Vertrauenswürdigkeit des konfigurierten Netzwerks mit Blick auf das Entstehen und 
das Wirken möglicher Stärken und Hindernisse. Schließlich schätzt der operationelle 
TrustMech, inwieweit verhaltensbezogene Faktoren die Vertrauenswürdigkeit von 
individuellen Partnern und des gesamten Netzwerks die gemeinsame Nutzung von 
Ressourcen beeinflussen. 
Table of Contents 
VII 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgment ........................................................................................................ I 
Abstract .................................................................................................................... III 
Abstract in German................................................................................................... V 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................VII 
1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Trust as a Necessary Ingredient in Sharing Logistics Resources ................. 3 
1.2 Trust Problem in Sharing Logistics Resources ............................................. 5 
1.3 Research Objective, Research Question, and Hypotheses ........................... 7 
1.4 Research Contributions ................................................................................. 9 
1.5 Research Approach: An Overview.............................................................. 10 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation ....................................................................... 10 
2 Shareable Resources and Trust in Collaborative Logistics ............................... 13 
2.1 Shareable Resources in Logistics ............................................................... 13 
2.2 Integrated Partnerships in Logistics and Supply Chain .............................. 17 
2.3 Nature of Trust ............................................................................................ 21 
2.4 Trust Determinants in Collaborative Sharing of Logistics Resources ....... 24 
2.5 Research Problem in a Broader-Spectrum .................................................. 27 
2.6 Summary and Conclusion ........................................................................... 32 
3 Research Methodology ...................................................................................... 35 
3.1 Background ................................................................................................. 35 
3.2 Influencing Factors, Partner Interactions, and Causal Relationships ......... 37 
3.3 Specification and Implementation .............................................................. 38 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion ........................................................................... 39 
Table of Contents 
VIII 
4 Current Trust Mechanisms in Collaborative Logistics ..................................... 41 
4.1 Behavioral Factors and Parameters Influencing Trust................................ 42 
4.2 Collaborative Controls, Interactions, and Negotiations ............................. 46 
4.3 Uncertainty and Complexity of Logistical Functions ................................ 55 
4.4 Interdisciplinary Collaborative Systems ..................................................... 59 
4.5 Trust Modeling Approaches........................................................................ 60 
4.6 Models of Trust and Reputation ................................................................. 63 
4.7 Summary and Conclusion ........................................................................... 70 
5 The TrustMech Concept .................................................................................... 73 
5.1 The General-Purpose TrustMech ................................................................ 73 
5.2 The Operational TrustMech to Logistical Functions .................................. 82 
5.3 Derivation of Hypotheses ........................................................................... 85 
5.4 Summary and Conclusion ........................................................................... 88 
6 Prototypical Implementation ............................................................................. 89 
6.1 Specification of Requirements .................................................................... 89 
6.2 Description of Agent Roles and Knowledge .............................................. 97 
6.3 Simulation Platform .................................................................................... 98 
6.4 Design and Setup of the Logistics Network ............................................. 100 
6.5 Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................... 106 
7 Validation and Application .............................................................................. 109 
7.1 Validation Approach ................................................................................. 109 
7.2 Results ....................................................................................................... 113 
7.3 Discussion ................................................................................................. 120 
7.4 Limitations ................................................................................................ 131 
Table of Contents 
IX 
7.5 Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................... 132 
8 Recapitulation .................................................................................................. 135 
8.1 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 135 
8.2 Outlook ..................................................................................................... 136 
References ............................................................................................................. 139 
Publications used directly in this Dissertation ...................................................... 161 
Appendix ............................................................................................................... 163 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................ 169 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................... 171 
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ 173 
 1 
1 Introduction 
Traditionally, sharing as well as collaboration existed since ancient times. In that 
period, ancestors shared various works such as the hunting, gathering, creating tools, 
and even looking after babies (Buczynski, 2013) in their family. Those shared works 
mostly spanned on small geographic areas and were supposed to satisfy joint needs 
of nearby local communities. Parallel to the traditional era, communities of today 
realize potentials of sharing the physical and non-physical resources. This sharing is 
gaining popularity because of benefits it provides to participants who share 
resources. Owing to realizable benefits, both the individuals and companies have 
started to adapt resource sharing into business models. Foundationally, the adapted 
business models stand primarily on a collaboration strategy to enable parties 
involved to share the idle and underutilized assets and physical spaces. Such 
shareable resources range from homes (Gorenflo, 2010), transportation vehicles 
(trucks), warehouses, distribution centers (Gci & Capgemini, 2008; Gorenflo, 2010; 
Weinelt, 2016), machinery and manufacturing facilities (Kück, Becker, & Freitag, 
2016).  
Many drivers accelerate and promote the re-birth of today’s collaboration in sharing 
resources. These drivers are mainly notable in the dimensions of technology, 
economy, ecology, and societal issues (Figure 1). In view of technological 
perspective, emerging advances in Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) play a crucial part to promote the collaborative sharing. The ICTs provide 
global scale and pervasive connectedness to the individuals, companies, and other 
objects (things) (Goudin, 2016) to facilitate resource sharing. 
Technological 
dimension
Economic dimension
Social dimension
Ecological dimension
Drivers of 
Resource Sharing
 
Figure 1: Drivers of resource sharing 
The world has seen resource sharing undergoing four phases of revolution in a 
perspective of connectedness. The connectedness has progressed in the sequence of 
connect to share information; connect people to each other; connect to share daily 
thoughts and media, to; connect to access and share assets (Mastercard & The Future 
Agenda, 2016), such as the physical assets and spaces. Correspondingly, the power 
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of the ICTs has reduced many difficulty’s underlying transactions that are essential 
to support the functioning of resource sharing. To exemplify this, barriers, which 
were previously inhibiting the: search for information with a trading partner; 
bargaining towards agreements, and; enforcing agreements reached, are in no small 
extent reduced. These achievements, backup from emerging digital platforms (see, 
for example, in Telles (2016)), and play a profound role to bring together 
(matchmaking) and manage stakeholders who are motivated to go sharing. 
The economic, ecological, and social dimensions drive today’s collaborative sharing 
(Figure 1). These drivers are synonymous with what Goudin (2016) discusses as 
drivers of the sharing economy. One can emphasize further these drivers as follows. 
That, the increasing production costs, benign environmental regulations, dynamic 
market needs (European Commission, 2013; Koh & Wang, 2010), and scarcity of 
energy resources constitutes issues, which drive individuals and companies to go 
sharing. Such sharing, particularly in logistics, offers many benefits to both 
individuals and companies. For example, through sharing resources, companies can 
reduce logistics costs, improve the quality of service offered, gain a position on the 
market, minimize investments, and reduce harmful emissions (Xu, 2013). 
Societal factors elevate a need to share resources. Today, many of us consume more 
than ever before (Buczynski, 2013). Equally, there appears to emerge a paradigm 
shift in the alternative use of resources. People are shifting from actual ownership 
towards temporary access to goods and services (Gesing, 2017). According to Gesig, 
consumer behavior appears shifting towards preferring experiences over 
possessions. Such shift in behavior implies that individuals and companies are 
becoming aware that owning a resource may be more expensive compared to access 
the same resource when it is needed. Besides such shift, the concentration of people 
in urban locations has created new needs such as mobility, to find that demand for 
means of transport increases (Goudin, 2016) than before. Similarly, an increase in 
population has resulted in a generation of more wastes, which have nowhere to go 
(Buczynski, 2013). Moreover, in terms of demand for energy resources, 
transportation’s share of overall final oil consumption, from 1990 to 2010, has 
increased by 7 percent (Dobbs, Oppenheim, Thompson, Brinkman, & Zornes, 2011).  
Despite this increasing demand, yet most of the fossil fuels used especially in 
transportation logistics are finite. In this respect, sharing transportation vehicles 
(trucks), for example, may leverage number of vehicle trucks deployed on the road 
while also reducing the amount of fuel usage, and CO2 emissions. 
Upon considering the outlined challenges, collaboration in sharing logistics 
resources remains not only imperative but also beneficial. For example, in less-than-
truckload, collaborative sharing provides opportunities to exploit synergies in excess 
capacity and increase asset utilization (Hernández & Peeta, 2014). As well, 
collaborative sharing can help to mitigate logistics inefficiencies, which Kayikci and 
Stix (2014) identify them as poor capacity utilization; empty backhaul; low-profit 
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margins, and; harsh impacts to environments. Furthermore, collaborative logistics 
helps small and medium-sized companies to reduce costs and increase operational 
efficiency (Wang & Kopfer, 2014). In the overall, collaborative sharing seeks to 
leverage excess capacities in resource ownership (possession) against demands by 
other consumers (users). 
Despite realizable benefits, there are many challenges, which hinder collaboration 
in sharing logistics resources. Many sources attribute to such challenges, especially 
those sources, which stem from governance mechanism of the sharing network. 
Under the governance mechanism, one issue to deal with is relational governance. 
The relational governance mechanism entails relational controls that rely heavily on 
the management of the trust. In the light of trust management, most of the literature, 
including (Buczynski, 2013; Dillahunt & Malone, 2015; Gesing, 2017; Gorenflo, 
2010; Goudin, 2016; Telles, 2016) identify trust as one of the leading factors 
inhibiting collaborative sharing. It is for this reason that the present dissertation 
addresses the trust problem within the context of collaboration in sharing logistics 
resources. 
In essence, collaborative sharing in logistics and other areas rests on the existence 
of mutual trust among parties involved. Literature (Mastercard & The Future 
Agenda, 2016; Wosskow, 2014) support this affirmation and see that trust remains 
a critical enabler of the collaborative sharing. In this case, efforts geared towards 
resource sharing may be successful when collaborating partners have trust in each 
other. Contrary to this, lack of trust (low trust) turns out to be a potential barrier to 
many collaborative partnerships (Pomponi, Fratocchi, & Tafuri, 2015) including 
those in logistics. Graham (2011) emphasizes further that the lack of trust make 
collaboration a hard proposition for many companies. This difficulty arises from 
many sources, such as the supporting environments, partner behavior, as well as 
collaborative processes that facilitate resource sharing itself. In the overall, the 
behavior exhibited by partners under the influence of collaborative logistics 
processes account primarily for indeterminate trusting situations, and reservations 
of partners to collaborate. 
1.1 Trust as a Necessary Ingredient in Sharing Logistics Resources 
In collaborative logistics, both the individuals and companies share resources to 
reduce costs, increase responsiveness, and improve utilization of assets and physical 
spaces. Statistically, potentials of sharing logistics resources carry implications. 
According to the World Economic Forum (2009): transportation logistics sector 
contributes 5.5% of the annual greenhouse-gas emissions; 24% of goods vehicle kms 
in the EU run empty, and; when carrying a load, trucks are typically only 57% loaded 
as a percentage of maximum gross weight. In both US and EU, almost 1 in every 
four trucks along the road runs empty; while within the trucks that are not empty, 
the utilization rates are 56% and 54% in US and EU, respectively (Srinivasan & 
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Leveque, 2016). Additionally, according to a survey conducted by (FLEXE, 2015): 
70% of supply chain professionals report situations where a warehouse capacity 
significantly exceeds inventory, and; 70% of warehouse managers with extra 
capacity do not have a solution; instead, they accept the unused space as sunk costs. 
These statistics imply that collaborative sharing remains a crucial strategy to 
mitigate the already outlined logistics inefficiencies. For example, whereas some 
trucks run empty while others are partially loaded, sharing of trucks can reduce the 
number of trucks dispatched on a particular route. Consequently, sharing of trucks 
can enable collaborating partners to: reduce costs; reduce emissions of harmful 
gases; improve utilization of physical assets and spaces, and; improve customer 
service. 
Collaboration in sharing resources faces many impediments, although it remains 
imperative. Among the most prominent unresolved challenges encountered in 
sharing resources are maintaining trust, transparency, liability, and insurance 
(Gesing, 2017). The effective collaborative sharing requires support involving high 
levels of trust among manufacturers, retailers, and logistics service providers 
(Bajorinas et al., 2008; Islam & Olsen, 2014). Fawcett, McCarter, Fawcett, Webb, 
and Magnan (2015) elaborate theoretically reasons about why collaboration 
strategies fail. Those authors emphasize that collaborations fail due to information 
hoarding and imbalanced power, among other reasons. Similarly, the difference in 
power and control among partners over collaboration processes, prevalence of low 
trust, and suspicion are also challenges of getting to collaboration table (World 
Economic Forum, 2011). Furthermore, literature (Fawcett, Magnan, & McCarter, 
2008; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008) has emphasized that partner (actor) 
behavior constitute root barriers to collaboration. Since partner behavior get 
influenced by collaborative processes, then Fawcett et al. (2008) consider the 
incentive alignment, conflicting decisions, procedures, and information sharing to 
be among the collaborative processes that impede trust. 
To put all together, partner behavior and collaborative processes constitute what this 
dissertation refers to as behavioral factors. They are factors, which influence (enable 
and inhibit) trust in collaborative sharing of logistics resources. On the one hand, 
these factors are considered core in exploiting benefits to collaborative sharing, 
especially when they are constructive and fairly practiced (enablers). On the other 
hand, such factors can also be unfair and destructive (inhibitors) to the extent of 
generating trust uncertainties that harm collaborative efforts directed towards 
resource sharing. 
The brief discussion about trust uncertainties which stem from the outlined factors 
advances as follows (for detailed discussion, see sections 2.4 and 4.1). Firstly, 
collaboration in sharing logistics resources depends on information visibility. 
Increased visibility in sales, inventory, and forecast information between a customer 
and supplier allows partners to improve performance (VICS, 2007). To attain this 
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visibility, collaborating partners have to exchange more information than before. 
While aspiring to ensure this visibility, partners can encounter real and suspected 
risks. Through information exchange, partners may indirectly expose their business 
models to competitors. Other partners may manipulate information before 
exchanging it, which in turn, may lead into additional uncertainties and low trust. 
Secondly, the fairness and trustworthiness of methods applicable to divide costs and 
expected gains remain not addressed to a considerable acceptance. The lack of 
significant acceptance can instigate logistics partners to suspect whether methods 
used will benefit all partners to the extent of efforts each has contributed. Thirdly, 
consortia in logistics are mostly dynamic, heterogeneous, and decentralized. These 
features introduce complexity and difficulties in managing and synchronizing 
decisions made by different partners, especially when such decisions are 
incompatible. The complexity arises, for example, when some partners make 
uncompromising decisions while remaining inflexible to adjust their decision rights. 
Finally, some partners may act opportunistically thereby taking advantages on costs 
of others. In the overall, these impediments cause the uptake of collaboration in 
sharing logistics resources to remain challenging. 
1.2 Trust Problem in Sharing Logistics Resources 
Mitigation of the trust problem underlying collaborative logistics and resource 
sharing can build on the perspective of sources of trust uncertainties or outcomes 
(consequences) of trust uncertainties. These perspectives appear equivalent to that 
of Rice (2016) who suggests that mitigations to disruptions can focus either on the 
source or outcome of a risk. There are plentiful mitigations that focus on the sources 
of trust uncertainties in the literature (refer Table 2 for details). However, most of 
such results, according to what Jonsson and Holmström (2016) affirm, are in the 
least form that is actionable for practitioners. Rice (2016) further stresses to refine 
the use of mitigation and incline it on mitigation approach that focuses on a 
predictable set of limited outcomes. Correspondingly, Spekman and Davis (2004) 
add that trust depends on foreseeable behavior and fair dealing. Henceforth, standing 
on these arguments, this work focuses on the perspective that refers to outcomes 
(consequences) of trust uncertainties than their sources. A fundamental basis of this 
focus is to provide the actionable and practical oriented viewpoint, exploration, and 
contribution to the trust problem in logistics. Additionally, this perspective aligns 
with what Fawcett, Fawcett, Watson, and Magnan (2012) emphasize, that managers 
fail to grasp the dynamism and intricacies that delimit the processes within the 
collaboration box. Such focus extends to the provision of more valuable insights 
about trustworthiness of prospective networks configured to facilitate resource 
sharing, on the one hand. 
On the other hand, the focus differs significantly from most of the contributions in 
literature. Literature contributions have put more emphasis on sources of trust 
uncertainties (see Table 2). For example, approaches to mitigate trust uncertainties 
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in a perspective of sources of risks are extensively studied. There is a plethora of 
literature addressing: role, antecedents, and dimensions of trust; approaches to 
search and select partners, as well as; the measurement and assessment of trust. 
Section 2.5 presents a detailed discussion of such literature. Moreover, except for 
studies which operationalize supply chain resilience (Aqlan & Lam, 2015; Cardoso, 
Paula Barbosa-Póvoa, Relvas, & Novais, 2015; Munoz & Dunbar, 2015), trust 
approaches resulting from consequences of the risk-worthy relationships in 
collaborative logistics remain least studied. Such trust approaches have to take a 
form of supply chain resilience within a context of the trusting outcome. The trusting 
outcome has a role to cater for insufficiency of sources of uncertainties. Jonsson and 
Holmström (2016) argue that research has mainly developed analytical models or 
empirically identified enablers and antecedents for outcomes; without referring to 
implementable practices and practical contexts. Although authors’ argumentation 
focuses in the supply chain planning, yet it applies also to collaboration in logistics.  
For that reason, and by referring, in particular, to the standpoint of the resilience, 
trusting outcomes, and actionable practices involving collaboration in sharing 
logistics resources, trust problems potential to address include: 
 Difficulties in understanding a degree to which partner behavior under the 
influence of collaborative logistics processes reinforce trust;  
 Difficulties in estimating forthcoming trusting situations, and; 
 Insufficiency of pathway explanations (forecasting) about specific character-
behavior that can strengthen or weaken needed trusting outcome. 
In uncovering outlined trust problems, this dissertation establishes a far-reaching 
understanding of how behavior and processes reinforce trusting outcomes. This 
establishment concentrates mainly on estimating and providing a better 
understanding of how partner (actor) behavior under the influence of collaborative 
logistics processes, reinforce trusting outcomes. Such understanding plays crucial 
roles to support logistics stakeholders to figure out, manage, and mitigate possible 
strengths and vulnerabilities underlying trustworthiness of prospective networks of 
sharing. However, one critical issue is about how to realize required reinforcement. 
Realizing reinforcement of trusting outcomes from partner behavior and 
collaborative logistics processes requires establishing an appropriate mechanism. 
The mechanism has to take a form of a logical process, which accounts for trusting 
actions, decisions, and reactions, which are to be undertaken by collaborating 
partners. This mechanism may appear in two perspectives. In the first perspective, 
an ideal desire is to achieve the mechanism that enables logistics managers and other 
stakeholders to predict the trusting outcomes rationally. However, in practice, 
achieving rational prediction seems the uneasy task. The second perspective entails 
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a practical reality of the world in which trusting outcomes undergo estimation. 
Henceforth, a desire that is practical to unveil is the mechanism that helps logistics 
managers to understand and develop confidence and reliability in the future, trusting 
decision and actions they undertake. The mechanism has to produce the intended 
and unintended (Jonsson & Holmström, 2016) trusting outcomes. One can 
accomplish this need by building a novel trust mechanism that accepts behavioral 
and process variations, and correspondingly, generates trusting outcomes. It has to 
stand upon a foundation of appropriate principles whose conceptualization mimics 
a representation of the human trusting process in the socio-cognitive domain.  
In summary, the central argument of this dissertation is as follows: Effective sharing 
of logistics resources requires the trust to support and encourage partners to 
collaborate. However, trust uncertainties resulting from the partner behavior and 
collaborative processes in logistics impede needed sharing. Such trust uncertainties 
hinder collaborative efforts, such as efforts to reduce: logistics costs; physical asset 
underutilization; harms to the environment, and; other logistics inefficiencies. The 
present dissertation addresses this problem by developing a mechanism that helps 
collaborating partners to forecast trustworthiness of a prospective (configured) 
consortium before its implementation. The development focuses mainly on the 
operational level of collaborative logistics. Such mechanism is set to unveil how 
partner behavior under the influence of collaborative logistics processes reinforce 
trusting outcomes, and accordingly advise stakeholders. To realize this objective, 
firstly, the Trust Mechanism (TrustMech) concept that stands on a conceptual 
paradigm of socio-cognition is developed. Secondly, the TrustMech concept is 
conceptually and operationally validated, and its potential application 
demonstrated by carrying out controlled experiments in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). 
1.3 Research Objective, Research Question, and Hypotheses 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to develop a trust mechanism that helps 
logistics stakeholders to understand trustworthiness of prospective networks of 
sharing they configure. In particular, this mechanism supports collaborating partners 
to gain a far-reaching understanding (forecasting), and; develop confidence as well 
as reliability in forthcoming, trusting situations they undertake thereof. 
This primary objective is realized by identifying key factors, which influence trust; 
establishing necessary trust-based interactions of partners; developing a trust 
mechanism concept, and; carrying out controlled experiments in a virtual world. 
Development of the trust mechanism is twofold: the general-purpose trust 
mechanism, and; the operational trust mechanism that addresses collaborative 
functions in sharing logistics resources. 
Besides this primary objective, specific objectives this dissertation achieves are 
twofold: 
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 To determine an extent to which both the combinatorial and singleton 
behavioral-process1 reinforce trust, and; 
 To provide pathways explanations for trusting outcomes that may potentially 
lead to strengthening (successes) or undermining (pitfalls) efforts on sharing 
resources. 
Apart from the stated objectives, this dissertation answers the following central 
research question: How can collaborating partners acquire a far-reaching 
understanding about the trustworthiness of prospective networks of sharing they 
configure? In answering this central research question, four specific Research 
Questions (RQ) involved are: 
 RQ1: What are potential factors and parameters, which affect trust in 
collaborative sharing of logistics resources? 
 RQ2: How do collaborating partners in logistics interact, and what conceptual 
framework can adequately depict trust-based interactions undertaken by such 
partners? 
 RQ3: How can a trust mechanism responsible for reinforcing trust from 
partner behavior under the influence of collaborative logistics processes, be 
devised efficiently and validated? 
 RQ4: To what extent do partner behavior and collaborative logistics processes 
influence trust? 
The behavioral factors, trust-based framework of partners’ interactions, and trust 
mechanism constitute deliverables for the first, second, and third research questions, 
respectively. Such composition excludes the demonstrative application of the trust 
mechanism concept. 
Henceforth, the fourth research question (RQ4) has been set to demonstrate potential 
applications of the trust mechanism. Its primary goal is to exemplify how partner 
behavior under the influence of collaborative logistics processes reinforces trusting 
outcomes. Moreover, the RQ4 is set to investigate relationships between behavioral-
process factors and trust to deepen the understanding. Achieving this understanding 
involves predicting system behavior (expected outcomes), which concern the 
trustworthiness of the sharing network (as whole) and individual partners. In a 
viewpoint of system behavior, there are many predictions to perform on a configured 
network of resource sharing. Even though, to fulfill the demonstrative purposes, the 
present prediction builds on hypotheses concerning: distortion of information 
                                                             
1 Behavioral-process comprises of partner behaviors (actions and decisions) under influence of 
collaborative logistics processes 
1   Introduction 
9 
accuracy; fairness of the sharing methods; conflicting preferences (dilemmas) 
among collaborating partners; comparative effects of the persuaded and rejected 
dilemmas, and; highly ranked influential predictor variable. Section 5.3 presents the 
detailed derivation of the outlined hypotheses.  
1.4 Research Contributions 
This dissertation provides two core contributions in the form of trust mechanism. 
The first contribution is the general-purpose trust mechanism (presented in section 
5.1). It is the crucial (fundamental) contribution to a body of knowledge in 
computing and engineering sciences. It is also the reusable contribution, 
customizable with little effort to suit specific application domains. The second 
contribution is the operational trust mechanism (presented in section 5.2). The 
operational trust mechanism is drawn (derived) from the general-purpose trust 
mechanism. It is set to address specifically the trust problem in collaborative sharing 
of logistics resources. Its operationalization stands mainly on defining predictor and 
response variables that are necessary to validate and demonstrate the application of 
the trust mechanism concept. In demonstrating its application, among others, the 
operational trust mechanism scrutinizes (as a result of reinforcement) trust 
discontents underlying scenarios related to sharing logistics resources. 
Besides these contributions, this dissertation provides other useful contributions in 
many ways. Resulting from research foundation and techniques, research objective 
and methodology, and analysis of simulation results, this dissertation also 
contributes through: 
i. Analysis of existing multidisciplinary foundations to trust in collaborative 
sharing; 
ii. Identification of limitations of numerical-based trust approach and 
proposition of socio-cognitive one to complement; 
iii. Identification of factors as well as parameters (criteria) which influence trust 
in collaborative logistics and resource sharing; 
iv. Analysis and comparison of existing models of trust and reputations, as well 
as their respective techniques; 
v. Establishment of a trust framework that depicts (guides) partners’ interactions 
in the collaborative sharing of logistics resources, and; 
vi. Provision of pathway explanations (forecasting) against emerging trust 
phenomena by building on the bottom-up instead of classical top-down 
interactions of partner’s character-behavior.  
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1.5 Research Approach: An Overview 
To achieve the stated research objectives, answer the research question, and 
contribute accordingly, the research problem is approached by: 
i. Conducting a literature review to analyze and synthesize key factors and 
parameters influencing trust in collaborative logistics; 
ii. Analyzing trust modeling approaches, models of trust and reputation to reveal 
strengths and limitations of existing contributions; 
iii. Analyzing approaches suitable to model conflicting decisions, information 
uncertainty, and negotiation protocols; 
iv. Establishing a conceptual framework that depicts partners’ trust-based 
interactions in collaborative logistics. This framework is established based on 
(partly) the PASSI technique under the Agent-Based Modeling (ABM); 
v. Developing the trust mechanism concept by building from the socio-cognitive 
paradigm, which also incorporates the analogy of human trusting process and 
socio-economic principles; 
vi. Designing and implementing a simulation prototype based on the Multi-Agent 
Systems (MAS); 
vii. Establishing the conceptual and operational validity of the proposed trust 
mechanism concept, and; 
viii. Conducting demonstrative application of the TrustMech under resource 
sharing scenario in logistics. 
Currently, this section presents only an overview of the research methodology. 
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology in a broad-view. 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 
The present dissertation follows a logical structure as per the stream indicated in 
Figure 2. Chapter 1 contextualizes the sharing of logistics resources, and trust 
problem, and justifies rationality of this research. Also, it outlines the problem 
statement, research objectives, and research questions, as well as research 
contributions. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 lay a foundation on which this research stands 
on. In particular, chapter 2 describes basic concepts, terms, and definitions, but also, 
provides an in-depth (extended) analysis and discussions of the research motivation 
and problem. Chapter 3 presents the research methodology. Chapter 4 presents state 
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of the art on trust mechanism. This state of the art enriches a fundamental research 
gap addressed in this dissertation. 
Structure of 
Work
I. Introduction
Motivation & Problem 
Statement
(Sections 1.1 & 1.2)
Research Objectives, Questions 
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(Sections 1.3 & 1.4)
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II. Research    
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Functions
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IV. 
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Simulation Platform 
(Section 6.4)
V. 
Recapitulation
Conclusion
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Research Methodology 
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Logistics Network 
(Section 6.4)
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Application
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(Section 7.1)
Results
(Section 7.2)
Derivation of Hypotheses
(Section 5.3)
Discussion
(Section 7.3)
Limitations
(Section 7.4
Outlook
(Section 8.2)
 
Figure 2: Structure of the dissertation 
Upon laying out the research foundation, this work proceeds to develop a trust 
mechanism concept in chapter 5. In particular, section 5.1 presents the development 
of a general-purpose trust mechanism. Section 5.2 presents the development of an 
operational trust mechanism that is customary to collaborative sharing of logistics 
resources. This operational trust mechanism draws from the general-purpose trust 
mechanism. 
Chapter 6 deals with an implementation that transforms conceptual trust mechanism 
into the computerized instance. This implementation stands on the MAS to transform 
the socio-cognitive interactions of collaborating partners in computer controlled-
environments using the PlaSMA2 platform. Moreover, chapter 6 addresses the design 
and setups of logistics network. Chapter 1 deals with the validation and application, 
and it presents results, discussions as well as limitations to this study. Finally, this 
work ends with the recapitulation in chapter 8, by providing the conclusion and 
outlook. 
                                                             
2 PlaSMA is an event-driven simulation system which has been designed to solve and evaluate 
scenarios of the logistics domain (http://plasma.informatik.uni-bremen.de) 
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2 Shareable Resources and Trust in Collaborative 
Logistics 
During the research parts of the contents have been published in (Daudi, 2015; 
Daudi, Baalsrud Hauge, & Thoben, 2016a, 2016c). 
Trust continues to receive significant attention due to critical roles it plays in 
collaborative logistics. Following this significance, already there are literary works, 
which have contributed in this area. Building from such literature works, the present 
chapter lays fundamental foundations of the research, and it broadens discussions on 
research motivation and research problem explicitly. Moreover, the chapter provides 
the descriptive and discursive avenue for basic terms, concepts, and definitions 
related to shareable resources, trust, and collaborative logistics, on the one hand. On 
the other hand, it discusses resource sharing in logistics, enterprise collaboration, 
nature of trust, and determinants of trust in collaborative logistics. The chapter ends 
by summarizing main addressed issues, but also the concluding remarks. On the 
overall, the descriptions and discussions throughout this chapter form a crucial 
clarity of the analysis and discussions of the entire dissertation. 
2.1 Shareable Resources in Logistics 
In recent years the concept of sharing has grown from a community-based practice 
into a profitable business model (Böckmann, 2013). This sharing features in the 
models of Business-to-Business (B2B), Business-to-Consumer (B2C), and 
Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C). The B2B involves sharing among enterprises while 
the B2C comprises of companies providing, for example, logistics assets or services 
to individual consumers. The C2C comprises peers who share assets or services such 
as the warehouses, accommodation, and vehicles (trucks). In their entirety, these 
profitable business models enjoy emerged digital platforms, which facilitate 
matchmaking and coordination. The use of digital platforms reduces the scale for 
viable hiring transactions or participation in consumer hiring markets (Goudin, 
2016), among others. 
Various areas such as the consumption, manufacturing, and logistics seem to 
characterize the re-emerged sharing of resources. As well, the literature appears to 
use various terms to describe and discuss resource sharing. The terms include the 
collaborative sharing (Gonzalez-Feliu & Morana, 2011), sharing economy (Goudin, 
2016), and collaborative consumption (Buczynski, 2013). The latter two are popular 
because they mostly involve sharing through renting idle or underutilized resources. 
Moreover, according to Gesing (2017), resource sharing in logistics emerges under 
the multi-customer and discreet urban warehouses, community goods on-demand, 
transport capacity, on-demand staffing, and data. In manufacturing, every 
production resource such as the specialized machine, or a whole production line can 
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constitute a shared resource (Kück et al., 2016). As far as this dissertation is inclined 
to shareable resources in logistics, the subsection 2.1.1 presents an overview of such 
resources, benefits of sharing, and associated trust challenges. 
2.1.1 Overview 
Logistics sector faces obvious problems of resource scarcity and underutilization, 
for example, in semi-filled trucks (Schönberger, Kopfer, & Kotzab, 2016). 
Basically, one can encounter the underutilization of resources when individuals and 
companies utilize only part of resource capacities they own while incurring same 
costs as if such resource has undergone utilization fully. There are many reasons 
accounting for scarcity and underutilization of resources, especially in logistics. 
According to Schönberger et al. (2016), three trends that have led to the scarcity and 
underutilization of resources are: continued deregulation of markets; increasing 
prices for energy consumption and emission, but also; increasing pressure to 
internalize external costs. The need to share the scarce or underutilized logistics 
resources seems to be fueled by other causes such as the globalization and population 
growth. According to Delfmann and Jaekel (2012), the globalization has caused 
multi-staged logistics systems, whereas the growth of world population has 
increased demand for more logistics services. Similarly, today’s logistics systems 
are characterized by many logistics objects and their manifold parameters (Schuldt, 
Hribernik, Gehrke, Thoben, & Herzog, 2011); transient customer demands and 
changes within the environment, and; globally and individualized distribution in 
small shipments (Hribernik, Warden, Thoben, & Otthein, 2010; Schuldt et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, the population has increased, it consumes more than ever before while 
waste it produces has nowhere to go (Buczynski, 2013). 
Therefore, in this context, collaboration in sharing logistics resources remains a very 
significant agenda that is expected to play a useful role to reduce resulting impacts 
on logistics systems. When parties go sharing: individualized products/services may 
be less expensive to deliver, while; improving planning of delivery route and 
synchronization of variant information sources. Transient demands (especially in 
small shipments) may need intelligent facilities to support customary sorting in 
warehouses. Instead of meeting such expensive needs on an individual basis, 
companies may opt to share warehouse and sorting facilities to reduce operational 
and investment costs. Equally, combining distinct delivery routes can help to serve 
energy consumption, and consequently, decrease waste resulting from engine 
combustion.  
The efficient collaboration in sharing logistics resources encounters several 
challenges. Challenges involve issues such as the safety, complexity, and 
uncertainty. According to Buczynski (2013), stepping outside a familiar framework 
of usage of resources makes people feel uncomfortable, but also; people have fear 
about possible adverse outcomes such as the theft, strangers, and intrusion of 
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privacy.  As well, shareable logistics resources are challenged to increasing 
complexity in planning and less freedom in decision-making, and; a need to process 
and analyze more data from collaborative partners compared to use same resources 
within a company (Baalsrud Hauge et al., 2014). Equally, there are uncertainties 
concerning the shrinking time-windows for deliveries, customized order bookings, 
and many packaging types (Nilsson, 2006). Other uncertainties Nilsson emphasizes 
are such as the variations in many products per pallet and per order, increased 
frequency of deliveries, increased product variants, and less volume per order. 
In due of all outlined challenges, the primary challenge is the lack of trust. This 
primary challenge aligns to what Goudin (2016) emphasizes, that the critical 
challenge to the growth of the sharing economy is the need to establish trust. In view 
of this, Goudin maintains that consumers need to trust that: delivery of services will 
be according to normal standards; they will receive adequate compensation in case 
of unmet expectation, and; maintenance to their safety and security is a priority.  
2.1.2 Types 
There are many types of shareable resources in logistics. One can derive typical 
shareable resources by considering the areas (parts) of a logistics system. The 
logistics system comprises of six parts: transportation, information systems, 
customer service, warehousing, inventory, and material management. Out of those 
parts, resource sharing is most feasible in transportation, information systems, 
warehousing, and on-demand staffing (an emerging area). Other areas such as 
material management have potentials to offer when partners go for shareable 
packaging. In the overall, sharing in logistics entails the physical, non-physical, and 
human resources. The sharing of physical resources involves a joint usage of 
tangible assets such as the vehicles (trucks), warehouses, distribution centers, and 
machinery equipment (Gci & Capgemini, 2008; Gorenflo, 2010; Weinelt, 2016) 
(Figure 3). By sharing warehouses, for example, firms can benefit from cost 
synergies and greater flexibility (Weinelt, 2016). Other shareable tangible assets 
include containers, machinery, and sorting and packaging infrastructures. Given 
those tangible resources, firms may share logistics infrastructures to sort and 
combine various products (goods) before shipping to customers and retailers. Such 
infrastructures are potentially shareable because their deployment, especially on the 
individual basis is difficult and expensive. 
The non-physical assets are intangible assets such as the data, information, 
supporting processes (Pomponi, Fratocchi, & Tafuri, 2015), as well as logistics 
services (Figure 3). Information is a non-physical shareable resource (Gci & 
Capgemini, 2008; Gorenflo, 2010) that drives and makes logistics systems 
functional. It is the core resource that has to be shared among collaborating parties 
to accomplish planning, management, and implementation of logistics functions. 
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Shareable resources in logistics
Physical resources Non-physical resources
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Sorting and packaging 
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On-Demand Staffing
Machineries
 
Figure 3: Shareable resources in logistics 
Moreover, partners may share logistics services offered under cloud computing 
(Figure 3). These services include the Platform as a Service (PaaS), Software as a 
Service (SaaS), and Logistics Business Process as a Service (BPaaS). The PaaS is a 
layer in clouds that provide essential services in the form of the platform 
(framework) (Schuldt, Hribernik, Gehrke, Thoben, & Herzog, 2010) that can be used 
to simulate various logistics scenarios and simplify their deployment. The SaaS may, 
for example, provide shareable digital platforms to facilitate matchmaking among 
suppliers and consumers of shareable assets. The BPaaS facilitates a bundling of 
several logistics cloud services from different vendors and providers, to produce a 
directly useable logistics turnkey application (ALICE, 2014). As well, sharing is 
seen to emerge in human resources. In recent years, human-beings have started to 
offer skills and personal time through shareable modes, facilitated by digital 
platforms (Gesing, 2017). In the US, according to Gesig, about 34% of the workforce 
work as freelancers, revealing that there is a fundamental shift in attitudes about 
flexibility in workforces. Although a wide range of shareable resources exists, this 
dissertation, in its present form, concentrate much on resource sharing that involves 
warehouses (and distribution centers), vehicles (trucks), and information (Figure 3). 
These resources are also classified in (Pomponi, Fratocchi, Tafuri, & Palumbo, 
2013) as logistics shareable assets at the operational and tactical level of 
collaborative logistics. 
There are many approaches needed to support resource sharing in logistics. On 
account of the decision-making processes and hierarchical structures, approaches to 
supporting resource sharing in logistics may consist of (Gonzalez-Feliu & Morana, 
2011): 
 Collaborative sharing with hierarchical decision making –where usually, 
users assume responsibilities on managing shared resources. A hierarchy has 
to be established to help in managing and guiding the collaborative sharing. 
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As well, the hierarchy supports central decisions which a manager or a small 
group of stakeholders undertakes; 
 Collaborative sharing with non-hierarchical decision making –is a more co-
operative approach where all users take part in the decision processes. The 
management can be given to a third party, for example, the broker, but all 
stakeholders are directly and equally involved in decisions. 
Thus, drawing from types of sharing approaches, a distinction may be established 
between “sharing” and “collaborative sharing.” Sharing means permitting someone 
to use what belongs to others. Collaboration means merely two or more entities work 
together to achieve a common goal. Accordingly, whereas the sharing may involve 
allowing a party to use a resource without mutual benefits, collaborative sharing 
draws on the joint usage of a resource that mutually benefits all parties involved. 
Therefore, in this respect, collaborative sharing can be referred to as an act that 
involves parties to use a resource jointly in a form that mutually benefits all those 
parties involved. 
2.2 Integrated Partnerships in Logistics and Supply Chain 
Since the era of the open-market transaction, a degree of integration of production 
factors has been increasing. The present era has witnessed such integration in the 
form of cooperation as well as collaboration, particularly in logistics and supply 
chain. Following this, the current section describes an evolutionary change of such 
integration towards collaboration (subsection 2.2.1). It subsequently introduces in 
short features of integrated partnerships (subsection 2.2.2) that are necessary to 
characterize the role trust plays in collaborative sharing of logistics resources 
(subsection 2.2.3). 
2.2.1 Transition towards Collaboration 
The objects of integration such as the coordination, cooperation, collaboration, 
extended and virtual enterprises resulted from a transition on a continuum in 
production factors. This transition dates back to the era of market transactions. 
Looking back on the nature of the firms (Coase, 1937) and economics of firms 
(Williamson, 1981); orchestration of transactions has shifted from markets’ 
transactions to authority. Under the authority orchestrated transactions, different 
production factors were integrated to achieve delivery of intended goods and 
services. However, because of the economic, environmental, and social pressures, 
there has been an increase in the level of integration of production factors. In 
manufacturing, for example, some of the pressures placed on enterprise emerge from 
reality that (Browne et al., 1995): manufacturing now takes place in a global 
economy; with manufacturing systems obliged to develop environmentally benign 
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products and processes, and; where business and organizational structures are under 
increasing stresses. Due to this, and in the appeal of levels of integration and 
interaction of production factors, the orchestration of transactions has evolved from 
the open-market negotiations to coordination, cooperation, and finally to 
collaboration (Figure 4). 
CollaborationCooperationCoordinationOpen Market Negotiations
 Price-based discussions
 Adversarial relationships
 Win-lose approach
 Little investment
 Less information sharing 
and interactions
 One-time, short term 
goals
 Little self interest
 Operational risk as key 
concern
 Managing task 
interdependencies and 
uncertainties
 Fewer supplies
 Long-term contracts
 Shared goals
 Relationship risk as key 
concern
 Managing resource 
dependencies
 Supply chain integration
 Joint planning
 Technology sharing
 Joint responsibility
 Mutual objectives
 Win-win approach
Low level of integration High level of integration
 
Figure 4: Transition towards collaboration3 
The first stage, open-market negotiations, was featured with adversarial (arm’s 
length) relationships and least information sharing. Succeeding the open-market 
negotiations is the coordination and cooperation. Whereas as the former refers to a 
deliberate and orderly alignment of partners’ actions to achieve jointly determined 
goals; the latter refers to a joint pursuit of an agreed-on goal in a manner 
corresponding to a shared understanding about contributions and payoffs (Gulati, 
Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012). Unlike the preceding two objects, a recent 
evolutionary stage (collaboration) has taken various forms, including the supply 
chain collaboration, collaborative logistics, but also the extended and virtual 
enterprises. In itself, collaboration is understood as the exchange of information, 
altering activities, and enhancing the capacity of another to attain mutual benefit on 
a common purpose (Himmelman, 2001). Kozar (2010) differentiates between 
cooperation and collaboration. She emphasizes that under cooperation, partners can 
perform their assigned responsibilities separately and bring their results to the table, 
while; under the collaboration, partners are involved in the direct interaction among 
each other to achieve common goals thereby negotiating and accommodating others’ 
perspectives. 
In the supply chain, collaboration refers to a partnership process involving two or 
more independent firms that work closely in planning and executing supply chain 
operations to achieve common goals and mutual benefits (Cao & Zhang, 2011). In 
logistics, collaboration seeks to increase information visibility, but also synchronize 
                                                             
3 It is has to be noted that Figure 4 is partly adapted from (Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 
2012; Spekman, Kamauff, & Myhr, 1998; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008). 
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the planning and coordination of workflows. A critical concern is why collaboration 
is vital to companies? 
Collaboration is vital because no company can individually be competitive and 
provide the spectrum of products, and services around products to satisfy today’s 
customer demands (Sitek, Seifert, & Klaus-Dieter, 2010). In due of this, 
collaboration has become a core trading mechanism, and its establishment has 
adopted many evolutionary initiatives (Cheng, Chen, & Mao, 2010). This evolution 
has particularly blurred enterprise boundaries to the extent that partnerships with 
suppliers, clients, and even competitors have become commonplace (Browne et al., 
1995). Some of those partnerships can emerge in the form of the extended and virtual 
enterprises, which appear to differ slightly with those of logistics and supply chain 
collaboration. For example, in the extended enterprise's relationships, firms are 
linked as learning organizations (Spekman & Davis, 2016), which is somehow 
different from collaboration in logistics and supply chain. In a context of similarity, 
enterprise networks occur when two or more participating enterprises are involved 
in the supply and receipt of goods or services on a regular and on-going basis (Jagdev 
& Thoben, 2001). Typical extended enterprises are characterized (Braziotis, 
Tannock, & Bourlakis, 2016): as the advanced form of the supply chain; with a focus 
on the product value chain for the entire product lifecycle; with an enhanced 
competitive capability, and; with an approach that focuses on exchanging 
information and knowledge. Supply network is another form of integration that is 
closely related to supply chain. In their distinctive features, supply networks consist 
of non-linear and dynamic structures, and their integration is more ad hoc (Braziotis, 
Bourlakis, Rogers, & Tannock, 2013) than those of the supply chain. 
2.2.2 Features of Integrated Partnerships and a Need for Trust 
Integration involves cross-functional interactions, which can result in intense 
relationships internal to the company and external to other companies (Chen, 
Daugherty, & Roath, 2009). The critical components of integration include the 
interaction, and information flow and business process linkage (Wong & Boon-Itt, 
2008). According to Kwon and Suh (2005), supply chain integration links all 
participating players throughout the chain, and its success depends on shared 
information and trust. It incorporates customers and suppliers into a cohesive supply 
network, characterized by information sharing, and interdependence (Huang, Yen, 
& Liu, 2014). 
Basically, integration occurs in three dimensions: supplier integration, customer 
integration, and internal integration (Schoenherr & Swink, 2012; Srinivasan & 
Swink, 2015). Supplier integration refers, to a degree, to which a company 
incorporates information about its supplier’s capabilities into its planning and 
execution (Srinivasan & Swink, 2015). This integration represents a change in 
attitude away from one of the adversaries to one of the collaborations (Wong & 
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Boon-Itt, 2008). The customer integration is the extent to which organization 
incorporates customer requirements into its planning and execution; and it involves 
information sharing on production planning, inventory levels, and deliveries, and 
demand (Srinivasan & Swink, 2015). The internal integration requires full system 
visibility from the point of purchasing to distribution within an organization to 
achieve customer satisfaction (Wong & Boon-Itt, 2008). Benefits of integrating 
chain activities are such as the ability to reduce costs and inventories, alignment of 
customer requirements, and improving competitiveness and responsiveness.  
The chain integration has been implemented using many initiatives. It has been 
implemented using various models such as the: Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI), 
Continuous Replenishment Programs (CRP), and Collaborative Planning, 
Forecasting, and Replenishment (CFPR). Fundamentally, these models stand on 
information integration, which is highly supported by ICTs to update manufacturers 
and retailers, and even other 3PL members. Under the VMI, the manufacturer has 
an authority to manage inventory of the retailer, while; under the CRP buyers and 
suppliers share inventory status to increase replenishment frequencies and reduce 
inventory (Yao & Dresner, 2008). 
The outlined features of integrated partnerships depend on the existence of mutual 
commitment and trust. One of the reasons for this dependency is that such 
partnership relationships, especially those on customer and supplier (external 
integration) span beyond the organizational boundaries. This span occurs because 
one organization can hardly accomplish its goals without relying on others in the 
chain. In realizing inter-organizational integration, participant organizations have to 
share their information with one another, while expecting to gain relative benefits 
out of it. However, integration may impose uncertainties (risks). Particularly in 
logistics, integration imposes many uncertainties. It may remain unclear, for 
example, that: all participant organizations (partners) will play a game trustworthily; 
shared information will be used as intended, and; partners will gain benefits they 
expected. In a viewpoint of these dilemmas, the success of integration has to stand 
upon a foundation of trust. It is for this reason that the next subsection presents a 
discussion on role trust plays in collaborative logistics and resource sharing. 
2.2.3 Role of Trust in Resource Sharing and Collaborative Logistics 
Compared to a formal mechanism, relational governance mechanism characterizes 
mostly the collaboration in sharing logistics resources. The relational mechanism 
comprises of the social mechanics of commitment, reputation, and trust. On account 
of this, models that support and facilitate the integration of logistics activities depend 
much on trust. Trust plays a crucial role in bonding together suppliers and customers. 
This role is even more vital, especially when customers and suppliers exchange 
information beyond their internal boundaries. Exchanged information has to be 
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reliable and bear integrity required to facilitate production planning, management of 
inventory, deliveries, and demand. 
However, a dilemma surrounding any collaborative relationship is that with close 
interactions comes a fear of opportunism where some partners may acts in their self-
interest to the detriment of others (Spekman & Davis, 2003). In this context, 
Spekman and Davis assert that if partners are to share sensitive information, they 
need an assurance that use of such information will be as intended. Additionally, 
there can arise a possibility that partners can share modified data that denies 
visibility and reality. The modification of data may occur when partners attempt to 
avoid disclosure of their business model through reporting slightly modified 
information. There are other uncertainties encountered when partners share logistics 
resources collaboratively. The uncertainties include fairness of methods used 
dividing costs and gains, as well as synchronizing distributed processes and 
decisions. In addition, Chopra and Meindl (2010) emphasize that some partners may 
have local focus and decision, and engage in information processing that leads to a 
distortion of demand information. In essence, the existence of mutual trust mitigates 
many of these challenges, and consequently, may motivate and strengthen initiatives 
geared towards collaborative sharing. 
2.3 Nature of Trust 
The role and significance of trust backups from a context of dependence that is 
commonly prevalent in relational exchanges. Typically, this dependence occurs in a 
situation where one party experiences difficulties in achieving its goals without 
relying on another party. This reliance is beneficial in case execution to transaction 
goes in a manner the trustor expects. If execution of the transaction proceeds 
unexpectedly, the prior established reliance turns out to be a risk. In some 
transactions, risks are recoverable while in others, restoration is entirely impossible. 
In due of this, trust makes sense in situations of dependence and where the execution 
of transaction seems risk-worthy. By risk-worthy, it means that the transaction bears 
possibilities of both the certainty and risks. 
Two conditions, namely: risk and interdependence (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer, 1998; Williamson, 1993) characterize trust in relationships. The first 
condition, risk, originates from the uncertain intention of the other party (Rousseau 
et al. 1998). This uncertainty arises because the trustor has incomplete information 
on the subject it desires to trust, at a moment of undertaking trusting decisions. The 
second condition, interdependence, implies that interests of one party can difficultly 
be achieved without relying upon another party (Rousseau et al. 1998). 
Strengthening the value of the outlined trust conditions depends on possible 
vulnerabilities that arise in trusting situations. Li (2012) emphasizes that trust tend 
to matter the most when uncertainty, vulnerability, and long-term interdependence 
are high. Likewise, according to Nguyen and Liem (2013), trust is characterized by 
2.3   Nature of Trust 
22 
risk, vulnerability, expectation, and confidence in the belief that trustee will perform 
in the manner predicted. Comprehending on arguments in (Li, 2012; Nguyen & 
Liem, 2013; Rousseau et al., 1998; Williamson, 1993), the risk, interdependence, 
expectations, and vulnerabilities situate (qualify) trust in interpersonal and inter-firm 
relationships. 
Towards realizing these trust conditions in their entirety, a critical requirement is to 
formalize in which object (actor of conception) is a notion of trust embedded within 
(Figure 5). Ideally, trust exists as embedded within the trustor and trustee objects. 
The trustor object is an actor who desires to assume trust (rely on another actor). 
Conversely, the trustee object is the actor who is to be trusted (be relied upon). 
Conceptualizing on these two opponent contexts, when trust is embedded within the 
trustor, its meaning differs significantly to when trust is embedded within the trustee. 
Trust as embedded within trustor is conceptualized as feelings and emotions; while 
trust, as embedded within the trustee, may mainly be conceptualized as competence, 
ability, and expertise (Laeequddin, Sahay, Sahay, & Waheed, 2012) (Figure 5). 
Trustor 
object
P
Trust
Q
Trustee 
object
P
Q
Trust
Trustee 
object
{ Competence, Ability, Expertise,  }
Trustor 
object
{ Feelings, Emotions, }
Trust as embedded within a trustor Trust as embedded within a trustee
 
Figure 5: Trust embeddedness within actors 
Conceptualizing and operationalizing trust as embedded within the trustor, 
especially in engineering sciences, remains uneasy, due to operational difficulties 
faced in measuring and assessing constructs like feelings and emotions. In due to 
this claim, Li (2012) maintains that the notion of trust as mental attitude is 
insufficient. He instead proposes to understand trust-as-choice or decision about 
trusting behavior. The trust-as-choice requires embedding trust within the trustee. 
This embeddedness appears similar to what (Möllering, 2006) describes as trust 
manifestation between the trusting attitude and trustful behavior. 
To this end, the present dissertation proposes and advances on the notion of trust as 
embedded within the trustee. Alongside this orientation, trust is conceptualized to 
result from trustworthy behavior and involves idealized rational decisions and 
choices than attitudes. This proposition is concordant with that of Li (2012) who 
affirm that trust-as-choice: involves behavior in trust-related exchanges; extends 
beyond a propensity to trust, and; captures dynamic nature of trust. This 
understanding is partly consistent with a layered notion of trust in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Trust stages and layers (Source: Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010) 
With the layered notion of trust, Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) theorize that trust:  
a) In its basic sense to be just a mental, cognitive attitude and disposition;  
b) In its richer use, to be a decision and intention based on that disposition;  
c) To be the act of relying upon other’s expected behavior, and;  
d) To be the consequent overt social interaction and relation to other parties. 
The first proposition is too psychological and thus challenging to unveil under 
computational settings. Due to this difficulty, it is prominent to substantiate that 
trust-as-decision or choice remains vividly feasible in the remaining principles. Due 
to this feasibility, in its characterization, trust consists of intention, decision, 
reliance, and behavioral expectation occurring in interactions such those featured in 
the socio-economic arena. 
Furthermore, to accomplish discussions of this subsection the following 
terms/concepts: trustor, trustee, and trust are defined as follows. Trustor is an entity 
that develops a degree of reliance on another object and accepts to be vulnerable to 
possible actions of that other object. Similarly, the trustee is the party in whom the 
trust resides, who has the opportunity to take advantage of the trustor’s 
vulnerabilities (Laeequddin et al., 2012). Moreover, trust is a multidisciplinary 
construct that is critical to human’s many and daily interactions. Due to this 
multidisciplinary nature of trust, until recently, a generalized theory of trust is still 
not reached. On account of this, there are diverse definitions of trust in literature. 
Despite this diversity, a particular consensus is somehow getting to a table. In 
general, the trust may refer, to a degree (level of confidence or expectation) to which 
the trustee will perform in a manner the trustor expects. To be more specific, this 
dissertation adapts the definition of trust in (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
According to authors’ definition, trust is a level of confidence a trustor–party 
develops in a trustee–party based on the expectation that the trustee–party will 
2.4   Trust Determinants in Collaborative Sharing of Logistics Resources 
24 
perform a particular action necessary to the trustor–party, irrespective of the ability 
to monitor or control the trustee–party. 
2.4 Trust Determinants in Collaborative Sharing of Logistics Resources 
Determinants of trust are elements, behavior, criteria, or factors, which characterize 
trust in relationships. These determinants vary depending on a domain in which 
trusting relationships befall. Determinants of hard-trust in computer-network 
relationships (interactions) are such as the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and 
privacy. Unlike the trusting relationships in computer-network interactions, trust 
determinants in collaborative logistics (and supply chain) are different.  
There are many determinants of trust in literature, which account for trusting 
relationships to collaboration in sharing logistics resources. In analyzing such 
determinants, a preliminary classification needs to be carried out. The goal of this 
classification is to figure out whether a particular determinant of trust contains a 
large part of the behavioral elements or not. On account of the present context, 
behavior implies a set of actions and decisions, which collaborating partners can 
undertake in collaboration. The ruling to behavioral and non-behavioral elements 
backs up from the problem statement already presented in section 1.2. That, the 
present work concentrates on investigating trust uncertainties that result from partner 
behavior under the influence of collaborative logistics processes. To this effect and 
in a standpoint of determinants of trust, two streams emerge. The first stream refers 
to trust determinants, which focus more on partner behavior (behavioral-oriented). 
The second stream refers to trust determinants, which contain least elements of 
partner behavior (non-behavioral). In enriching this further, the behavioral-oriented 
stream depicts trust determinants, which involve various sets of partner’s actions, 
interactions, and decisions, whereas; non-behavioral stream depicts determinants, 
which lack this requirement. 
A survey of the literature was conducted to establish determinants of trust (factors) 
which influence collaboration and resource sharing in logistics4. Apart from 
collaborative logistics, the survey involved other areas such as the supply chain, 
manufacturing, and business. For this reason, factors synthesized from literature do 
not only apply to collaborative logistics. Furthermore, specifications were provided 
to screen factors between behavioral and non-behavioral oriented streams, and; 
establish preliminarily how each behavioral factor can influence partner trust. In the 
end, results from the survey on the literature unveiled a total of nine (9) factors. The 
factors are commitment, capability, information sharing, communication, asset 
specificity, joint knowledge creation, incentive alignment, bargaining power, and 
                                                             
4 Daudi, M., Baalsrud Hauge, J., & Thoben, K.-D. (2016a). Behavioral factors influencing partner 
trust in logistics collaboration: a review. Logistics Research, 9(1), 19.  
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opportunism (Table 1). Each trust determinant is briefly discussed and deliberated 
on whether it constitutes the behavioral or non-behavioral stream. 
Commitment 
Commitment constitutes crucial elements in social exchanges among collaborating 
partners. It refers to an exchange partner who believes that an ongoing relationship 
is worth working on to ensure that it endures indefinitely (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). 
In a context of collaborative paradigm, commitment appears to be a form of a belief, 
which may drive a trustee-partner to fulfill tasks delegated to it, in a way that 
conforms to expectations of a trustor-partner. However, a fundamental question is 
whether commitment influence trust or trust influences commitment. According to 
Asawasakulsorn (2009) and Kwon and Suh (2004), there is a definite relationship 
between trust level and degree of commitment, whereby trust influences 
commitment. According to Seppänen, Blomqvist, and Sundqvist (2007) trust is 
potentially a reciprocal construct because it is both, a cause and partly an effect. 
Therefore, on the one hand, the presence of trust causes entities to develop more 
commitment. On the other hand, when entities perceive that commitment exists they 
relatively develop more trust. Henceforth, in a context of collaborative logistics, and 
in concordance to Asawasakulsorn (2009) and Kwon and Suh (2004), it may be 
posited that trust influences commitment. This argument rests upon a fact that, 
usually entities have to trust before they develop commitment. With this 
establishment, commitment is least considered a factor that can influence 
collaborating behavior and subsequently trust. 
Table 1: Determinants of trust (factors) to collaboration in logistics 
Capability 
Capability in collaboration is mainly applied when searching and selecting partners. 
It refers to competence or work standard, skill, knowledge, and ability to fulfill a 
promise, agreement or obligation (Tejpal et al., 2013). Partner’s capability 
Determinant Literature 
Commitment (Jones, Fawcett, Fawcett, & Wallin, 2010; Ouzrout, Chaze, Lavastre, 
Dominguez, & Akhter, 2013; Skandrani, Triki, & Baratli, 2011; Wu, Chuang, 
& Hsu, 2014) 
Capability (Laeequddin et al., 2012; Skandrani et al., 2011; Tejpal, Garg, & Sachdeva, 
2013) 
Information sharing (Chen, Yen, Rajkumar, & Tomochko, 2011; Kwon & Suh, 2004; Skandrani et 
al., 2011; Wu et al., 2014; Yin & Zhao, 2008) 
Communication (Cao & Zhang, 2011, 2013; Su, Song, Li, & Dang, 2008) 
Asset specificity (Jeng & Mortel, 2010; Kwon & Suh, 2004) 
Joint knowledge creation (Cao & Zhang, 2011, 2013) 
Incentive alignment (Cao & Zhang, 2011; Cruijssen, 2006; Wang & Kopfer, 2011; Xu, 2013) 
Bargaining power (Cruijssen, 2006; Jones et al., 2010; Kwon & Suh, 2004; Xu, 2013) 
Opportunism (Hudnurkar, Jakhar, & Rathod, 2014; Ouzrout et al., 2013; Tejpal et al., 2013; 
Wang & Kopfer, 2011) 
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applicable during the search and selection is unassociated with partner’s behavior, 
but mainly the competence of the partner. To this end, arguably, the capability in 
collaboration can characterize (describe and represent) behavior of collaborating 
partners in the least satisfactory manner. 
Information Sharing and Communication 
Information sharing and communication appear well-known issues concerning 
collaboration and trust. According to Kumar and Nath Banerjee (2014), information 
sharing is an act of capturing and disseminating timely and relevant information for 
decision-makers to plan and control supply chain operations. In similar 
understanding, Cao and Zhang (2011) define communication as contact and message 
transmission process among supply chain partners, which concerns issue related to 
the frequency, direction, mode, and influence strategy. Subject to requirements of 
collaboration and resource sharing, a critical question is whether information sharing 
and communication influence collaboration and trust. According to Kottila and 
Rönni (2008), high frequency of communication is not an indication of collaboration 
and is less significant than the quality of communication in the creation of the trust. 
With this view in mind, information sharing can better characterize the behavior of 
the partner compared to communication. Meaning that partner’s actions and 
decisions associated with the information sharing are worthy to reveal useful insights 
related to trusting than those associated with the frequency of communication. 
Asset Specificity and Joint Knowledge 
The asset specificity and joint knowledge creation constitute fundamental issues in 
supply chain and collaborative logistics. Asset specificity is a transaction-specific 
investment involving physical or human assets that are dedicated to a particular 
relationship, and which cannot be redeployed easily (Heide, 1994). Level of asset 
specificity may imply partners’ commitment and trustworthy in sharing resources 
especially when underlying resources are uneasy to redeploy. Moreover, joint 
knowledge creation is the extent to which supply chain partners develop a better 
understanding of and response in the market and competitive environment by 
working together (Cao & Zhang, 2011; Malhotra, Gosain, & El Sawy, 2005). Upon 
examining further these issue, asset specificity is least related to the behavior of 
partners but an investment. Correspondingly, there may exist significant limitations 
about how to represent partner behavior in a perspective of investment. In reference 
to joint knowledge, partner behavior is highly recognized at the operational level; 
whereas joint knowledge creation focuses primarily on the strategic level. To this 
end, it is thus insufficient to qualify joint knowledge creation as the behavioral factor 
in the operational level of collaborative logistics. 
Incentive Alignment, Bargaining Power, and Opportunism 
Literature considers the incentive alignment, bargaining power, and opportunism as 
significant concerns that impede collaboration and trust. The incentive alignment is 
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understood as a process of sharing costs, risks, and benefits (savings) among partners 
(Hudnurkar et al., 2014). Equally, bargaining power is an ability of a person, group, 
or organization to exert influence over another party to impress outcome of the 
negotiation and achieve a favorable deal (Xu, 2013). Moreover, Ouzrout, Chaze, 
Lavastre, Dominguez, and Akhter (2010) refer to opportunism as a particular form 
of the inconsistency of purpose; involving disclosure of incomplete/misleading 
information, especially calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, or cause 
confusion. In a viewpoint of opportunism, Spekman and Davis (2004) emphasize 
that a dilemma surrounding any collaborative relationship is a fear that one partner 
will act in its self-interest to the detriment of others. 
In summary, four determinants are deliberately formalized and qualified to 
constitute the stream of behavioral factors that influence trust. The behavioral factors 
are information sharing, incentive scheme, bargaining power (decision 
synchronization), and opportunism. Section 4.1 presents further discussion on how 
each factor influences trust.  
2.5 Research Problem in a Broader-Spectrum 
The current section presents in a broad-view a discussion on challenges of trust to 
collaboration in sharing logistics resources. The discussion focuses on considering 
how existing literature has dealt with this problem. Furthermore, the discussion 
furnishes an understanding of the context, motivation, and problem statement in a 
wider-view. It is also worthy to note that the discussion in this section carries a 
multidisciplinary perspective. The multidisciplinary perspective arises due to a fact 
that, literature contributions that address trust problems originate from many areas. 
The discussion continues by considering the following. The first consideration 
entails extents to which current approaches and mechanisms can address the trust 
problem. Second, a degree to which literature contributions cannot solve the outlined 
research problem constitutes a research gap. Such research gap formalizes a core 
basis of the research problem on which this dissertation contributes. Moreover, 
before analyzing and discussing literature contributions, a reference is made to 
behavioral factors influencing trust in collaborative sharing of logistics resources. 
As highlighted previously, trust uncertainties impede the collaboration in sharing 
logistics resources. Collaborating partners encounter mostly such uncertainties 
when: searching for a partner; bargaining towards agreements, and; enforcing 
collaborative agreements. Trust uncertainties encountered during the bargaining and 
enforcement stem, mainly from partner behavior and underlying collaborative 
logistics processes. Explaining this in short, first, collaborative logistics demands 
information visibility across an entire chain. In due to this demand, the quality of 
data uses in the process, and possible misuse procreates trust uncertainties. Second, 
trust uncertainties arise in respect of an extent to which methods (mechanisms) to 
divide costs and gains may reasonably be accepted. Third, the act of synchronizing 
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complex group-wise decision-making to a compromise, especially when partners 
establish individual preferences, which are incompatible, pose additional complexity 
and trust uncertainties. Fourth, opportunism becomes high because of fear that some 
partners might be involved with hidden and incongruent purposes (extended 
discussions in section 4.1). 
It is noteworthy to recognize contributions from the literature that has dealt with trust 
the problem. This recognition goes in parallel with the identification of underlying 
limitations. The recognition may be looked on from perspectives of contributions, 
which originate from collaborative logistics; supply chain collaboration, and; other 
related areas. An overall goal is to explore solutions proposed from all possible 
angles. Henceforth, literature which addresses trust issues, mostly in logistics, 
supply chain, and other areas were surveyed and analyzed. In the final analysis, 
Table 2 presents the: literature analyzed; focus on that literature; methods used to 
study the trust and related problem, as well as; results or findings and 
recommendations. 
On the overall, the literature on trust in collaboration has mostly focused on: 
 Addressing the the nature, roles, antecedents, and determinants of trust aimed 
to overcome the opportunism, alliance failure, and subsequently build trust 
(Cao & Zhang, 2013; Chen et al., 2011; Day, Fawcett, Fawcett, & Magnan, 
2013; Jones et al., 2010; Jones, Fawcett, Wallin, Fawcett, & Brewer, 2014; 
Madlberger, 2008; Skandrani et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2014); 
 Proposing approaches for measuring trust (Ha, Park, & Cho, 2011; 
Laeequddin et al., 2010) and select collaborating partners in a formation stage 
(Asawasakulsorn, 2009; Seifert, 2009). 
 Investigating the impact of trust on collaborative processes (Ha et al., 2011; 
Hossain & Ouzrout, 2012; Jeng & Mortel, 2010; Madlberger, 2008; Wu et al., 
2014) and managerial ties (Wang, Ye, & Tan, 2014).  
 Studying dynamics underlying trusting attitudes and trusting actions (Huang 
& Wilkinson, 2014), as well as the influence and relationships between trust 
and other collaborative dimensions (Asawasakulsorn, 2015; Chen et al., 2011; 
Ha et al., 2011; Jeng & Mortel, 2010; Kwon & Suh, 2004; Mlaker Kač, 
Gorenak, & Potočan, 2015). 
Table 2: Literature addressing trust problem and related areas 
Article Focus Method Results / Findings / Recommendations 
(Huang & 
Wilkinson, 2014) 
Dynamics in trusting 
attitudes and trusting 
actions 
A case study 
using the 
interview 
Trust is really useful when trusting actions occur 
Recommending on the outcome of trust 
uncertainties 
(Jeng & Mortel, Impact of trust on the Survey using Trust affect the level of collaborative processes 
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Article Focus Method Results / Findings / Recommendations 
2010) level of collaborative 
processes 
questionnaire practiced by firms with their suppliers 
Trust is positively related to asset specificity and 
collaborative processes 
(Madlberger, 
2008) 
Antecedents of 
inter-organizational 
information sharing 
Survey using 
questionnaire 
Trust in the trading partners do not positively 
impact the strategic and operational information 
sharing behavior 
(Kwon & Suh, 
2004) 
Testing a relationship 
between trust and 
commitment 
empirically 
Survey using 
questionnaire 
Behavioral uncertainty decreases the level of trust 
Information sharing lowers the degree of 
behavioral uncertainty and indirectly improve the 
level of trust 
A model that can span interactions regarding trust 
is indeed required for a complete understanding 
of trust in supply chain partnerships 
(Chen et al., 
2011) 
Role of information 
sharing, quality, and 
availability of trust in 
collaboration 
Survey using 
questionnaire 
Levels of the information quality and availability 
are positively related to a trust level  
Information sharing is positively related to 
commitment 
Information quality and availability play a 
positive role in building trust 
(Skandrani et al., 
2011) 
Determinant and 
manifestations of trust 
in supply chains 
Survey using 
interview 
Trust manifests in risk-taking, demonstrating a 
preference for a partner, and confidential 
information sharing 
(Jones et al., 
2010) 
Facets of supply chain 
trust and its multi-
faceted measure 
A survey using 
interview and 
literature review 
Most companies lack the know-how and ability 
to develop high levels of trust 
The necessity of trust cycle within the context of 
an exchange cycle 
(Hossain & 
Ouzrout, 2012) 
Modeling trust in 
supply chain 
management 
MAS simulation Level of trust impact directly level and quality of 
information sharing 
(Jones et al., 
2014) 
Role, influence, and 
measurement of trust 
in supply chain 
alliances 
Survey using 
interview and 
questionnaire 
Performance can be improved when partners 
pursue trust-based collaboration and demonstrate 
trustworthiness 
Role of trustworthiness signaling as a proactive 
means of developing trust 
(Ha et al., 2011) Measure trust and 
investigate the effect 
of trust on supply 
chain collaboration 
and logistics 
efficiency 
Survey using 
questionnaire 
Affective trust influence collaboration in 
information sharing and benefit/risk sharing 
Trust in competency affects collaboration in joint 
decision making and benefit/risk sharing 
Detecting insignificant relationships: between 
trust in a competency and information sharing, 
and; between benefit/risk sharing and logistics 
efficiency 
(Laeequddin et 
al., 2010) 
Develop an instrument 
to measure trust 
Theorization The critical perspectives of trust in a supply chain 
relationship are: characteristics trust, rational 
trust, and institutional trust/security system 
(Asawasakulsorn
, 2015) 
Partner selection 
criteria during the 
formation stage 
Survey using 
questionnaire 
Direct prior alliance experience is positively 
related to some elements of trust 
Commitment is positively related to trusting the 
intention 
(Seifert, 2009) Measuring 
performance 
Laboratory 
experiment 
Approach to select partners during collaboration 
formation 
(Cao & Zhang, 
2013) 
Nature, antecedents 
characteristics, and 
consequences of 
Survey using 
questionnaire 
Supply chain collaboration stand on   
elements: information sharing, goal congruence, 
decision synchronization, incentive alignment, 
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Article Focus Method Results / Findings / Recommendations 
supply chain 
collaboration 
resource sharing, collaborative communication, 
and joint knowledge creation 
(Mlaker Kač et 
al., 2015) 
Influence of 
commitment to 
collaborative behavior 
Survey using 
questionnaire 
Trust has a semi-strong/strong influence on 
relationship commitment 
Relationship commitment and trust have a strong 
influence on collaborative behavior 
(Wang et al., 
2014) 
Impact of trust on 
information sharing 
and opportunism 
Survey using 
questionnaire 
Quality of the information shared – rather than 
the extent of information sharing – should be seen 
as the primary leverage in reducing supplier 
opportunism 
(Wu et al., 2014) Trust as antecedents of 
information sharing 
and collaboration 
Survey using 
questionnaire 
Trust is vital to determine information sharing 
and collaboration 
Information sharing and collaboration indicate 
partial mediation effect on supply chain 
performance 
(Day et al., 2013) Role of trust as an 
enabler and constraint 
between buyers and 
suppliers 
A case study 
using the 
interview 
Buyer behavior on not fulfilling promises and 
share information diminish trust 
Buyer behavior on performing to promise and 
sharing necessary information promotes trust 
(Moramarco, 
Stevens, & 
Pontrandolfo, 
2013) 
Role of pre-existing 
trust for the successful 
buyer-supplier 
relationships 
A laboratory 
experiment 
using human as 
subjects 
Face-to-face and e-mail negotiations may be used 
as trust-building or trust-repairing strategies 
(Capaldo & 
Giannoccaro, 
2015) 
The positive 
relationship between 
trust and performance 
in supply chain 
Simulation using 
a mathematical 
model 
Trust has a positive effect on supply chain 
performance 
(Abdullah & 
Musa, 2014) 
Impact of trust and 
information sharing on 
relationship 
commitment 
Survey using 
questionnaire 
There is a definite relationship between trust and 
relationship commitment, and; information 
sharing and relationship commitment 
To put it together, contributions from existing literature appears primarily in five 
areas. First, literature has contributed on roles, meaning, characteristics, antecedents, 
and dimensions of trust. The second contribution features under approaches used to 
search and select appropriate partners. Approaches to measure and assess trust 
constitute the third contribution; whereas influence/impact of trust marks the fourth 
contibution. Finally, the literature has contibuted on establishing relationships 
(correlations) between trust and the antecedents, determinants, and collaborative 
processes. 
However, literature in Table 2 carries many limitations as follows. Firstly, some of 
the approaches proposed remain theoretical, for example, in (Laeequddin et al., 
2010), because they lack empirical evaluation. Secondly, for studies which involve 
the empirical evaluation, yet such studies lack an exact nature of the collaborative 
realm. Most literature (see in Table 2) has advanced a survey method using the 
questionnaire and interview techniques. One drawback of survey method is that it 
hardly incorporates process and time during data collection. As a consequence, most 
of the empirical trust research consists of the static, cross-sectional, survey-based 
studies designed to develop and test variable-based correlation models in which 
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process and time are least considered (Huang & Wilkinson, 2014; Lewicki, 
Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006). The tiniest consideration of time and process is 
against a longitudinal property of a trust that requires the trust to build over time 
through repetitive interactions (Spekman & Davis, 2004). Moreover, measuring trust 
at one point in time, according to Delbufalo (2012) inflates an actual effect size of 
the trusting outcome compared to longitudinally designed research. Thirdly, most 
studies establish influential relationships between trust and its determinants and 
collaborative processes without unveiling the extent of this influence. Fourthly, 
some of the results and findings in the literature lead to controversies. For example, 
results and findings in (Madlberger, 2008) contradict with most of the other results 
(see, in Table 2). Fifthly, except for a study in (Hossain & Ouzrout, 2012), the 
analysis in most of the studies is based mainly on the top-down than the bottom-up 
analytical approach. The bottom-up analytical approach envisions a micro-level 
analysis of interactions of collaborating partners. This approach enriches multiple 
partners’ interactions, which in the end; aggregate, to sum up, a whole effect, thus 
providing more valuable insights on the trust problem. 
Therefore, towards enriching the problem statement, the outlined limitations 
(challenges) may be summarized in categories as follows: 
 Knowledge gap –there is a lack of explicit establishment about an extent to 
which partner behavior under the influence of collaborative logistics 
processes reinforces trusting outcomes. In a context of this study, processes 
being referred are the information sharing, incentive alignment, decision 
synchronization, and opportunism; 
 Controversies –some results and findings contradict, while others seem to 
focus more only on correlations among variables. There is a need to unfold 
arising contradictions, and at the same time, extend the investigation beyond 
correlative establishments;  
 Mitigation approach –compared to the trusting outcome, most studies 
advance on the mitigation approach that focuses on sources of trust 
uncertainties. Unlike the sources of trust uncertainties, a mitigation approach 
that focuses on the limited prediction of trusting outcomes (consequences) 
remains imperative, and; 
 Methodological flaws –there is a lack of collaborative realm and nature of 
trusting due to: absence of time (cross-sectional than longitudinal) and 
process; usage of top-down than bottom-up analysis, and; simple causality of 
trust. 
To this end, set to overcome the outlined limitations, the present dissertation builds 
on the resilience of systems, which among others, requires estimating outcomes of 
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trust uncertainties. Meaning that practitioners need to estimate and understand 
trusting outcomes resulting, for example, from manipulation (distortion) of 
exchanged information; various methods used to distribute savings, as well as; 
compromised and uncompromised decisions among logistics partners. Barroso, 
Machado, Carvalho, and Machado (2015) conclude ideation to estimate outcomes. 
Barroso et al. empathize that to adopt the most suitable mitigation strategies 
(proactive or reactive); it is necessary to identify in advance risks (uncertainties) that 
may potentially occur and estimate their potential effect(s). This assertion compares 
to that of Huang and Wilkinson (2014) who recommend investigating the outcome 
of trust uncertainties. In a similar context, Kwon and Suh (2004) propose a need for 
a model that can span trust-based interactions and provide a complete understanding 
of trust in supply chain partnerships. Henceforth, as suggested in (Rice, 2016), the 
focus has to shift from mitigating sources of trust uncertainties to predicting 
(forecasting) outcomes of trust uncertainties. Accordingly, development of a 
particular trust mechanism has to stand on the perspective of estimating trusting 
outcomes (consequences) that result from reinforcement of behavior and 
collaborative processes. 
With reference to provisions outlined in an earlier paragraph, this study advances on 
risky-worth relationships prevalent in collaborative sharing of logistics resources. 
Respective sources of risk and uncertainties are already established in section 2.4, 
although section 4.1 presents detailed discussion. In particular, the information 
sharing, incentive scheme, decision synchronization, and opportunism are main 
behavioral sources that account for risks, uncertainties, and finally the low level of 
trust to collaboration in sharing logistics resources.  
Also, the present research conducts longitudinal investigation on influence of 
behavioral factors on trust. The investigation takes into account mechanisms by 
which partner behavior and underlying logistics processes reinforce trust in the 
sharing of logistics resources. By drawing also from the social ability of partners, 
this research integrates feedback loop to trust. Finally, purported to suit real-world 
settings the MAS simulation experiments are conducted to provide virtual but yet 
realistic logistics scenarios. 
2.6 Summary and Conclusion  
The present chapter has described and defined basic concepts related to a topic 
addressed in this dissertation. It has discussed reasons as to why resource sharing in 
logistics is imperative, and correspondingly specified logistics resources, which are 
feasible to share. The chapter has argued on various forms of collaborations as 
strategic alliances that facilitate the sharing of resources. Role and nature of trust 
have been discussed extensively to establish how collaborative relationships depend 
on mutual trust. Additionally, drawing from the logistics and supply chain 
integration, the chapter has unveiled how trustworthy relationships matter in sharing 
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logistics resources. Towards broadening an understanding of the research problem, 
the chapter has also addressed recent challenges of trust in collaborative sharing of 
logistics resources and related areas.  
Primarily, individuals and companies are motivated to go sharing because of the 
scarcity and underutilization of resources. Many factors such as the turbulence of 
markets, costs, energy consumptions, environmental concerns, globalization, 
urbanization, and population growth drive a need to share resources. In logistics, 
feasible resources to share are such as the warehouses, distribution centers, vehicles 
(trucks); as well as information and information systems. However, collaborative 
sharing depends on mutual trust among partners involved. Concordant to this, trust 
is a relational factor necessary to maintain collaborative relationships. In its nature, 
trust becomes meaningful when embedded within the trustee. Conceptualization of 
trust as embedded within the trustee requires that trust manifests in behavior than 
attitudes. In a viewpoint of this embeddedness, the subsequent conceptualization has 
to consider trust-as-choice that entails decision-making and respective actions. In 
collaborative sharing of logistics resources, trust, as manifested in behavior, is 
profoundly influenced by the information sharing, sharing scheme, decision 
synchronization, and opportunism. 
Recent challenges of trust range from controversies in findings, flaws in the research 
methodology, to unanswered questions. In particular, an extent to which partner 
behavior and logistics processes reinforce trusting outcomes remains mostly not 
addressed. Equally, some results and findings seem to contradict. Furthermore, a 
mitigation approach that focuses on the trusting outcome appears ignored in the 
literature. Moreover, most of the previous studies do not incorporate process and 
time and advances in the linear analysis while employing simple causality of trust. 
The successful resource sharing in logistics requires, among others, to address most 
of the previously outlined recent challenges. Beyond understanding sources of trust 
uncertainties, logistics managers and other stakeholders have to understand also a 
degree of the impact such uncertainties may generate. In addition, collaborating 
parties willing to share logistics resources need the ability to forecast (anticipate) 
possible strengths and weaknesses of their network before implementing it. 
In its entirety, the chapter has discussed the motivation and research problem in the 
broad-spectrum. In order to address the identified research problem, the subsequent 
task is to establish an appropriate research methodology. For this reason, the next 
chapter discusses in a broad view the research methodology employed by this study.  
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3 Research Methodology 
The overall goal of this chapter is to present the methodology used to study the trust 
problem and mainly address the research problem specified in section 1.2. For this 
reason, this chapter extends the previous overview of research methodology 
presented already in section 1.5. The methodology appears structurally in four 
sections, which are: background (section 3.1); environmental factors, partner 
interactions, and causal relationships (section 3.2); specification and implementation 
(section 3.3), as well as; summary and conclusion (section 3.4).  
This research, among others, is guided by an interdisciplinary theoretical foundation 
presented in section 4.4. This foundation comprises principles drawn from 
transaction cost economics; social exchange, and; social dilemma. It stands on 
simulation of collaborative sharing scenarios under a framework of Multi-Agent 
Systems (MAS). In a context of MAS, a laboratory (controlled) experiment is 
employed as the primary method. Accordingly, principles of the Agent-Based 
Modeling (ABM) are used to guide the development of the conceptual modeling of 
partners’ interactions as well as causal mechanics. The ABM principles provide a 
closer linkage to the MAS simulation experiments in the domain of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI). In relation to the MAS, reasons mentioned in section 3.3, justify 
advantages the ABM in AI has over other comparable approaches such as the system 
dynamics, mathematical modeling, and stochastic differential equations. The ABM 
permits agents to adapt experience in both proactive and reactive situations. 
Alongside the advantages of the ABM , Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2006) emphasize 
that when past experiences determine agents’ interactions, and; especially when the 
agents continually adapt to that experience, mathematical analysis becomes very 
limited in deriving resulting dynamic consequences. 
This research has also followed a longitudinal time horizon. A preference to follow 
the longitudinal time horizon arises from a fact that trust builds over time. This 
preference enables collaborating agents to learn, adapt, and accordingly, react to 
emerging trustworthiness issues. In collecting data obtained from experiments, the 
text files and relational database tables are used as tools for capturing needed data. 
Moreover, analysis of data collected advances on both the dedicated (such as 
Minitab5) and general statistical software (such as Excel) tools.  
3.1 Background 
In the light of the overview already presented, this dissertation adapts the model-
centered methodologies of the AI as well as heuristics of empirical works on trust. 
The model-centered approach, as proposed by Cohen (1991) requires advancing on 
                                                             
5 https://www.minitab.com/en-us/products/minitab/ 
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the Modeling, Analysis, and Design (MAD) methodology for supporting the design 
and analysis of AI systems. However, the MAD, in its current form, is more 
appropriate for model-centered than system-centered research6. The present work, 
however, is mostly system-centered than model-centered. It is for this reason that 
the MAD methodology is preferably adapted to suiting context of the present work. 
The second consideration entails the heuristic of empirical works on trust. In a 
viewpoint of this heuristic, Möllering (2006) stipulates the methodology that 
advances on establishing: causal chain; the level of analysis; the aim of investigation; 
the viewpoint of operationalization, and; method of field work. For the causal chain, 
the trust and dependency are preconditions whose antecedents comprise of factors 
influencing trust in collaborative sharing of logistics resources. Such preconditions 
manifest in partners’ behavior, and; their consequences are observed using logistics 
performance metrics. Additionally, analysis of trust centers at a micro-level to serve 
predictive purposes. The operationalization of trust uses the trustor and trustee 
agents, although their coordination depends on the third-party (broker or 
administrator). Concerning the method, preference goes to the quantitative method, 
although the final trust values exist in both the quantitative and qualitative 
expression. However, the present work focuses on controlled experiments, instead 
of field works. 
Therefore, following the clarification and specification provided, this dissertation 
pursues prominently the methodology presented in Table 3. This methodology 
comprises six stages. 
Table 3: A broad-view of the research methodology 
 
Goal 
 
Activity 
Approach/Method/ 
Technique 
Data Sources & 
Tools 
 
Deliverables 
1. Establishing 
environmental 
factors 
a) Establish factors and 
parameters influencing 
trust 
Literature review Literature Factors and 
parameters 
b) Establish partners’ trust-
based interactions 
Analysis & Synthesis Literature Conceptual 
framework 
2. Modeling 
causal 
relationships 
a) Establish an appropriate 
modeling approach 
Analysis & 
Comparison 
Literature Modeling 
approach 
b) Identify strengths and 
limitations of existing 
models 
Analysis & 
Comparison 
Literature Strengths & 
limitations 
c) Develop a TrustMech 
concept 
ABM Inputs from 1, 2a 
& 2b 
TrustMech 
concept 
3. Predicting 
behavior 
Derive hypothesis N/A Inputs from 1 & 2 Hypotheses 
4. Implementing 
a prototype 
a) Specify requirements and 
design 
ABM design & 
modeling 
Inputs from 1, 2, 
& UML 
SRS 
b) Computerize the MAS guided by spiral PlaSMA, JADE & Simulation 
                                                             
6 A distinction of the two is clarified in (Cohen, 1991) 
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Goal 
 
Activity 
Approach/Method/ 
Technique 
Data Sources & 
Tools 
 
Deliverables 
TrustMech model PostgreSQL  prototype 
5. Validating 
TrustMech 
a) Establish conceptual 
validity 
Statistical test & GD Results from 
simulation 
Conceptual 
credibility 
b) Establish operational 
validity 
Comparison to other 
models  
Results from 
simulation 
Operational 
credibility 
6. Demonstrating 
application 
Test hypotheses derived 
from 3 
Statistical tests and 
GD 
Results from 
simulation   
Applicability 
of TrustMech 
The first stage entails establishing environmental factors, whose deliverables 
supports the modeling of causal relationships in the second stage. The third and 
fourth stages involve predicting system’s behavior and transforming TrustMech 
concept into a computerized instance, respectively. Remaining stages seek to 
establish validity (stage five) and demonstrate application (stage six) of the 
TrustMech concept. 
3.2 Influencing Factors, Partner Interactions, and Causal Relationships 
The first goal (in Table 3) entails establishing environmental factors based on the 
literature survey/review. This review is meant to identify critical factors and 
parameters, which influence trust in collaborative sharing of logistics resources. 
Besides such factors, significant interactions partners undertake during collaboration 
are also established. This establishment takes into account identification of the 
following aspects: key partners and their roles; tasks performed by partners, and; 
information exchanged among such partners. In the end, all identified aspects are 
loosely linked together to form a conceptual trust-based framework. 
The second goal (Table 3) focuses on modeling causal relationships. The 
accomplishment of the causal relationships is threefolds. At first hand, standard 
approaches used to model, trust, and reputation are analyzed and afterward 
compared to conclude the most appropriate one. Secondly, strengths and limitations 
of existing models of trust and reputation, as well as underlying techniques are also 
analyzed and compared. Resulting strengths are thoughtfully adapted while 
unfolding limitations. The third step incorporates the development of the Trust 
Mechanism (TrustMech) concept. The development begins with a general-purpose 
TrustMech, and afterward, deriving the operational TrustMech from the general-
purpose TrustMech. As highlighted previously, this development rests on principles 
of transaction cost economics, social exchange and learning, and dilemma analysis. 
Concordant to this, the TrustMech is conceptually modeled based upon the ABM 
method, as described and discussed in subsequent sections. 
The third goal (Table 3) is set to predict how a system may behave, and subsequently 
demonstrate the application to the TrustMech concept. In a present context, the 
prediction has to depend on hypotheses. A purpose of the hypotheses is to investigate 
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how the TrustMech helps logistics stakeholders to understand phenomena that may 
emerge in prospective resource sharing networks. 
3.3 Specification and Implementation 
Implementation of the prototype (fourth goal) involves: specifying requirements and 
design, as well as; transforming the conceptual TrustMech into the computerized 
instance. Among others, this transformation applies the ABM method, “PASSI” 
(Cossentino & Potts, 2002) technique as well as the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML). Why choosing to apply the ABM? According to Axelrod and Tesfatsion 
(2006),  ABM is a method for studying systems which: are composed of interacting 
agents, and; exhibit properties arising from the interactions of the agents that cannot 
be deduced by merely aggregating the properties of the agents. Axelrod and 
Tesfatsion further maintain that the ABM uses concepts and tools from social and 
computer science to represent a methodological approach that permits a deeper 
understanding of fundamental causal mechanisms in social systems. Given these 
points, the ABM is more suitable, especially upon considering the context of the 
research problem that also originates from social systems. In due to this, modeling 
TrustMech using system dynamics, may contradict the reality of world on 
representation of trusting situations. 
In addition, models built on the ABM conceptual paradigms are used to simulate and 
elaborate complicated scenario in socio-economic systems (Bandini, Manzoni, & 
Vizzari, 2009). It is far from other approaches such as the mathematical modeling, 
stochastic differential equations, and system dynamics. For example, the latter 
modeling approach seems unable to provide sufficient features of an agent such as 
learning, adaptability, and social ability. Furthermore, compared with other 
modeling approaches, the ABM (Bonabeau, 2002): captures emergent phenomena; 
provides a natural description of a system, and; is flexible. Bonabeau emphasizes 
further that the ability of the ABM to deal with emergent phenomena drives the other 
benefits. 
Besides the ABM, the UML technique sequenced in steps proposed by Cardellini et 
al. (2007) provides a guide in specifying requirements and designs. The 
specifications and designs take into account the UML extensions proposed in 
(Bersini, 2012; Cardellini et al., 2007; Cossentino & Potts, 2002; Odell, Parunak, & 
Bauer, 2000). The UML unifies and formalizes methods of many approaches to the 
object-oriented software lifecycle and supports modeling of (Odell et al., 2000): 
 Use cases for specifying actions performed; 
 Dynamic models, in the form of sequence diagrams, and; 
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 Static models, in the form of class diagrams, which describe the unchanged 
semantics of data and messages. 
Transformation of the conceptual TrustMech into a computerized instance succeeds 
the specification of the requirements and design. This transformation builds on the 
MAS that consists of computerized intelligent agents. Intelligent agents are known 
as agents who are capable of flexible autonomous actions, social ability, reactivity, 
and pro-activity to meet their objectives (Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995). It might be 
interesting to know why MAS is applied. Application of the MAS comes when a 
phenomenon under investigation seems complicated, and mainly when handling 
such a phenomenon using other forms of experiments is difficult. On account of this, 
it becomes hard to deal with the outlined research problem using experiments that 
are founded, for example, on the systems dynamics, micro-simulation, and 
stochastic differential equations. Moreover, the case study, field study, and action 
research methods are less appropriate compared the MAS approach. This 
appropriateness is raised by existing difficulties to obtain real-world platform to 
validate and demonstrate how useful the proposed TrustMech concept is. In 
developing (building) a prototype, it is preferred that the respective transformation 
use the PlaSMA framework to provide logistics infrastructure, the organizational, 
and individual agents in their roles as decision-makers (Warden et al., 2010). The 
final goal is concerned with formalizing approaches to be used to validate the 
TrustMech. The validation employs two validation objects, namely: conceptual and 
operational validity. Establishment of the operational validity rests on comparing the 
TrustMech to other rival models. Establishment of both validities employs the 
Graphical Displays (GD) and statistical techniques. Since further elaborations on 
validation also depend on output from subsequent chapters, then section 7.1 presents 
a detailed discussion on validation approach. 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
The current chapter has presented the research methodology employed to study the 
trust problem in collaborative sharing of logistics resources. The proposed research 
methodology supposes to: 
1) Identify environmental factors by reviewing the literature; 
2) Establish trust-based interactions undertaken by collaborating partners in 
logistics, based on the ABM; 
3) Develop the TrustMech concept based on the ABM; 
4) Carry out laboratory (controlled) experiment using the MAS as the primary 
method;  
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5) Establish the conceptual and operational validity by relying on the internal 
consistency and model to model comparison techniques, respectively and; 
6) Demonstrate the application of the TrustMech concept by simulating resource 
sharing scenario(s) in logistics. 
The first purpose of controlled experiments is to enrich a virtual realism in the 
respect of process and time. The second purpose is to provide an alternative to a lack 
of a real-world platform needed to carry out industrial testing. Moreover, the 
methodology pursued overcomes many methodological flaws identified previously 
in section 2.5. Expectedly, the controlled experiments generate enough amounts of 
output data to draw patterns (trends) of trust behavior. The simulation platform 
provides also flexibility, for example, on an ability to add or reduce the number of 
participating partners.  
A closure to this chapter marks an opening of a next chapter. To this effect, the next 
chapter (chapter 4) presents state of the art on trust mechanism in collaborative 
logistics. Among others, it presents discussion regarding behavioral factors 
influencing trust, trust modeling approaches, and models of trust and reputation. 
Accordingly, the chapter reveals strengths and limitations of existing models of trust 
and reputation. Revealed strengths and limitations refer to an extent to which 
existing models of trust and reputation can suitably be applied to solve the trust 
problem. In the end, the chapter specifies contributions this dissertation provides to 
a body of knowledge. 
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4 Current Trust Mechanisms in Collaborative Logistics 
During the research parts of the contents have been published in (Daudi, Baalsrud 
Hauge, & Thoben, 2016b; Daudi et al., 2016a; Daudi, Baalsrud Hauge, & Thoben, 
2017a, 2017b). 
The chapter presents, among others, the most-recent requirements and developments 
(aspects) that address mechanisms of trust in collaboration and related areas. Much 
attention pursues on aspects, which can add value to a proposed concept in chapter 
5. The first aspect focuses on addressing the analysis and synthesis of critical 
behavioral factors and parameters that account for promotion and detriment of trust 
in collaborative sharing of logistics resources. This aspect extends previous 
establishments in subsection 2.4 to unveil further how such behavioral factors 
influence trust. The second aspect involves discussion on means by which 
collaborating partners interact, negotiate, and get coordinated. Such discussion 
results further into establishing the conceptual framework that depicts and guides 
trust-based interactions of partners engaging in sharing logistics resources 
collaboratively. The third aspect addresses suitable means to model information 
uncertainty and decision-making in the decentralized, complex, and predicament 
environments. Realization of this suitability encompasses comparing the qualitative 
and quantitative streams that address information sharing; while also identifying 
incompatible decisions. 
The other most-recent aspects addressed in this chapter include theoretical 
foundation, trust modeling approaches, and models of trust and reputation. To this 
effect, the fourth aspect is set to formalize an interdisciplinary theoretical foundation 
that guides this research. The interdisciplinary foundation builds on principles of 
social exchange and transaction cost economics. Furthermore, since trust is a multi-
context construct, it can then be modeled from various perspectives. As such and in 
concordance to the research problem, the fifth aspect focuses on identifying an 
approach that is most suitable to model trust mechanism. Towards this suitability, 
three approaches for modeling trust are analyzed and compared to conclude the most 
appropriate one. The sixth aspect concerns the analysis and comparison of well-
known models of trust and reputation. Its goal is to unveil a degree to which such 
models are appropriate as well as limited to addressing the outlined research 
problem. The chapter ends by summarizing key findings, but also by providing 
concluding remarks. 
As general remarks in this chapter, it is worth taking note about an interchangeable 
usage of words, as well presentation of the interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary 
discussions (contents). Firstly, the terms partner and agent are used interchangeably 
to link the organizational systems, Agent-Based Modeling (ABM), and Multi-Agent 
Systems (MAS). Secondly, contents of section 4.1 and subsection 4.2.2 present the 
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interdisciplinary issues. Section 4.1 addresses the integration of trust and its 
influencing behavioral factors, while; subsection 4.2.2 deals with trust and 
interactions among collaborating partners in logistics. Section 4.4 is also presented 
in an interdisciplinary manner because it integrates the theoretical foundation from 
principles of transaction cost economics and social exchange. Thirdly, the remaining 
sections present multidisciplinary issues because they separately address the topical 
points in question from other domains, including computing, engineering, and 
management sciences. These domains provide a solution approach to trust problem 
in the collaborative sharing of logistics resources. 
4.1 Behavioral Factors and Parameters Influencing Trust 
The section provides discussions on behavioral elements, which characterize trust in 
sharing resources in collaborative logistics (Figure 7). It establishes how behavioral 
factors influence trust and articulate parameters (criteria) which constitute each 
factor. In particular, an assumption exists that under current settings the fourth 
factor, opportunism, remains intrinsic in the other factors. Those other factors are 
the information sharing, sharing scheme, and decision synchronization. The outlined 
behavioral factors are two-sided in a sense that they can deteriorate or promote trust. 
To clarify this, when partners behave in a way that imposes positive or negative 
influence then trust can be promoted or deteriorated, respectively. The latter refers 
to behavioral uncertainties. According to literature, behavioral uncertainties refer to 
potentials inherent in a situation for difficulty anticipating and understanding actions 
(Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006) of partners with whom one is 
collaborating or interacting. 
4.1.1 Information sharing 
Collaborating partners share information among themselves to facilitate planning 
and operation of logistics functions. Partners share information concerning various 
logistics elements such as the capacity, lead time, demand, production schedules, 
inventory, and cost. These elements, according to Flynn, Koufteros, and Lu (2016), 
are task characteristics whose uncontrolled variability imposes a micro-level 
uncertainty. In connection to this, Wu et al. (2014) stipulate that one can treat 
information sharing as a behavioral intention of partners that leads to actual behavior 
in collaboration. As such, challenges associated with information sharing are such 
as: coping with demand uncertainty; coping with logistics decision-making 
complexity, and; dealing with the vulnerability of opportunistic behavior to protect 
the individual interest (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). Such challenges may 
difficultly be determined in advance, while their effects remain a bottleneck to 
partners’ motives to collaborate. Despite these challenges, still, other partners may 
behave fairly, while minimizing the demand and decision-making uncertainties. 
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Under such circumstances, collaboration becomes featured with a mix of both 
certainty and uncertainty. 
Accordingly, while exchanging information, collaborating partners exhibit 
information-sharing behavior, which may be beneficial or detrimental. Beneficial 
behavior entails the action and decision of partners in a context of exchanging 
information that conforms to required standards of the collaborative consortia. On 
the contrary, actions and decisions which lack this conformity remain considerably 
damaging. The categories (dimensions) of Information Quality (InfQ) can 
characterize both, the beneficial and detrimental information behavior. This 
characterization employs a viewpoint of the information exchange rituals exhibited 
by partners during collaboration. The four dimensions of InfQ are system support, 
inherent (context examination), representation, and purpose-dependent (data use in 
processes) (Rohweder, Kasten, Malzahn, Piro, & Schmid, 2011). As per the 
methodological approach followed by this research, the former three dimensions are 
difficult to characterize in computational settings. For this reason, this dissertation 
builds on the dimension of purpose-dependent because it depicts data to use in the 
collaborative logistics processes. 
Behavioral Factors and  Criteria
Information Sharing
 Timeliness
 Relevance
 Accuracy
 Completeness
Incentive Scheme
 Cost allocation
 Savings allocation
 Risks allocation
Decision Synchronization
 Perceived conflicts
 Bargaining power
Opportunism
 Claim of shares
 Usage of alliance resources
 Usage of proprietary 
information
Misaligned incentives
Deteriorate Trust Promote Trust
Poor quality information
Unsynchronized decisions
Incongruent purposes
Quality information
Aligned incentives
Synchronized decisions
Congruent purposes
 
Figure 7: Factors and parameters influencing trust 
A critical analysis of the literature on collaborative logistics has unveiled that 
characterization of data uses in processes may consist of many criteria (Figure 7), 
including: 
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 Timeliness (Cao & Zhang, 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Yin & Zhao, 2008); 
 Relevance (Cao & Zhang, 2011; Chen et al., 2011); 
 Accuracy (Cao & Zhang, 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Yin & Zhao, 2008), and; 
 Completeness (Cao & Zhang, 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Yin & Zhao, 2008). 
These criteria, together, emphasize the on-time availability of reliable data, abundant 
enough to meet consumer’s needs. In addition, such data has to represent a fact on 
business reality and provide adequate interpretation within an intended context. 
Under the present settings, such context is the collaboration in sharing logistics 
resources. 
Information sharing (exchange) behavior can influence trust in both negative and 
positive ways. For example, the untimely, irrelevant, inaccurate and incomplete 
information (information asymmetry) may escalate uncertainty and low level of 
trust. This uncertainty signals not only a situation of deviation from the prior 
agreement but also inconformity. In contrast, the act of exchanging the timely, 
relevant, accurate and complete information (quality information) signals a situation 
of compliance and high level of trust to previously established collaborative 
agreements. The exchange of quality information by partners appears to grant and 
promote trustworthiness. Conversely, the exchange of poor quality information by 
partners can deteriorate trust. Even though, a choice to exchange quality or poor 
information remains a partners’ innate ability that is guided further by prevailing 
situations.  
4.1.2 Incentive Scheme 
According to Simatupang and Sridharan (2005), proper incentives motivate partners 
to align individual decision-making more closely with an overall goal of 
collaborating. Even though, it is hard to identify contributions of each partner in the 
coalition (Wang & Kopfer, 2011). This difficulty relates to means or methods, which 
collaborating partners can use to divide costs and saving resulting from coalitions. 
Towards mitigating this problem, Xu (2013) and D’Amours and Rönnqvist (2010) 
have emphasized on simple rules of thumb that distribute savings proportionally. In 
similar manner, Tseng, Yan, and Cruijssen (2013) propose a general framework for 
designing a compensation rule. Despite these initiatives, one issue that seems 
unveiled yet is about an extent to which such methods are trustworthy and fair. 
The literature has discussed trust challenges associated with sharing scheme 
methods. For example, arguments exist that it is difficult to determine potential cost 
savings (Cruijssen, 2006; Wang & Kopfer, 2011) as well as ensuring a fair allocation 
of the shared workload in advance (Graham, 2011). In support of this, one open 
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question is, to what extents are rules or methods (proposed in literature) reasonably 
acceptable and thus trustworthy? In the light of this open question, Cruijssen (2007) 
claims that many collaborative logistics initiatives disintegrate because of trust 
uncertainties concerning the fairness of these rules. 
In relation to behavioral uncertainty, one critical requirement is to synthesize how 
incentive alignment influence partner trust in sharing logistics resources. The 
influence depends on a degree of fairness, which partners perceive upon distribution 
of costs and gains. For example, unfair allocation of incentives may increase trust 
uncertainties because of suspiciousness and rivalry in unseen returns. Conversely, 
upon realizing fairness in the sharing of pains and gains using evenhanded 
negotiations (Jones et al., 2010; Sutherland, 2006), trust can be promoted. To this 
end and in viewpoint of the incentive scheme, allocation of costs (Cruijssen, 2006; 
Jones et al., 2010; Xu, 2013), allocation of savings (Jones et al., 2010); Wang & 
Kopfer, 2011), and risks allocation (Cao & Zhang, 2011; Jones et al., 2010) 
constitute formal criteria, which can affect trust in collaborative sharing of logistics 
resources (Figure 7). 
4.1.3 Decision Synchronization 
Decision synchronization refers to a process by which partners orchestrate decisions 
in planning and operations to optimize chain benefits (Simatupang & Sridharan, 
2002). It is joint decision-making that plays a vital role to resolve many issues such 
as the costs, forecasting, ordering, and replenishment of logistics orders. Decision 
synchronization becomes crucial to situations where decisions made by one 
partner(s) create uncompensated costs or benefits to others (Cruijssen, 2006). 
The joint decision-making involves synchronizing decisions among partners who 
are not only distributed but also who possess distinct preferences. Such preferences 
center on a particular domain of decision to the extent that positions taken in decision 
rights by different partners result in conflicts due to arising incompatibilities. To 
avoid such conflicts, one has to synchronize decision positions of individual partners 
to a compromise. This decision synchronization involves a joint exercising and 
redesigning of decision rights (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005) to help resolve 
conflicts or disagreements (Kwon & Suh, 2004) that arise. In the supply chain, for 
example, disagreements may occur when companies attempt to optimize their 
performance while disregarding benefits of the supply chain as a whole (Trkman, 
Stemberger, Jaklic, & Groznik, 2007). Effects of such disregards may also affect 
partners on an individual basis. In their entirety, such self-interested decisions seem 
to generate consequences that may either strengthen or weaken trust in sharing 
logistics resources. 
To mitigate a problem of incompatible preferences, an owner of a specific decision 
right has to reconsider effects of its decision rights and position on other partners 
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and entire consortium. This consideration requires parties concerned to resolve 
arising differences (conflicting preferences). This dissertation refers to unresolved 
conflicting preferences as unsynchronized decisions. The unsynchronized decision 
appears in two behavioral discontents: rivalry and compromise (Simatupang & 
Sridharan, 2005). Simatupang and Sridharan describe such behavioral discontents as 
follows: 
 With rivalry behavior, a party has a high concern for its interest coupled with 
low concern for the other parties’ interests;  
 With compromise behavior, a party emphasizes on give-and-take bargaining 
during the relationship. 
Towards building trust, partners have to moderate their decision rights to the 
compromise style which appears satisfactory and acceptable. In contrast, the rivalry 
style may largely contribute to low level of trust. As concluding remarks, perceived 
conflict (Cruijssen, 2006; Kwon & Suh, 2004) and bargaining power (Cruijssen, 
2006) are criteria constituting decision synchronization (Figure 7) and are 
considered to yield a significant influence on trust. 
4.2 Collaborative Controls, Interactions, and Negotiations 
The section presents discussion set to accomplish three main issues: control 
approaches for mediating interactions of collaborating agents; trust-based 
interactions of collaborating agents (partners), as well as; negotiation protocols. In 
accomplishing the first issue, concepts of the institutional and social control 
approaches are discussed and subsequently adapted in subsequent sections and 
chapters. The goal of this adaptation is to regulate interactions of agents in 
collaborative sharing of logistics resources. The second issue entails trust-based 
interactions of collaborating agents. This dissertation characterizes such interactions 
in the form of a conceptual framework that specifies, among others, typical agents, 
their roles and tasks, as well as information to be exchanged. Regarding the third 
issue, out of three protocols of interactions, one protocol appears most suitable to 
the context of the outlined research problem. 
4.2.1 Institutional and Social Control Approach 
Agents reside and interact in both the physical and virtual world. A large part of such 
a world is dynamic and heterogeneous. The world comprises human-agents, 
hardware-agents (robots), software-agents (programs), and organizations; which 
altogether appear beginning co-interact but also co-evolve. Most of the interactions 
undertaken by agents, whether formal or informal, are mediated. On the one hand, 
this mediation seeks to control or regulate agent behavior about norms articulated 
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by a community in which such agents reside. On the other hand, a degree of 
trustworthiness attributed to each agent, constitutes determinants of interactions 
such agent undertakes. The mediation and trustworthiness depend on principles, 
which can be drawn from various norms. A norm is an (ideal) behavior which agents 
are expected to exhibit (Grizard, Vercouter, Stratulat, & Muller, 2007). Norms are 
also understood as social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what 
ought to be done and not (Sunstein, 1996). Tuomela (1995) categorizes social norms 
into rules (r-norms) and proper social norms (s-norms). The r-norms are created and 
regulated by authorities such as formal institutions. Unlike the r-norms, the s-norms 
represent the conventions or the mutual beliefs about the right thing to do in a 
community (Grizard et al., 2007; Tuomela, 1995). By drawing on the r-norms and 
s-norms, the subsequent paragraphs present a discussion on the institutional and 
social control approaches for mediating collaborative interactions in logistics. 
The institutional approach assumes a central authority that observes or enforces 
agents’ actions, and punishes them, in case they exhibit undesirable behavior (Pinyol 
& Sabater-Mir, 2013). There are many institutional activities, which monitor and 
verify agents’ conformity (Lianos, 2003) to r-norms. Under the institutional 
approach, control encircles structural aspects of the interactions of the form: 
allowed, forbidden, and obliged actions (Pinyol & Sabater-Mir, 2013). The formal 
rules comprise articulated and written norms with formal sanctions, reinforced by 
properly established authorities (Tuomela, 1995). In e-commerce, for example, 
institutional enforcement is implemented using reputation systems. In general, 
reputation refers to something said or believed about a people or thing’s character or 
standing (Josang, Ismail, & Boyd, 2007). On employing the reputation, for example, 
an entity can be trusted standing on the degree of reputation ratings a respective 
community has provided to it. In e-commerce, reputation systems are implemented 
in digital forms to provide buyers a reputation of the seller (service providers) of 
goods and services. It is from this reputation where the buyers can derive and 
establish trust in service providers. Next to institutional control is the social control 
approach. 
The social control approach is a way for the population to avoid unwanted agents 
(Rasmussen & Jansson, 1996) in a community. It mainly applies s-norms to regulate 
interactions of agents thereby sanctioning misbehaving agents. The s-norms sanction 
is only a social approval or disapproval, which is hard to decide in advance (Grizard 
et al., 2007). The social sanctions create a range of unfriendly feelings, which are 
intense, and may lead to substantial consequences (Sunstein, 1996) to the 
misbehaving agent. Moreover, the authority point of view distinguishes the 
institutional approach from the social approach. Unlike the institutional approach, 
which is centrally coordinated, the social approach is decentralized. In the light of 
this decentralization, each agent is obliged to enforce s-norms to other agents 
surrounding it. 
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When applied to solve the trust problem, each control approach bears strengths as 
well as limitations. The institutional control approach suits collaborative settings, 
which are coordinated by a central authority. Example of central authority is a usage 
of the broker to administer a network of collaborative sharing. This central authority 
(broker) has to be a neutral agent (body). Furthermore, consortia designed to last for 
a medium or long-term duration usually are controlled based on the institutional 
approach. Those designed to last for short-term may only provide essential 
information to the authority and be coordinated based on the social approach. This 
study builds on the institutional control that fulfills longitudinal observations.  
4.2.2 Partners’ Trust-based Interactions to Collaboration in Logistics 
The primary goal of this subsection is to establish a conceptual trust-based 
framework that depicts and guide interactions of collaborating partners in sharing 
logistics resources. The conception of this framework considers: how collaborating 
partners (agents) can interact when engaged in the sharing of resources, and; what 
particular trusting processes they are engaged. This conception draws from many 
angles, including early collaborative models in supply chain integration such as the 
VMI, CRP, and CPFR. 
This establishment involves identifying and specifying the following main aspects: 
key partner entities; partner’ trust-based characteristics; propagation of trusting 
processes; essential roles and tasks performed by partners; information exchanged 
by partners, and; emerging preferences in decision rights that may be incompatible. 
Furthermore, in developing the trust-based framework, it is worthy to note that the 
term “agent” is more formal in place of the term “partner.” A goal of this 
interchangeability is to link subsequent chapters that address the development of 
TrustMech concept and its subsequent implementation. Establishment of the 
framework consists of three main stages: selection and front-end agreement (Figure 
8); engagement and order forecast (Figure 9), and; transaction execution (Figure 
10). 
Towards examining trust uncertainties, which underlie collaboration in sharing 
logistics resources, three categories of agents: shipper, carrier, and receiver 
constitute crucial and formal partnering entities (Figure 8). Additional to defined 
categories of agents is a warehouse manager whose interactions are less frequent 
than those of the other agents. Other stakeholders are currently not included in the 
framework because they do not play primary roles. The leading role of the shipper 
is to produce goods, while that of the receiver is to receive (consume) produced 
goods. The primary role carrier is to move goods between the shipper and the 
receiver. The warehouse manager is responsible for storing goods in a shared 
warehouse. Notably, each agent category may consist of more than one actor who 
still serves similar roles. The ABM and MAS allow to adjust the number of actors 
befalling in each category. 
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Selection and Front-End Agreement 
In the first stage (Figure 8), agents have a responsibility to undertake a decision of 
disposing of their willingness to participate in risk-worthy relationships. In respect 
of this, the shipper, receiver, and carrier develop an intention to trusting by taking 
on strategic agreements in a context of the planning of logistics functions. According 
to Mayer et al. (1995), assessment of the propensity to trusting by the trustor-agent 
depends on two aspects: a relationship it has with the trustee-agent, and; other factors 
outside of the relationships which lead into uncertain decisions. The uncertain 
decision (or decision-making uncertainty) means an inability to predict partner 
behavior or changes in the external environment (Joshi & Stump, 1999). In a context 
of sharing logistics resources, the decision uncertainty is attributed to, for example, 
production capacity, warehouse capacity, carriage capacity, and consumption 
capacity. Moreover, this relationship between the trustor-agent and trustee-agent 
depends on previous experiences and future expectations. 
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Figure 8: Collaborative interactions in developing a propensity to trusting 
In developing a propensity to trusting, each trustor-agent determines if 
characteristics of the trustee-agents meet (satisfy) its needs to establish an intention 
to trust. Given such needs, the decision may become satisfactory or unsatisfactory. 
If characteristics of the trustee-agent’s are unsatisfactory, the trustor-agent 
terminates its intention to trust. Otherwise, the trustee-agent commits its intention to 
trust.  
Besides the defined procedures, tasks performed in this stage include: setting up 
specificity of a consortium; inviting partners; submission (exchange) of necessary 
information; assessing submitted capacities, and; synchronizing conflicting 
preferences (P1 and P2). A short description of outlined tasks, as adapted in part from 
VICS (2004) is as follows:  
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 Setup of specificity: It is a setup or configurations of a collaborative 
consortium to execute logistical functions. More precisely, a leader of the 
consortium (also known as a broker) sets out specific requirements for the 
prospective consortium. In this setup, the broker, for example, specifies the 
length of collaboration period, number of participants, as well as entry and 
exit rules. The broker also specifies the planning capacities of prospective 
partners in the aspect of production, warehousing, carriage, and demand. Such 
planning includes daily, weekly, and monthly sizes of the production, 
warehousing, carriage, and demand capacity. 
 Invitation: The broker agent invites prospective partners by sending 
specificities it has configured to potential partners residing in a community, 
and who desire to go sharing. Afterwards, the broker waits for responses from 
the community. 
 Submission: Upon receiving this invitation, interested prospective partners 
respond by applying for a collaboration opportunity thereby submitting 
needed information. Those who might not be interested, ignore the call. 
Besides submissions to this call, the broker uses beliefs it possesses as well as 
those it can enquire from the related community to obtain partners’ previous 
trustworthy. The two forms of beliefs, together, serve to extend confidence 
about prospective partners with whom one is going to share logistics resources 
collaboratively. Moreover, partners may also acquire experience (beliefs) of 
one another, among themselves. 
 Assessment and adjustment: Once interested prospective partners have 
submitted their proposals; the broker begins to assess them. The goal of this 
assessment is to figure out whether proposed capabilities can satisfy 
specificity of the consortium set. The results of the assessment may be 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory. At this level, the configuration of the 
consortium is halfway successful if results are satisfactory. If unsatisfactory, 
the broker recommends adjustments. In either case, the broker publicizes 
results to applicant members. On receipt of results, applicant members can: 
accept the proposal, suggest further adjustments or otherwise reject them. If 
the proposal is rejected or suggested to adjustments, broker adjusts strategic 
structures (capabilities and capacities) again until when they are acceptable or 
terminates them otherwise. Alike to previous roles of beliefs, again, each 
prospective partner makes a decision depending on beliefs it possesses. 
 Synchronization of preferences: Alongside the defined protocols, before 
passing the strategic agreement, two conflicting preferences (P1 and P2) which 
can result in conflicts must be compromised. Even though, detailed open 
choices to each agent, their consequences like rewards and penalties are 
established in Table 4 and Appendix I. 
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Engagement and Order Forecast 
In the second stage (Figure 9), trustor-agents are engaged to forecast orders and 
establish their actions to trusting. The action to trusting require trustor-agents’ to 
delegate their tasks to the trustee-agents. Since risks are inherent in the behavioral 
manifestation of the desire to be vulnerable (Mayer et al., 1995), trustor-agents have 
to develop a degree of expectation. This expectation relates to the performance of 
the trustee-agent in executing the task delegated to it. Such expectations can be 
developed using standard deviation method or common benchmark underlying 
logistics functions. 
Specific tasks undertaken at this stage include: extending order forecasts into 
shipping forecasts; building initial loads and assign a carrier; deciding on which 
methods to use in diving costs and savings, and; synchronizing conflicting 
preferences (P3, P4, and P5).  The preferences P3, P4, and P5 are defined in Table 4 
and Appendix I. 
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Figure 9: Collaborative interactions in the development of expectation 
This stage involves mainly three activities, whose description is adapted in part from 
VICS (2004) and presented as follows: 
 Extending orders: At this level, collaborating partners are expected to have 
more accurate information than it was in the strategic and front-end agreement 
stage. For example, different from previously, planned capacities, shipper, 
warehouse manager, carrier, and receiver may at present be having more 
accurate information. Such information reflects how much is possible to 
produce, store, transport, and demand. In this task, the primary activity is to 
extend order forecasts into shipment forecasts. 
 Initial load building: This task focuses on the preliminary building of small 
loads from shippers onto full trucks for delivery and storage. It helps the 
carrier to forecast under or over truck capacities as well as a warehouse 
manager to forecast storage capacity. 
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 Sharing scheme method: Departing from proportional sharing methods, 
partners have to deliberate which one to advance on. As far as proportional 
sharing method bears many options, partners have to deliberate further, which 
specific option to apply. 
 Synchronization of preferences: Upon successful executions of the previous 
tasks, partners negotiate to compromise conflicting preferences (P3, P4, and 
P5). 
Physical Distribution 
The last stage (Figure 10) involves carrying out the physical distribution (move 
goods from shipper to receiver) as well as storage of goods in a warehouse. It is the 
stage in which realization of benefits to collaboration can occur. Additionally, 
context to the trusting process, this is a moment where comparison of previously, 
developed expectation against a score realized (actual score) takes place. The actual 
score realized becomes crucial feedback that signals back to a respective agent, 
about the extent of the performance of the task, it delegated. This feedback can be 
below, within or above the previously established expectation.  
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Figure 10: Collaborative interactions during transaction execution 
Furthermore, tasks performed in this stage include leveraging shipment forecasts, 
configuring actual orders, and activating accounting process. Description of these 
tasks, as adapted  in part from VICS (2004), is as follows: 
 Leverage shipment forecasts: This is a final adjustment in quantities to be 
shipped and ordered. In a similar context, it is a final adjustment to carrier’s 
capacity and storage space in a warehouse. At this moment, the shipper, 
warehouse manager, receiver, and carrier are expected to provide real 
information about their transactions. 
 The configuration of actual orders: The broker configures an actual order, and 
execution begins by entailing a virtual movement and storage of goods. The 
carrier pickups the small loads and move them to receivers. Furthermore, there 
can occur temporary storage of some goods, if a need arises. 
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 Activation of the accounting process: Finally, the broker activates the 
accounting process to reward partner. Hereafter, each partner acquires records 
about operating performance resulting from the executed collaboration that it 
compares with its prior expectations. Moreover, partners may have further 
preferences such as the visibility information, lead time, responsiveness and 
on-time delivery. On these preferences, fortunately, all partners appear to have 
compatible positions. The exception is seen on the on-time delivery 
preference, by which the carrier perceives a possible delay. Even though, on-
time delivery preference has been excluded to reduce complexities, which 
may appear in the MAS simulation platform. 
4.2.3 Negotiation Protocols 
Collaborating agents in logistics act autonomously so do their negotiations. In 
automating agent’s negotiation processes, an appropriate negotiation protocol has to 
be developed, adapted, or adopted. Since this study does not intend to develop 
negotiation protocols, then the latter two options are considered in a subsequent 
analysis. Short explanations about automation of negotiations precede an analysis of 
the protocols. To this end, and according to Jennings et al. (2001), the automation of 
negotiation deals with: 
 Negotiation protocols: a set of rules that govern the interactions such as the 
legitimate types of participants, negotiation states, events that change 
negotiation states, and valid actions of the participants in particular states; 
 Negotiation objects: range of issues over which agreement must be reached, 
such as the price and quality, and; 
 Agents’ decision-making models: the decision-making apparatus employed 
by participants in acting alongside with the negotiation protocol. 
This section is instead set to discuss the negotiation protocols in a broad view, and 
it formalizes the appropriate one. Thus, remaining issues such as the negotiation 
objects and agent decisions making model remain addressed in subsequent sections 
and chapters. 
Three types of agents’ negotiation protocol, namely: auction-based, bargaining-
based, and Argumentation-Based Negotiations (ABN) can be distinguished. The 
former two negotiation protocols are preferred than the ABN because they are less 
complicated, and are easy to understand and follow. According to Rahwan et al. 
(2003), the ABN negotiation protocol is more complicated compared with the rest 
because it involves many locutions and rules. For this reason, subsequent 
comparison involves only the auction-based and bargaining-based negotiation 
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protocols. A goal of this comparison is to figure out the negotiation protocol that 
suits better to needs of the research problem at hand. 
Descriptive workability of the auction-based and bargaining-based protocols 
proceeds as follows. Under the auction-based negotiation protocol, an auctioneer 
calls out prices (negotiation objects, with a single attribute, for example). Meaning 
that one partner exclusively proposes potential agreements while others only accept 
or reject them (like the Dutch auction) (Berndt & Herzog, 2016). When other 
partners reject proposals in the auction, an auctioneer makes a new offer which it 
believes will be more acceptable (Jennings et al., 2001). The auction-based protocol 
appears equivalent to a single-tier (1: N) interaction protocol proposed in (Warden, 
Wagner, Langer, & Herzog, 2012) to facilitate knowledge transfer among agents. 
According to this interaction proposition, an advisee may place a same advisory 
request from multiple advisors. Unlike the auction-based negotiation protocol, the 
bargaining-based negotiation protocol requires that partners bilaterally exchange 
offers and counter-offers (Berndt & Herzog, 2016). 
Concerning control approaches, the auction-based negotiation protocol suits 
centralized (institutional control) exchanges, while the bargaining-based negotiation 
protocol suits the decentralized (social control) exchange. Together with this, in a 
viewpoint of the complexity, the auction-based negotiation is less complicated 
compared to bargaining-based negotiation. It is because the bargaining-based 
negotiation advances on the bilateral exchanges that complicate more the 
agreements. 
In reference to a topological structure of sharing networks in collaborative logistics, 
this dissertation adopts the auction-based negotiation. It is the negotiation protocol 
whose mechanism matches the centralized exchange. The centralized exchange 
requires that the broker-agent coordinates exchanges among collaborating agents 
(shippers, warehouse managers, receivers, and carriers). Furthermore, as 
emphasized in (Berndt & Herzog, 2016), the auction-based negotiations correspond 
to the FIPA iterated contract net interaction protocol (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11: Iterated Contract Net interaction protocol (Source: FIPA, 2002) 
A brief description of the negotiation protocol in Figure 11 can proceed as follows. 
The initiator (broker) sends a call for a proposal to multiple participants 
(collaborating agents). Upon receiving the proposal, collaborating agents either 
agree (propose) or refuse to collaborate, and accordingly, respond to the broker. 
After that, the broker assesses agents’ proposals to the extent that it accepts them or 
suggests further adjustments. It then sends back the revised proposal to collaborating 
agents who finally accept or reject the proposal. Subsection 6.1.2 provides further 
details about an algorithm that corresponds to the iterated contract net interaction 
protocol. 
4.3 Uncertainty and Complexity of Logistical Functions 
The analysis and discussion under this section formalize method and derive relevant 
techniques for modeling a purpose-dependent InfQ dimension (for the selected 
attribute). It also establishes an appropriate approach for modeling incompatible 
preferences. 
4.3.1 Information Uncertainty 
When partners (agents) exchange the precise information, then planning, 
implementation, and control of logistics functions become relatively more 
straightforward. Opposed to this, agents may exchange uncertain information, thus 
leading to inconsistent behavior as well as trust uncertainties. The four attributes that 
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constitute the InfQ on the dimension of data use in the process can describe better 
the uncertain information. These attributes depict the dimensions of data quality 
measurement process as follows (Bobrowski, Marré, & Yankelevich, 1999): 
 Timeliness: data is as up to date as needed; 
 Relevance: every piece of information is essential to get a representation of 
the real world; 
 Accuracy: every set of data represents a real-world situation, and; 
 Completeness: every fact of the real-world is represented, and its value is 
present at the real time. 
Presently, this dissertation employs one attribute, the information accuracy because 
other attributes are currently uneasy to quantify in computational settings. 
Additionally, employing all attributes at once may complicate the model and impose 
difficulties in observing resulting outcomes. 
Literature in logistics and supply chain models the information sharing and 
information accuracy in two standpoints. The first standpoint concerns a qualitative 
stream defined by constructs such as the “no information sharing,” “limited 
information sharing,” and “full information sharing.” This stream has been 
commonly used in (Chan & Chan, 2009; Strader, Lin, & Shaw, 1998; Zhang & 
Zhang, 2007; Zhao & Xie, 2002; Zhou & Lee, 2014) to study how information 
sharing impacts various performances of the chain. The second standpoint concerns 
a quantitative stream which builds on a continuum of the information certainty and 
uncertainty. The certainty and uncertainty usually are defined by a coefficient which 
ranges between the lower and upper bounds. The lower and upper bounds are 
formulated depending on a context of the problem at hand. Firouzi, Jaber, and 
Baglieri (2015) use this stream to investigate the role of trust in a shared forecast 
between the supplier and manufacturer. In their model, Firouzi et al. (2015): 
 Assume that the supplier’s shipment quantity is affected by the coefficient (θ) 
multiplied by the manufacturer’s order quantity (q), such that θ times q is the 
shipment quantity; 
 The coefficient θ is the supplier’s uncertainty on which the manufacturer has 
a belief θ´; 
 The probability distribution of random yield uncertainty (θ) and 
manufacturer’s belief (θ´) is from the same distribution family; although this 
may not occur at the same time. 
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This dissertation uses information accuracy, which is the attribute of the InfQ to 
study trust uncertainties underlying information sharing behavior of partners. This 
information accuracy is modeled using the quantitative stream. Concordant to 
(Firouzi et al., 2015), logistics elements such as the production capacity, market 
demand, and forecasts are modeled to be affected by a specific factor. Through this 
factor, collaborating agents can manipulate (modify/distort) or retain true beliefs 
(actual information) before exchanging that information to others. 
The influential situations that surround partners, such as previous trustworthiness, 
determine a degree to which partners distort the actual information. Therefore, upon 
considering such situations, three categories of factors (affection) can affect a degree 
of information accuracy: 
 Negative distortion (or negative information accuracy) that is denoted by a 
symbol “γ.” This category of distortion implies that partner chooses to 
exchange information, which is below an exact value; 
 No distortion (or neutral information accuracy) that is denoted by the symbol 
“α.” This category of distortion implies that partner chooses to exchange 
information that is equal to the exact value. As well, partners may exchange 
information whose distortion is small and tolerable, and; 
 Positive distortion (or positive information accuracy) that is denoted by the 
symbol “ß.” This category of distortion implies that partner chooses to 
exchange information that is above the exact value. 
It is crucial to note that each factor comprise a set, from which partners select 
elements to use in affecting the accuracy of information. The affection materializes 
by multiplying the chosen factor with a real-world situation data. For example, let 
q0 denote the real-world data, and qn denote the value of affection. Then the affection 
is of the form: qn = q0 + q0 * factor. To illustrate, if q0 is 100 units and factor is -0.15 
then the value after affection is 85 units (qn = 100 + 100 * -0.15). The factor is a 
coefficient whose value may be negative, zero, or positive.  
4.3.2 Synchronization of Complex Decisions 
Many collaboration scenarios assume that partners’ preferences in decision rights 
are compatible. However, such assumption seems to contradict because there are 
incidences when decision positions taken by collaborating agents may be 
incompatible. By incompatible, it means that agents can take positions in decision 
rights that differ. Incompatible preferences in collaboration are distasteful, 
henceforth, a need to compromise (synchronize). In collaborative logistics, one can 
encounter major incompatible preferences on issues such as the production, 
distribution, and demand for goods (refer to Okdinawati, Simatupang, and 
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Sunitiyoso (2014) for detailed discussions). The synchronization hinges on 
calibrating individual agents’ position to an agreement. Since the synchronization 
process involves complex decision-making, it has to be guided by an appropriate 
resolution approach. For this reason, employing a confrontation analysis approach 
helps to study and model conflicting preferences. 
A methodological approach to confrontation analysis is grounded in drama theory, 
although it has its background in mathematics. The approach involves the characters 
as players (agents). Such characters may consist of individuals, groups or 
organizations that deal with each other (Azar, Khosravani, & Jalali, 2012). 
Typically, the approach and method, together, emphasize that characters have 
options to their decisions and interact through particular episodes. The four blocks 
that builds this episodic frames (Bennett & Howard, 1996; Howard, Bennett, Bryant, 
& Bradley, 1993): who are the relevant agent types; choices open to each agent 
type; consequences (outcomes) of various choice combinations, and; agents’ 
preferences for outcomes. 
Built on this framework, open choices in preferences may contain a point in a 
decision which becomes a last and uncongenial (also called dilemma). Agents face 
dilemmas at a point when each of the participating agents has taken a position that 
it considers as final (a moment of truth), which may be compatible or incompatible 
(Murray-Jones & Howard, 2001). If positions are found to be compatible, 
collaboration continues to subsequent stages. If positions are incompatible agents 
have to negotiate by synchronizing (calibrating) positions in their conflicting 
preferences. Although agents get into negotiation, it is not mandatory that always 
they will end up in a compromised state. 
To any occurring dilemma, according to (Bryant, 2007), a character may respond by 
changing its position; amending its preferences for the possible outcomes; denying 
that the dilemmas exist, or; taking irreversible unilateral action. There exist six 
dilemmas in total. They are the dilemma of cooperation, the dilemma of trust, the 
dilemma of persuasion, the dilemma of rejection, the dilemma of positioning, and 
the dilemma of a threat (Bennett, 2004; Bryant, 2007; Hermawan, Kobayashi, & 
Kijima, 2008; Murray-Jones & Howard, 2001). The first two dilemmas are referred 
to as dilemmas of collaboration mode, while the remaining are dilemmas of conflict 
mode. Presently, this dissertation draws on dilemmas of conflict mode and advances 
specifically on dilemmas of persuasion and rejection.  
To compromise conflicting preferences, agents engage in negotiation whereby some 
agents convince others to accept their positions or follow them otherwise. Although 
there may exist many principles to guide the negotiation process, this study employs 
a negotiation process that rests on anchoring and adjustment principles. Proposed in 
(Bazerman, 1998), the anchoring and adjustment principles require that agents take 
decisions by starting from an initial value and adjusting to the final decision. 
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This dissertation employs five conflicting preferences to investigate an impact they 
generate on trust. These conflicting preferences (Table 4) are adapted from 
Okdinawati et al. (2014). 
Table 4: A matrix of conflicting preferences and threatened future 
The definition of each preference is as follows: 
 Demand mode (P1): Receiver prefers fluctuated demand of goods due to 
uncertain market demand; 
 Profit mode (P2): Carrier prefers increasing profit by increasing transportation 
rates; 
 Production quantities (P3): Shipper prefers producing goods in fixed 
quantities; 
 Delivery quantities (P4): Carrier prefers delivering goods in fixed quantities, 
and; 
 Full capacity or not (P5): Carrier prefers to deliver goods in full capacity of 
its carriage. 
For example, looking from Table 4 and preference (P1), receiver prefers uncertain 
demand while the shipper and carrier prefer the absolute demand. In this case, the 
threatened future is an uncertain demand which is the receiver’s position. The 
receiver has to persuade the shipper and carrier or reject the existence of this threat.  
4.4 Interdisciplinary Collaborative Systems 
The economic and social theoretical foundations inspire the proposed trust 
mechanism concept in chapter 5. These foundations also link to control approaches, 
agents’ interactions, and negotiation protocols. This interdisciplinary loop in 
 
Agent 
 
Options 
Agent’s Position Threatened 
Future Shipper Receiver Carrier 
Receiver Demand mode 
(P1) 
Certain 
demand  
Uncertain 
demand 
Certain demand Uncertain 
demand 
Carrier Profit  
mode (P2) 
Reduce 
transport costs 
Reduce 
transport costs 
Reduce transport 
costs or increase 
transport rates 
Increase transport 
rates 
Shipper Production 
quantities (P3) 
Fixed 
quantities 
Consistent 
with demand 
Both options Fixed quantities 
 
Carrier 
Delivery 
quantities (P4) 
Consistent with 
demand 
Consistent 
with demand 
Fix delivery 
quantities 
Fix delivery 
quantities 
Full capacity or 
not (P5) 
Both options Both options Full capacity Full capacity 
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foundation backups from Nooteboom (2003) who concludes that trusting processes 
among people and organizations need to take into account the economic and social 
phenomena. For this reason, the transaction cost economics, social exchange, and 
social dilemma foundations are mainly applied to guide the development of trust 
mechanism concept (Figure 12). 
Transaction Cost 
Economics
Social 
Exchange 
Social 
Dilemma
Governance mechanisms
Behaviors and 
interactions
Conflicts and 
resolutions
 
Figure 12: An interdisciplinary theoretical foundation to trust mechanism 
Firstly, principles of transaction cost economics, which address on the firm existence 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) are used to establish collaborative logistics as a 
form of firms. This establishment employs, for example, the principles of 
information search, bargaining, and reinforcement. Secondly, self-reinforcing 
principles in relational or social exchanges are used to guide characterization 
(description and representation) of behavior exhibited by partners during 
collaborative interactions. In particular, principles of learning, social-ability 
(Bandura, 1977, 1986), and propositions of value and rationality (Homans, 1974) 
are employed. Thirdly, it is prominent that partners can exhibit behavior, which 
procreates not only misunderstandings but also dilemmas. To synchronize (manage 
and resolve) resulting dilemmas (conflicting preferences), a confrontation analysis 
method proposed in (Bennett, 1998, 2004; Hermawan et al., 2008; Murray-Jones & 
Howard, 2001) is applied. Furthermore, development of the trust mechanism in 
chapter 5 pursues a common framework of a causal chain proposed in Möllering 
(2006). 
Finally, it is worthy to note that this dissertation seeks not to describe and discuss in 
details of each concept and principle underlying the three theoretical foundations. It 
is for this reason that readers are referred to sources for further details. 
4.5 Trust Modeling Approaches 
The focus of this section is to present an establishment that answers a question: in 
the context of the outlined research problem, which approach can appropriately be 
used to model trust? This question is answered by analyzing and discussing the three 
modeling approaches, namely: reputation, game-theory, and cognition. The analysis 
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and discussion partly draw from other related works in (Adams, Flear, Taylor, Hall, 
& Karthaus, 2010; Artz & Gil, 2007; Pinyol & Sabater-Mir, 2013; Sherchan, Nepal, 
& Paris, 2013). 
4.5.1 Reputation Approach 
Trust generated using a reputation system is commonly referred to as reputation-
based trust. Reputation-based trust is established from past interactions or 
performance of an entity to assess agent’s future behavior (Artz & Gil, 2007). For 
example, the e-markets (such as the eBay and Amazon) and digital match platforms 
(such as the Uber, Bla Blar Car, and Airbnb) establish and manage trust by mainly 
relying on online reputation systems. 
The reputation systems (whether traditional or online ones) carry strengths and 
limitations. On the one hand, the reputation approach appears richer in third-party 
information, obtainable from non-direct interactions or observations. This richness 
provides supplementary understanding that is relevant to help trustor-agent 
undertake trusting-decisions. On the other hand, firstly, the reputation systems may 
be biased due to unfair ratings or change of identity. Secondly, reputation systems 
lack a direct involvement of the trustor-agent, which as a result, hinders direct 
interactions and observations. Therefore, in itself, reputation approach to trust 
modeling in collaborative logistics is insufficient. It may instead become a 
constituent element in other trust modeling approaches. 
4.5.2 Game-theory Approach 
The second consideration is inclined to a game-theory approach. The game-theory 
is a mathematical system to analyze and predict (prognosticate) how humans behave 
in strategic situations (Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2002). The game-theory involves 
strategic decision-making by participants in contexts where characters do not 
communicate. According to this approach, before its decision-making, the trustor-
agent attempts to predict an outcome of its decision thereby trying to refer to what 
the trustee-agent will do as a reaction. This approach offers a wide range of choices 
and associated pay-offs, upon which engaged agents have to go for (for example, in 
the prisoner’s dilemma). 
There exists underlying assumption in the analysis of games. In particular, the 
assumption to a standard equilibrium analysis of the game is that all agents think 
strategically, optimize their choices, and adjust their responses to an equilibrium 
(Camerer et al., 2002). Still, this assumption holds only to an entirely rational agent, 
who is capable of unlimited information sensing. The agent has to be a mythical hero 
who knows a solution of all mathematical problems and able to perform all needed 
computations (Selten, 1999). Be that it may, these propositions to the rational agent 
4.5   Trust Modeling Approaches 
62 
seem contradicted. People tend to do only a few steps of iterated reasoning and then 
stop because the reasoning is too complicated (Robinson, 2004). Moreover, while 
not every player behaves rationally in complex situations (Camerer et al., 2002), 
human-agents find it extremely hard to define their preferences consistently over 
outcomes (Jennings et al., 2001). In practice, game-theory models have given good 
results in scenarios involving the least complex interactions, in e-markets, for 
example (Sabater & Sierra, 2005). Given these points, the game-theoretical approach 
may be appropriate to problem domains other than the trust in sharing logistics 
resources. 
In the viewpoint of trust requirements in collaborative logistics, the game-theory 
approach is limited as follows. According to Bachmann (2011), game-theoretical 
models: reduce trust to an utterly calculative decision, and; tend to focus on 
relationships between two agents, without showing much interest in the broader 
context in individualized decisions. In addition to the complexity of the trust 
scenarios, under game-theory approach: decision-making appears a guess, and; 
when players are human beings, a generalization of results can be challenging. 
Following this limitation, Sabater and Sierra (2005) propose to explore other 
possibilities such as combining game-theory with the cognitive approach. 
4.5.3 Cognitive Approach 
Cognitive modeling approach employs cognitive aspects of human agency into 
computational settings. It stands on coherent beliefs about different trustee’s 
characteristics and reasoning about these beliefs to make trusting-decisions 
(Ramchurn, Huynh, & Jennings, 2004). Clancey, Sierhuis, Damer, and Brodsky, 
(2005) propose to integrate cognitive models with social studies. Clancey et al. 
further suggest shifting from modeling not only goals and tasks (why people do what 
they do) but also behavioral patterns (what people do when they are engaged in 
purposeful activities). In a standpoint of this proposition, trust modeling that 
employs integrated socio-cognition has its first initiation in (Castelfranchi & 
Falcone, 2001, 2005; Falcone, Pezzulo, & Castelfranchi, 2003). 
One the one hand, the integrated socio-cognitive approach is more suitable for 
modeling trust within the context of the outlined research problem than its 
counterparts. This suitability grounds on reasons that the socio-cognitive modeling 
is closer to the artificial modeling of mind, and theory of delegation; is non-reducible 
to a pure probability or risk index; it links beliefs and decisions, and; it is analytically 
powerful on the dynamic property of trust (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2001). Such 
modeling distinguishes itself from models that are focused only on cognitive aspect, 
which in the end impose limitations, as follows. Firstly, cognitive models lack 
explanations on how they bootstrap and they focus on the internal components while 
ignoring how such components are built (Pinyol & Sabater-Mir, 2013). Secondly, 
forming beliefs comprising the cognitive models is not a trivial matter (Burnett, 
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2006). Thirdly, cognitive models seem to lack explicit details on the calculus of their 
evaluations. Therefore, to uncover these limitations, the concept of trust mechanism 
proposed in chapter 5 rests on the integration of social and cognitive aspects. These 
aspects mimic representation of human being. Subsections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 provide 
further clarification on such aspects. 
4.6 Models of Trust and Reputation 
The current section presents the analysis and comparison of existing models of trust 
and reputation. The analysis and comparison are meant to reveal an extent to which 
existing models, in their current forms, can suitably address the research problem 
defined already. Accomplishment of this task centers on establishing whether the 
already existing models are adequate to apply in developing needed trust mechanism 
or; have limitations to uncover through extending such models.  
A plethora of trust and reputation models exist within the literature. It may even be 
tough to survey, analyze, and compare them, as well as deliberating for their 
strengths and limitations. Efforts to overcome this challenge and spot well-known 
models, relied on an alternative technique. Such technique involved analysis of 
literary works, which had reviewed (surveyed) models of trust and reputation. The 
analysis of literary works was preferred because, usually review articles provide, 
among others, a summary of literature concerning most models of trust and 
reputations, but also their preliminary strengths and limitations. 
In particular, this analysis builds on the previous survey works carried out in (Artz 
& Gil, 2007; Audun, Roslan, & Boyd, 2007; Pinyol & Sabater-Mir, 2013; Sabater 
& Sierra, 2005; Sherchan et al., 2013). Afterward, models that seem to be suitable 
are selected. The selection updates a list of other models, considered on the merit of 
researcher’s experience. The extent to which a particular model is well-known and 
highly cited throughout the literature also constitutes a guide in the selection. 
Finally, a purposeful selection ended up by concluding four models, namely: 
SPORAS (Zacharia & Maes, 2000), FIRE (Huynh, Jennings, & Shadbolt, 2006), 
Castelfranchi & Falcone –C&F (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010), and 
BDI+Repage (Pinyol, Sabater-Mir, Dellunde, & Paolucci, 2012). These models are 
well-known for their attempts to address trust and reputation challenges in various 
domains other than collaboration in sharing logistics resources. It is worthy to note 
that the C&F and SPORAS models address trust and reputation, respectively, 
whereas; the FIRE and BDI+Repage address both trust and reputation. 
4.6.1 Analysis 
The outlined models are analyzed based on the benchmark criteria used in (Artz & 
Gil, 2007; Audun et al., 2007; Pinyol & Sabater-Mir, 2013; Sabater & Sierra, 2005; 
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Sherchan et al., 2013) for surveying/reviewing the literature and classify trust and 
reputation mechanisms/models. Guided by this benchmark, seven criteria to analyze 
the models are specified. They are information sources, model’s granularity, agent-
oriented approach, paradigm type, procedural dimensions, visibility, and model’s 
conceptuality. There are sub-criteria supplementing each criterion. 
 Information sources: It refers to origins, from which information needed to 
generate trust or reputation get collected. Information required can be 
collected as direct experiences (Pinyol & Sabater-Mir, 2013; Sabater & Sierra, 
2005; Sherchan et al., 2013), sociological information, and witness 
information (Pinyol & Sabater-Mir, 2013; Sabater & Sierra, 2005). As 
considered one of the most valuable sources of information, the direct 
experience can result from direct interactions or direct observations (Pinyol & 
Sabater-Mir, 2013). Sabater and Sierra (2005) distinguish the two experiences 
as follows. The former, as used by many trust and reputation models, is the 
experience that stands on the direct interaction with the partner-agent(s). The 
latter, uncommon and restricted to specific scenarios, is the experience that 
stands on the observed interaction with other members of the community. 
The second source, sociological information, depends on social relations 
between agents and the role that these agents play (Sabater & Sierra, 2005). 
The third source, witness information, is an information source obtainable 
through third-parties. Such third-parties, in most cases, are expected to have 
previously interacted with a target agent. Pinyol and Sabater-Mir (2013) also 
refer to such information as the information gathered from other agents. 
Another source of information is the certified reputation. It comprises ratings 
presented by the rated agent about itself, as obtained from its partners based 
on past interactions (Pinyol & Sabater-Mir, 2013). 
 Model’s granularity: This criterion clarifies whether a trust or reputation 
model is context specific or multi-context one. Identifying the right context 
for a piece of information or using the same information in several contexts is 
two examples of the capabilities defining a real multi-context model (Sabater 
& Sierra, 2005). Pinyol and Sabater-Mir (2013) refer to the granularity as the 
context-dependence of trust/reputation information. 
 Agent-Oriented Approach: An agent may apply the social or solitary 
approach to assess trust and reputation. Under the solitary approach, a 
calculation of potential cooperation partners is solely conducted by the 
individual agent by relying on its past experiences (ERep, 2006). 
Contrastingly, under the social approach, the assessment is mostly conducted 
by the individual agent, although it can also employ third-party information. 
4   Current Trust Mechanisms in Collaborative Logistics 
65 
 Paradigm Type: Building on Sabater and Sierra (2005) as well as Pinyol and 
Sabater-Mir (2013), the trust and reputation models can be classified cognitive 
or numeric (mathematical). A model is cognitive if its notion of trust or 
reputation builds on beliefs and their degrees, and; numeric if an explicit 
representation of cognitive notions is lacking (Pinyol & Sabater-Mir, 2013). 
In analyzing models of trust and reputation, this dissertation reflects the 
paradigm type criterion in the form of “Evaluation”. Meaning that the 
analysis of the model focuses on establishing whether the evaluation follows 
a numeric or cognitive approach. 
 Procedural dimension: It describes an extent to which evaluation procedures 
or calculus of a given model is detailed (implicit or explicit). Implicit 
representation is standard in some cognitive models, although some non-
cognitive models also lack explicit details on the calculus of their evaluations 
(Pinyol & Sabater-Mir, 2013). Moreover, concerning the assessment of trust 
and reputation, many models use Likert scaling to rate trust and reputation by 
employing various levels. The typical levels are 3 and 5, although some 
studies use 10. 
 Visibility: It distinguishes between the global and subjective properties of 
agent’s trust or reputation information. The agent information can be 
considered a: global property if all other agents can observe it; or private and 
subjective property that each agent builds (Pinyol & Sabater-Mir, 2013). 
Under the subjective property, each agent assigns a personalized 
trust/reputation value to each member of the community (Sabater & Sierra, 
2005). 
 Model’s conceptuality: This criterion is used to classify whether a model of 
trust or reputation is conceptualized as cognitive or game-theoretical. 
A short description of each model precedes the classification and comparison. 
Notably, for a detailed description of models, readers can refer to sources. 
The SPORAS Model 
SPORAS (Zacharia & Maes, 2000) is a reputation mechanism for building trust in 
online marketplace community where users rate each other. Its algorithm stands on 
four principles: 
 New users start with a minimum reputation value; 
 The reputation value of a user never falls below the reputation of a new user; 
 After each transaction, user’s reputation value becomes updated; 
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 Two users may rate each other only once, and; 
 Highly rated users experience much smaller rating changes. 
The FIRE Model 
FIRE is an integrated trust and reputation model for open multi-agent systems 
(Huynh et al., 2006). It integrates trust and reputation based on many information 
sources to produce a comprehensive assessment of an agent’s likely performance. 
Specifically, the FIRE integrates four different types of trust and reputation: 
 Interaction trust resulting from experience; 
 Role-based trust defined by various role-based relationships; 
 Witness reputation built from reports of witnesses, and; 
 A certified reputation built from third-party references. 
The C & F Model 
The C&F is a socio-cognitive model of trust founded on agents’ belief. According 
to this model, agents act by the degree of reliability and certainty they attribute to 
their beliefs (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010). Such beliefs are to be evaluated based 
on (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010):  
 The value of the content of that belief; 
 Sources of that belief (whether it is another agent, own inference process, a 
perceptive sense of mine); 
 How the source evaluates the belief (the subjective certainty of the source 
itself); 
 How the trustor evaluates this source (about this belief). 
The outlined beliefs are essential ingredients to the mental state of a trustor to have 
a goal that it achieves by delegating a task to the trustee (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 
2000). 
The BDI + Repage Model: 
The BDI + Repage (Pinyol et al., 2012) model is a result of integration of logic-
based cognition in Repage (Sabater, Paolucci, & Conte, 2006) model. This 
integration employs human cognitive reasoning defined by a Belief-Desire-Intention 
logic. This belief logic relates closely to those stated in (Wooldridge, 2009), 
although there are additional contexts. Pinyol et al. (2012) conceive these logics as 
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Belief Context (BC), Desire context (DC), and Intention Context (IC). On top of 
these contexts, there are other four contexts: Planner Context (PC), Communication 
Context (CC), Repage Context (RC), and the Grounding (GrC).  
After providing the brief description that underlies each model, a next task is to 
analyze the models based on criteria, which are already specified. Results of this 
analysis are provided in a tabular form (Table 5) to simplify an overall presentation. 
Table 5: Analysis of the models of trust and reputation 
Criteria Sub-criteria SPORAS FIRE C&F BDI+ Repage 
 
 
Information 
sources 
Direct experience     
Witness information   x  
Certified reference x  x x 
Categorization x x  x 
Reasoning x x   
Model’s 
granularity 
Context dependent x    
Non-context dependent  x x x 
Agent-Oriented 
Approaches  
Social     
Solitary x x  x 
Evaluation Numeric    x  
Cognitive x x   
Procedural 
dimension 
Explicit   x  
Implicit x x  x 
Likert scale size 5 5  5 
Visibility Subjective x    
Global  x x x 
Model’s 
conceptuality 
Game-theoretical   x x 
Cognitive x x   
“” means supported      |     “”means partly supported     |     “x” means not supported 
Subsection 4.6.2 provides a detailed discussion on comparing the four models. It 
also identifies limitations and suitability of the models.  
4.6.2 Comparison of Models: Limitations and Suitability 
The two streams, suitability and limitations (in Table 6) lead this comparison. Firstly, 
regarding limitations, each model is assessed by scrutinizing its inability to address 
the outlined research problem. Secondly, regarding suitability, each model is again 
assessed to determine an extent to which it can suitably address the defined research 
problem. In the end, as the input to chapter 5, a course of action proposed for 
developing the TrustMech concept is recommended. Considerations towards 
assessing the models proceed as follows. 
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The first consideration hinges upon the SPORAS model. About its limitations, this 
model stands on mechanisms, which do not incorporate formal logics of reasoning. 
Notably, its calculus of on trust evaluation is purely numeric. The numerical 
evaluation, usually, denies a reflection of the human reasoning mechanics and notion 
of belief. However, in view of its suitability, the Likert scale size and direct 
experience (information source) used by SPORAS are worth to draw on. Following 
these limitations, the SPORAS model, in its current form is assessed to be unsuitable. 
Furthermore, even upon considering extending the SPORAS, yet it remains hard to 
fulfill requirements of the TrustMech concept. 
Table 6: Suitability and limitations of the trust and reputation models 
The second consideration involves the FIRE model. Conceptually, the FIRE model 
rests on the game-theory approach. Since the game-theory approach is already 
conclusively inappropriate, the FIRE model seems unsuitable to extend. Even 
though, similar to the SPORAS, proposed mechanism in chapter 5 applies the Likert 
scale size of 5 that the FIRE model has also employed. 
The final consideration builds on comparing the C&F and BDI+Repage models. 
While both models rest on a conceptual paradigm of the socio-cognition, they carry 
differences in the evaluation and procedural dimension criteria. First, unlike the 
BDI+Repage which employs the numeric and cognitive evaluations, the C&F 
employs only the cognitive evaluation. Second, whereas the procedural dimension 
of the C&F seems implicit, that of the BDI+Repage model is rather explicit. Third, 
compared to the C&F model whose evaluation scale appears unclear, the 
Model Suitability Limitations 
SPORAS  Can control agents with a bad reputation  
 Can reduce biases resulting from multiple 
submissions 
 Incorporates agents’ social-ability 
 Lacks the formal logics of reasoning 
 Susceptible to rating noise due to treating all 
ratings equally (Huynh et al., 2006) 
 Penalizes newcomers and may discourage them 
from participating in the community (Huynh et 
al., 2006) 
FIRE  Integrates many information sources to 
produce agent’s likely performance 
 Incorporates agents’ social-ability 
 Less feasible to agent’s ability to evaluate trust 
for itself, especially in highly dynamic 
interactions 
 Assumes agents report their trust information 
truthfully (Huynh et al., 2006) 
 Lack cognitive reasoning 
C & F  Modeling approach follows human mental, 
cognitive ability 
 It incorporates agents’ social-ability 
 It remains unspecified how agents obtain 
information to build their beliefs (Sabater & 
Sierra, 2005) 
 Implicit establishment of weight assigned to 
sources of belief 
 Trust evaluation is unclear 
BDI+ 
Repage 
 Incorporates agents’ social-ability 
 Modeling approach follows human mental 
cognition ability 
A mechanism on how to obtain realistic 
probabilities to be assigned to each belief is 
unclearly established and difficult to attain 
practically 
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BDI+Repage model uses the Likert scale whose size is 5. As well, the C&F model 
incorporates solitary agent-orientation. Therefore, resulting from outlined suitability 
and limitations, this dissertation builds (extends) on strengths of the C & F and 
BDI+Repage models, while uncovering their underlying limitations. Strengths of the 
SPORAS and FIRE models are as well incorporated. 
4.6.3 Main Contributions 
The goal of this subsection is to derive (specify) main contributions, which the 
proposed trust mechanism concept in chapter 5 provides. These contributions result 
from limitations unveiled in the C & F and BDI+Repage models and are threefold. 
In particular, analyzed models lack to address adequately critical issues about belief 
weight mechanism, explicit evaluation, and learning enforcement. 
Belief Mechanism 
Both models almost attempt to assign weights on each of the generated sources of 
beliefs. Assigning weights on beliefs raise open challenges about the viability of an 
underlying mechanism responsible for generating needed weights (especially in 
virtual reality). Even when it is claimed to be there, such mechanism appears to 
assign weights implicitly and thus imposing consequent difficulties to obtain needed 
(assumed) realism. There are backup reasons as to why the assignment of weight is 
seen to be difficult. First, a human trusting process is a mix of two notions 
(component): cognition and emotion. A question thrown up is to whether assigned 
weight takes into account their mix or is inclined to one component.  Second, 
quantifying such beliefs in real-life trust problem is not a trivial matter. Third, such 
weighted beliefs seem to correspond to an intention of trusting where the trustor 
develops only a willingness to assume the risk but not to take the risk. This means 
that beliefs are only used to develop a propensity for trusting where a party can still 
withdraw its intention to trust. In overcoming this limitation, the proposed trust 
mechanism puts no weight on beliefs. Instead, the trustor-agent processes received 
beliefs and decide on whether it proceeds to trusting action or abort. 
Explicit Evaluation of Trust in a Perspective of Expectation 
Evaluation of trust and reputation in the C&F model is implicit. The C&F model 
evaluates trust based on fuzzy cognitive maps whose representations are even more 
implicit. Although evaluation of trust in the BDI+Repage models is explicit, still it 
seems that it needs further improvement. The BDI+Repage evaluate trust and 
reputation based on beliefs whose weight assignments appear impractical to unveil. 
Additionally, the BDI+Repage evaluate trust by using both the numeric and 
cognitive approaches. Thus, on account of these limitations, proposed TrustMech 
evaluates trust based upon an analogy of a human trusting process that propagates 
in three primary stages. In particular, the TrustMech evaluates trust by comparing 
an expectation developed during an action to trusting against a score realized after 
4.7   Summary and Conclusion 
70 
execution of a transaction. This evaluation approach goes in parallel with what 
Vangen and Huxham (2008) propose that each time partners act together; they take 
a risk and form expectations concerning intended outcomes. According to authors, 
trusting behavior becomes reinforced when the outcome meets expectations.  
Learning Reinforcement 
The proposed TrustMech incorporates learning enforcement to make the mechanism 
more cognitive in a socio-able context. This enforcement builds on principles of 
social behavior and learning. The learning enforcement improves the proposed 
TrustMech in comparison with its counterparts, on the one hand. On the other hand, 
it marks trust dynamics in view of a reciprocal property of trust. 
4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
The current chapter has presented state of the art on keys issues related to the 
research problem outlined in chapter 1 and broadly discussed in chapter 2. It has 
presented the analysis, discussion, and in other sections, the assessment of the 
behavioral factors influencing trust in collaborative logistics, and; trust-based 
interactions. The chapter has also addressed issues about uncertainty in information 
sharing; complexity in decision-making; modeling approaches, as well as; existing 
models of trust and reputations. In particular, contents of this chapter are both 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary. 
Concluding remarks in this chapter comprises the following statements. First, 
partner behavior under the influence of collaborative logistics processes reinforces 
trusting outcomes. In a current form, this reinforcement relies on three collaborative 
processes, which are the information sharing, sharing scheme, and decision 
synchronization. To highlight this, the exchange of poor quality information, use of 
unfair sharing methods, and exercising power and decisions in a manner that 
excludes consideration of other partners; together, can procreate trust uncertainties. 
Second, in regard to trust modeling approaches, out of the reputation, game-
theoretical, and cognitive approaches, the socio-cognitive approach appeals the best 
approach that suits the context to the research problem. Third, shippers, carriers, 
receivers, and warehouse manager constitute main categories of collaborating 
partners in logistics. They assume distinct roles, tasks, and exchange a wide range 
of information. As well, collaboration in sharing logistics resources undergoes three 
stages: selection and front-end agreement; engagement and forecast, to; physical 
distribution. Fourthly, out of four well-known models of trust and reputation, no 
model can sufficiently address the outlined research problem. For this reason, the 
TrustMech proposed in chapter 5 stands on strengths of existing models while 
fulfilling limitations of such models. 
The current chapter, among others, has identified strengths and limitations of 
existing works. In view of this, the next chapter (chapter 5) develops the TrustMech 
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concept. The development adapts identified strengths. The main contribution of the 
proposed TrustMech is on the evaluation of trust. The TrustMech follows an explicit 
procedural evaluation, which advances on comparing previously developed 
expectation against a score realized after executing a delegated task.
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5 The TrustMech Concept 
During the research parts of the contents have been published in (Daudi et al., 2016a, 
2016b, 2017b). 
The present chapter is set to detail the development of the Trust Mechanism 
(TrustMech) concept. The development rests on principles, which have been 
introduced in chapter 2 and discussed in chapters 3 and 4. The development also 
concentrates on trust analysis that focuses on the micro-level than macro-level, to 
provide a bottom-up predictive investigation. Additionally, this development 
inclines towards an experimental measurement of trust that grasps trusting behavior 
than attitudes. At first hand, section 5.1 presents the development of the general-
purpose TrustMech concept. As highlighted before, the general-purpose TrustMech 
is a reusable contribution, customizable with little effort to suit domain-specific 
needs. Furthermore, the general-purpose TrustMech is principled to the 
interdisciplinary foundation specified already in section 4.4. Second, the general-
purpose TrustMech is customized to derive the operational TrustMech to logistical 
functions. The customization incorporates measurement variables, derived with 
respect to the functioning of logistics activities (section 5.2). In particular, the 
operational TrustMech is set to investigate the trust problem in the collaborative 
sharing of logistics resources. Succeeding the operational TrustMech is the 
derivation of hypotheses in section 5.3. Test results to these hypotheses constitute 
answers to the fourth research question (RQ4). The chapter ends by providing 
summary and conclusion (section 5.4). 
5.1 The General-Purpose TrustMech 
Development of the general-purpose TrustMech builds on an analogy of the human 
trusting process (Figure 13). This process propagates in three basic stages: 
“propensity to trusting; action to trusting” (Laeequddin et al., 2012), and; task 
execution (observable outcome). Succeeding the task execution is an evaluation 
stage that is twofold: measuring trust, and; assessing trust. 
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Figure 13: Generic TrustMech: analogy of the human trusting process 
In a measurement stage, a quantitative measurement of trust involves comparing an 
established expectation against an observed score (outcome). In an assessment stage, 
there is a mapping between the quantitative and qualitative values. On the whole, 
this human trusting process also corresponds to a Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) 
model of human practical reasoning. In its current form, this propagation is 
conceived generic because it applies to most trusting situations, including those in 
logistical functions. 
5.1.1 Propensity to Trusting 
The propensity to trusting concerns a willingness of a trustor-agent to delegate its 
task in risk-worthy dependencies (an intention to trust). It is a preliminary means to 
figure out whether benefits to task delegation outweigh perceived risks. The 
propensity to trusting is a preliminary evaluation of the trustee set to assess an extent 
to which the trustee-agent can be useful. Usually, assessment of this usefulness 
depends on a goal which the trustor-agent desires to achieve upon delegating its task.  
To achieve this preliminary assessment, the trustor uses beliefs which it possesses, 
or it can acquire from community surroundings it. Usually, beliefs of agents 
comprise of states, facts, knowledge, and or data about the trustee. These beliefs may 
be within agent’s memory itself and other neighborhood territories. If beliefs are 
outside of the agent’s memory, trustor-agent has to inquire them from the third-party 
community (Figure 14).  
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Figure 14: Agent’s learning and social ability in the trusting process 
Towards acquiring external beliefs, the trustor agent ought to possess two core 
features: learning-ability, and; social-ability. An agent who possesses these features 
is conceptually capable of learning from experiences and acts socially through 
repetitive interactions. By repetitive interactions, it means that the trustor-agent 
learns from previous experience and uses acquired beliefs to decide issues regarding 
its next engagement. The learning can be internal or both the internal and external. 
The external learning requires that the trustor-agent acquire new beliefs from third-
parties. Learning from third-parties requires the trustor-agent to communicate with 
third-party agents. This requirement also furnishes a reciprocal property to the trust. 
This property emphasizes that trust is a cause and an effect simultaneously. 
Correspondingly, the principles of learning-ability and social-ability accentuate that, 
human-agents: tend to repeat past rewarding actions, and; learns by observing 
behavior and consequences (outcome) of such behavior. One crucial implication 
brought about by such principles is that real-world agents accumulate beliefs while 
observing how costly or rewarding is past actions they were engaged in previously. 
Moreover, in the preliminary evaluation of the trusting process, humans tend to 
memorize their experience against a situation they are facing at hand (Figure 15). 
It is noteworthy to understand that, the fast memory stores the highest ranking costs 
and rewards (experiences) separate from the main memory. This storage scheme 
seeks to facilitate and speed up the process of recalling and comparing. The present 
dissertation refers to the fast memory as the working or buffer memory (Figure 14 
and Figure 15). Regarding newly acquired beliefs, the memory of agents is normally 
updated at a rate of newly incoming trust experiences (beliefs). 
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Figure 15: Memory structure of the trustor 
The process to recall and compare costs and rewards of past experiences proceeds 
as follows. The trustor-agent retrieves many experiences that are context-specific to 
its intention of trusting. Each retrieved experience match a situation at hand in an 
attempt to figure out possible similarities. Upon finding the matches, the trustor-
agent goes one-step further. This further step is meant to determine extents to which 
matched similarities were costly or rewarding. In a standpoint of social exchange: 
costs comprise of elements, which carry negative values (outcomes), while; rewards 
comprise of elements, which carry positive values (outcomes). Since past 
experiences generate many rewards and costs, among the retrievals, the trustor-agent 
checks for the experience that generated best rewards or worst costs. As far as the 
decision mechanism to costs and rewards are similar, to limit duplicates, discussion 
in subsequent paragraphs advances in a generalized form. Notably, this form of 
generalization advances on the rewards. 
Henceforth, if the best rewarding experience exists and contextual characteristics of 
this reward resemble a situation at hand, the trustor-agent makes decisions. The 
undertaken decision is a replication of the past decision that is expected to reward 
accordingly. At this moment, the trustor may appraise the trustee by preliminarily 
agree to collaborate. 
There are cases when the direct experience may be missing, or the trustor-agent may 
prefer to inquire additional experiences from the third-party community. In this 
situation, the trustor-agent has to socially interact with potential third-parties who 
have had prior interactions with the targeted trustee-agent. Such experiences add 
value to confidence in developing a propensity to trusting. In the end, depending on 
selected characteristics and a degree of their fulfillment, the trustor-agent can 
commit its propensity to trust. After passing this stage, the trustor-agent proceeds to 
a subsequent stage, the action to trusting. 
5.1.2 Action to Trusting 
In general, trust deals with a problem of predicting (forecasting) another actor’s 
future behavior. Towards this prediction, a fundamental role of action in trusting is 
to anticipate an extent to which the trustee-agent may behave. Establishment of this 
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anticipation depends upon a context of a task the trustor-agent delegates to the 
trustee-agent. This dissertation refers to this anticipation as an expectation. It is a 
degree of confidence the trustor-agent develops in the trustee-agent. Development 
of expectation is a forecast process set to figure out what the trustee can perform vis-
à-vis to task delegated to it. It is also a fundamental cognitive reasoning process 
undertaken by humans before executing the transaction to trusting. This transaction 
to trusting occurs only when perceived benefits outweigh possible risks 
(uncertainties).  
The action to trusting is carried out (assessed) by the cognitive agent to predict future 
state and resulting consequences (outcomes). The assessment of results takes one of 
the following global states: withdrawal or acceptance. Withdrawal occurs when the 
trustor-agent is confident that the task it delegates will not be performed as expected 
and respective payoffs will likely be unsatisfactory. In contrast, the acceptance 
occurs when the trustor is confident that the trustee-agent will execute the delegated 
task in a manner it expects and that payoffs will be satisfactory. Once the trustor-
agent delegates its task, it subsequently subjects itself to vulnerabilities that may 
result from the trustee-agent’s actions. The interesting question is, “how do human-
agents develop expectations?” 
Human-agents develop an expectation by building on the rule-norms (r-norms) and 
social-norms (s-norms) of a target community. Here are few examples of such 
norms. Starting with r-norms, in the banking sector, for example, people make fixed 
deposits while expecting interest rate, say of R%. Drivers expect a car to accelerate 
to a speed equivalent to a magnitude to which the driver presses an accelerator pedal. 
Equally, a partner can count that the collaboration is worthy if it gains benefits that 
it was expecting. Examples related to the s-norms are such as an honest person is 
expectedly faithful; expectedly, children below the age of 18 years should not take 
alcoholic drinks, and; users on social media should expectedly not use abusive 
language. In their entirety, expectations can vary from one community to another, as 
well as from one individual to another. Although both r-norms and s-norms prevail, 
the present development on expectation draws on the r-norms. This drawing is 
parallel to the problem statement stated already in chapter 1, which requires 
advancing on the r-norms. 
The mechanism to develop expectation may be generic or context-specific. The 
context-specific mechanism employs benchmark values that are known in a 
community. Such benchmark values may consist of industrial best-in-class or 
averagely known values. For example, a specific value for a given performance 
indicator (say E) may formally become an average score. Thus, every scored value 
(S) that, obtained after executing the transaction to trusting is compared against the 
value E. The outcome of this comparison yields three main possibilities (see in 
Figure 17). One way to develop expectation is to rely on standard (benchmark) 
values, which the community regards as normal or typical practices. In a viewpoint 
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of this, section 6.4 provides a broad discussion on the context-specific mechanism 
of expectation that employs benchmark values. The context-specific mechanism can 
potentially be applied to develop expectations in situations where benchmark values 
are obtainable. If, however, obtaining such benchmark values is difficult, then a need 
to employ a general mechanism to development of expectation arises. 
Unlike the context-specific mechanism, the present provision is set to devise a 
general mechanism of expectation. This expectation may consist of scenarios that 
involve single or multi-trustor agents. Since establishing an expectation for a single-
trustor agent is relatively more straightforward, then the current general mechanism 
focuses on the multi-trustor agents. Foundationally, the general mechanism of 
expectation draws from principles, which can better explain phenomena of 
expectations in human interaction systems. In recalling back, human-agents build 
expectations by looking at past experiences undertaken by themselves or related 
third-parties. In choosing from the multiple past experiences, human-agents tend to 
choose an alternative which by forecasting appear the most rewarding in subsequent 
engagements. Therefore, it is deducible that upon offering the trustor-agent with 
multiple options, the trustor-agent will choose those options it perceives (expects) to 
generate high payoffs (rewards) than low payoffs (cost).  
On account of the outlined establishments, the general mechanism of expectation 
draws from Bandura's (1977, 1986) principle of outcome expectation. According to 
this principle, one determinant of human’s behavior is the expectation of 
consequences of its actions. A subsequent implication of this principle is that 
developed expectation has to correspond to a level of performance, forecasted in 
respect of the trustee’s ability to execute task delegated to it. Within a context of 
collaboration, expectations have to be realistic and set within acceptable limits. 
Meaning that agents have to develop neither lowest nor highest rated expectations. 
One technique that can be applied to set neither lowest nor highest expectation is the 
standard deviation technique. 
The standard deviation is the statistical technique applied to establish acceptable 
limits. Mechanics of this technique go as follows. Assume a collaboration 
consortium to consist of n number of partners (equation 1). 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 = {𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3, … , 𝑃𝑛} … 𝑒𝑞𝑛 1   
Each partner draws from its past experiences a highly ranked reward that it 
previously encountered, and, which also matches better with an underlying context. 
Let such past reward, as denoted by Exp, represents the expectation of that particular 
partner. For all available partners, there shall be a total of n individually estimated 
expectations. In a second step, mean expectation (Expmean) is obtained from 
individually estimated expectation (Expind) (equation 2). 
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𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 =
∑ (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑  𝑜𝑓𝑃𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
n
… 𝑒𝑞𝑛 2 
In a third step, one can obtain the standard deviation to individually established 
expectations (Expsd) as illustrated in equation 3. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑑 =  ±√
∑ (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑  𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
2
… 𝑒𝑞𝑛 3 
A global range of expectation whose size is two times that of the Expsd (Figure 16) 
is consequently, attainable (equation 3). One peculiar feature of global expectation 
is that its range is devised to be customary (CustomExprange). The range is customary 
because each collaborating agent set own expectation. As the expectation of different 
agents is anticipated to differ, then upon applying the Expsd, resulting range will 
consequently, differ (in most incidences). 
Expectation above the average
Expectation below the average
-ve Expsd
+ve Expsd
Mean Expsd Key: sd_A = sd_B
sd_A
sd_B
 
Figure 16: Range of expectation 
Furthermore, since each trustor-agent estimates its expectation, then the mechanism 
checks if such expectation is within acceptable limits. If not, the trustor-agent 
redefines its expectation to ensure that it is within an acceptable range (limits).  
5.1.3 Executing a Transaction to Trusting 
Execution of the transaction is a final stage in which the trustee-agent performs the 
delegated task. This execution also entails a shift of control power, from the trustor-
agent to the trustee-agent. The shift means that when the transaction is under 
execution, the trustor-agent passes (loses) its control at the hands of the trustee-agent 
and waits or observes for resulting outcomes. Such outcome on task delegation 
forms feedback in reference to the already developed expectation. The feedback 
results from comparison of the observed outcome against a corresponding 
expectation. Owing to these provisions, the subsequent subsection presents a 
detailed discussion about this comparison (measurement and assessment of trust). 
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5.1.4 Evaluation of Trust 
The evaluation of trust is twofold: measurement of trust, and; assessment of trust. 
Measurement of trust centers on comparing a degree of expectation developed by 
the trustor-agent when it delegates a task against a real score observed after 
execution of the task. Within a perspective of the human trusting process, this 
comparison is simple to follow and understand but yet sounding logical. Moreover, 
resulting from the comparison of the expectation against the realized score, an 
outcome may comprise of three primary states: below expectation, within 
expectation, and above expectation (Figure 17). 
Below Expectation
Within Expectation
Above Expectation
Observed Outcome
Global 
outcome 
states
 
Figure 17: Global outcome states of the trusting process 
These global states, in their present forms, are operationalized a macro. Due to this, 
refining further those macro levels, for example, can result in the meso level or even 
micro level. The refinement will still depend on the contextual needs and level of 
modeling. In their present form, such states may correspond to a Likert scale of size 
3. After measuring trust, a next task is to assess trust. 
Assessment of trust is meant to interpret quantitative values into qualitative ones. In 
its natural form, trust is a qualitative construct, which is richly understandable in the 
form of attitudinal cues. Owing to this, and in a context where the present study 
investigates trust problem using the experimental method, obtained results have to 
exist (interpreted) into attitudinal values. Interpretation of attitudinal cues requires 
deciding in advance, which a Likert scale size to use. As previously established, this 
dissertation uses the Likert scale of size 5. Assessing trust based on this scale can 
stand on the: standard deviation technique or benchmark values. The standard 
deviation technique requires that the range of expectation indicated in Figure 16 be 
divided into 5 (scale size) equal segments. From left to right, interpretation of the 
segments into attitudinal values is as follows: least trustworthy, less trustworthy, 
trustworthy, more trustworthy, and most trustworthy (Figure 18).  
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Figure 18: Trust meter to measure and assess trust 
To exemplify this, assume that the mean expectation of partner “P1” is seven units, 
and the standard deviation for all collaborating partners is ±3units. Then the range 
of expectation for “P1” will be six units (two times the standard deviation). This 
range expectation lies between 4 (7-3) and 10 (7+3) units. Upon dividing the range 
by Likert scale size (5), it yields an interval of 1.2 units. Let a value observed after 
execution of the transaction to trusting by “P1” be denoted by “score.” Then 
interpretation of resulting trust level into attitudinal value is as follows: 
 Least trustworthy if observed value is in the interval: {4.0 <= score < 5.2}; 
 Less trustworthy if observed value is in the interval: {5.2 <= score < 6.4}; 
 Trustworthy if observed value is in the interval: {6.4 <= score < 7.6}; 
 More trustworthy if observed value is in the interval: {7.6 <= score < 8.8}, 
and; 
 Most trustworthy if observed value is in the interval: {8.8 <= score < 10.0}. 
If another partner, say, “P2” had a mean of expectation of 5 units while the standard 
deviation remains common to all, the range of expectation will lie between 2 units 
(5-3) to 8 units (5+3).  
Unlike the standard deviation technique, the benchmark value technique follows the 
following procedures. Definition of the expectation value has to depend on industry 
practice. Let this value denoted by “scoreInd.” Then values below the scoreInd 
constitute lower expectation while those values above scoreInd constitute upper 
expectation. The range of expectation spans from the lower to upper expectations. 
However, precisely defined range relies usually on prevailing practices of the 
industry as well as the experience of the logistics manager. It is for this reason that 
subsection 6.4.3 presents an example of trust evaluation based on the benchmark 
values, which this dissertation has used to validate the TrustMech, and demonstrate 
5.2   The Operational TrustMech to Logistical Functions 
82 
its application. It is also worthy to note that under the benchmark value technique, 
all partners use similar interval. 
5.2 The Operational TrustMech to Logistical Functions 
Section 5.1 has detailed the development of the TrustMech concept within a 
generalized context. Towards investigating (forecasting) trust uncertainties 
underlying collaborative sharing of logistics resources, the general-purpose 
TrustMech needs refinement. This refinement is unveiled by customizing the 
TrustMech into logistical functions. The customization includes formalizing the 
predictor (independent) and response (dependent) variables, as well as linking them 
to causal mechanics. Further operationalization entails specifying settings, 
especially benchmark values for response variables (section 6.4). Such values are 
separated from the current operationalization because they are adjustable. Moreover, 
in this operationalization, the behavioral factors and parameters influencing trust are 
set as predictor variables. Equally, performances metrics adapted from logistics and 
supply chain are used to define response variables. 
On the whole, the operationalization supposes that parametric variations (input) are 
set into the TrustMech to produce (output) a corresponding reflection in response 
variables (results). In the end, evaluation of trust uses generated results with an 
assumption that distinct parametric variations will generate distinct and similar 
effects on performance metrics, and subsequently, the trust. 
5.2.1 Predictor Variables 
Three primary predictor variables procreate trust pains to the collaboration in sharing 
logistics resources. The predictor variables are the information sharing, incentive 
scheme, and decision synchronization (Table 7).  
Table 7: The predictor variables and their sub-variables7 
Each main variable comprises sub-variables. This modeling supposes that variations 
in sub-variables either in isolation or combination will yield the distinct trusting 
                                                             
7 Note: These predictor variables are not meant to be exhaustive 
Main predictor variables Sub-predictor variables 
Information sharing 
(Information accuracy) 
Positive accuracy; neutral accuracy, and; negative accuracy 
Incentive Scheme Distance traveled; the number of customers served; total load 
shipped, and; general 
Decision synchronization Demand mode –P1; profit  mode –P2; production quantities –
P3; delivery quantities –P4, and; full capacity or not –P5 
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outcomes. In reference to this, sections 4.1 and 4.3 have already presented discussion 
regarding details about the principal and sub-predictor variables. 
5.2.2 Response Variables 
Response variables used in the operational TrustMech are at first hand derived from 
the Supply Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) model (Supply Chain Council, 
2012). Subsequently, related works which have adopted and adapted metrics of the 
SCOR model constitute a basis for deriving response variables. Such works are 
unlimited to logistics metrics affected by collaborative transportation management 
(VICS, 2004); logistics performance measurement systems (Gunasekaran, Patel, & 
Tirtiroglu, 2001), and; a framework for measuring performance in a supply chain 
(Gunasekaran et al., 2001). This derivation is meant to serve the validation and 
application purposes. For this reason, selected, response variables do not constitute 
a complete list (unmeant to be exhausted). They are instead used to validate the 
TrustMech as well as demonstrating how useful and applicable the TrustMech is. 
Accordingly, the response variables may be changed to fit contextual needs of a 
respective logistics manager but also a business domain. 
The employed response variables (metrics) can be explained in perspective proposed 
by Audy et al. (2012). Such perspective distinguishes between qualitative and 
quantitative benefits of collaborative logistics. Although two streams of benefits are 
notable, this study concentrates on the quantitative benefits of collaborative 
logistics, constituted by shareable and non-shareable benefits. 
There are five performance perspectives set to serve measurement and analysis of 
processes underlying the supply chain. These perspectives emphasize (Supply Chain 
Council, 2012): 
 Reliability –an ability to perform tasks as expected by focusing on the 
predictability of the outcome of a process; 
 Responsiveness –a speed at which entities perform tasks for providing 
products or services to the customer; 
 Agility –an ability to respond to external influences such as the marketplace 
changes; 
 Cost –the cost of operating the supply chain processes such as the 
management and transportation costs, and; 
 Asset management efficiency (asset) –an ability to efficiently utilize assets. 
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The present operationalization employs some metrics from three attributes, which 
are the reliability, cost, and asset. Currently, other attributes such as the 
responsiveness and agility are unconsidered because it is much difficult to 
accommodate them in a prototype that implement the operational TrustMech. A 
reason behind is that the prototype to operational TrustMech does not incorporate 
time functions due to technical constraints, but also to reduce resulting complexities. 
To this end, Key Performance Indicators (KPI) defined under the attributes of the 
reliability, cost, and asset (Table 8) are purposely selected out multiple KPIs defined 
in SCOR model.  
Table 8: Purposely selected response variables8 
The selected KPIs provide partners the potential chances to behave in both deceitful 
and trustworthy manner concurrently. Other KPIs such as the item location accuracy, 
delivery quantity accuracy, and delivery location accuracy provide insignificant 
chances for partner exhibit deceitful and trustworthy behavior concurrently. 
Additionally, although this selection is unexhausted, yet it remains relevant to serve 
the purpose of validation and application. The response variables presented in Table 
8 are defined as follows: 
 Forecast accuracy defined as the difference between the forecasted value (F) 
and the actual value (A) (Armstrong, 2001); 
 Order fill rate defined as the number of order lines/cases/SKUs delivered in 
full divided by the total number of lines/cases/SKUs ordered (VICS, 2004); 
 Backorders as a percent of total orders defined as the portion of total orders 
that held and shipped late due to lack of availability of stock (Manrodt, 
Vitasek, & Tillman, 2011); 
 Distribution cost as a percent of sales defined as the cost to run distribution 
relative to total sales (Manrodt et al., 2011); 
                                                             
8 Note: These response variables are not intended to be exhaustive. They are rather selected for 
demonstrating the application to the operational TrustMech. 
Orientation Performance attribute Response variables 
 
Customer-oriented 
perspective 
 
 
Reliability 
Forecast accuracy 
Order fill rate 
Backorders as a percent of total orders 
 
 
Internal-oriented 
perspective 
 
Cost 
Distribution cost as percent of sales 
Cost saving 
 
Asset utilization 
Vehicle fill 
Full truck load 
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 Cost saving defined as the potential financial collaboration benefit evaluated 
based on freight cost per pallet (Audy et al., 2012); 
 Vehicle fill defined as the average volume of vehicles used divided by the total 
volume of vehicles (VICS, 2004); 
 Full Truck Load (FTL) defined as the number of trucks with over 95% of 
volume full divided by the total number of trucks shipped  (VICS, 2004). 
Succeeding a specification of predictor and response variables is a logic underlying 
a causal chain of trust. To fulfill this, the present operationalization follows a 
fundamental logic of trust causal chain, adapted in part from Möllering (2006). 
Essentially, the logic of trust propagation exhibits the following sequence. That, (a) 
partner behavior under the influence of collaborative logistics processes procreates 
an impact in; (b) the operational TrustMech that generates corresponding reactions; 
(c) whose manifestation is observed using logistics performance metrics; (d) to 
determine underlying trustworthiness, and; (e) other emergent trustworthy behavior 
(Figure 19).  
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Figure 19: The operational TrustMech to logistical functions 
For a sake of enriching the causal chain, this propagation implies that variations in 
partner behavior under the influence of logistics collaborative processes have to feed 
back into the TrustMech. Correspondingly, the TrustMech act predictively, by 
scrutinizing interactions among the trustor-agents and trustee-agents. In the end, the 
TrustMech generates trust levels that reflect interactions and reactions which 
partners have undertaken. 
5.3 Derivation of Hypotheses 
Prediction is one of a constituent criterion that helps to understand a system and its 
underlying aspects such as behavior (Cohen, 1991). According to Cohen, one can 
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claim this understanding if he can predict to some degree of success how changes to 
the design of a system or environmental conditions will affect behavior. In relation 
to the designed logistics network and settings presented in section 6.4; this 
dissertation seeks to predict how partner behavior and collaborative logistics 
processes reinforce trust. Beyond this prediction, the purpose is to additionally 
explore and uncover behavior (emerging phenomena or unforeseen events), which 
are helpful in lessening the trust problem. To realize these goals, a total of five 
hypotheses are derived in the subsequent paragraphs.  
First Hypothesis 
During the collaboration, partners exchange necessary information among 
themselves. A degree to which the exchanged information is accurate or inaccurate 
(manipulated) information remains the choice and decision of the individual partner. 
The exchange of accurate (non-manipulated) information signifies a realistic 
collaborative situation that carries needed trustworthy and congruence than 
opportunism, on the one hand. On the other hand, exchanging incorrect 
(manipulated) information signifies incongruence to goals of collaborating. The 
manipulated information may imply partner’s deceitful efforts to win individual 
payoff on the cost of others. Deceitful efforts may occur when partner exaggerates 
real information, either positively or negatively. It also occurs when the partner is 
unwilling to be entirely honest thereby deviating from exchanging information that 
reflects reality. For example, a shipper may provide forecasts that are above (positive 
exaggeration) or below (negative exaggeration) of what it can produce. To this end, 
in order to understand how different levels of information accuracy affect trust, the 
corresponding hypothesis states as follows: 
Hypothesis 1:  (Information accuracy) 
The negatively exaggerated, neutral (unexaggerated), and positively 
exaggerated information accuracies generate distinct levels of trust. 
Second Hypothesis 
There is an open question on how partners can divide collaborative costs and gains. 
Similarly, an extent to which methods for dividing costs and gains are fair, 
trustworthy, and thus acceptable appears unclearly established. It is also doubtful 
whether it is possible to decide in advance about incentive schemes to use. To this 
end, and under the present configurations, this dissertation establishes the fairness 
and trustworthiness of the three proportional sharing methods, namely: distance 
traveled; number of customers served, and; total load shipped. One main goal is to 
establish if one method is more valuable and trustworthy than the rest. In realizing 
this, the corresponding statement of the hypothesis is:  
Hypotheses 2: (Fairness of the sharing methods) 
The proportional sharing methods: distance traveled, number of customers 
served, and total load shipped rank equivalently in levels of trust they 
generate. 
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Third Hypothesis 
The logistics network under simulation consists of five conflicting preferences (P1 
to P5). Ability to compromise these preferences depends either on the state of 
persuasion or rejection. Despite the state to which they are compromised, conflicting 
preferences may affect the level of trust of the network with similar or different 
magnitudes. With this idea in mind, it is helpful to know whether one preference 
generates trust impact in a large magnitude than others. Achievement of this goal 
hinges on setting up the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: (Impact of conflicting preferences on trust) 
All conflicting preferences generate an equivalent effect on levels of trust. 
Fourth Hypothesis 
Collaboration on sharing logistics resources is assumed to proceed in the absence of 
dilemmas other than dilemmas of a collaboration mode. This assumption does not 
hold for all moments. Instead, the collaborative sharing may face dilemmas of 
conflict mode such as the persuasion and rejection. Such dilemmas are part of 
complex decision-making in logistics and have to undergo compromise before 
advancing to subsequent stages. Expectedly, the persuaded dilemma will yield better 
trust levels than the rejected one. Ability to figure out whether the compromised and 
uncompromised dilemmas differ about the effect they generate on trust requires 
setting up the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: (Persuaded and rejected dilemmas)  
Persuaded dilemma yields higher levels of trust than the rejected dilemma. 
Fifth Hypothesis 
The configured logistics network has three main predictor variables: information 
sharing, sharing scheme, and decision synchronization. In a viewpoint of influences, 
it may be interesting to determine how they are ranked. Towards achieving this goal, 
a corresponding statement of the hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 5: (The most influential main predictor variable) 
Information sharing ranks higher on the effect it generates on levels of trust 
compared with the sharing scheme and conflicting preferences. 
Moreover, an overall goal (also stated in section 1.2) is to deeply investigate how 
partner behavior and collaborative logistics processes (behavioral-processes) 
reinforce trustworthiness of the logistics network. This goal is further purported to 
understand unforeseen (emergent) events, which are interesting and valuable for 
improving trust in an entire network of sharing. It is unfortunately hard to unveil this 
reinforcement by relying only on hypotheses set already. As an alternative, it is 
possible to rely on the unspecific (unstated) hypothesis. To this effect, analysis of 
output behavior in the experiments 1 to 9 helps to realize this goal. 
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5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
The current chapter has focused primarily on developing the TrustMech concept. 
The central purpose of the TrustMech concept is to provide a predictable set of 
trusting outcomes in collaborative logistics. The TrustMech is devised generic, and 
therefore, it remains a concept to apply in various domains. The TrustMech stands 
on artificial modeling of human’s minds that mimics workability of the human 
trusting process. Such trusting process consists of three stages: intention to trusting; 
action to trusting, and; execution of a task delegated. It requires that an agent 
(individual and firms) make trusting decisions by building on past rewarding actions, 
while; avoiding those costly ones. In its operationalization, the TrustMech draws on 
collaborative functions set to share logistics resources. The operationalization 
comprises plugging in both the predictor and response variables. In addition, the 
operationalization also involves the design and setups related to the trust meter, 
benchmark values, conflicting preferences, and logistics network. In order to 
demonstrate the application of the TrustMech, section 5.3 has provided predictions 
on trustworthy behavior of the logistics network. The goal of this prediction is to 
provide a deeper understanding that underlies the simulated logistics network. 
The proposed TrustMech differs from other related models (mechanisms) in 
literature. The most distinguishing feature of the TrustMech is its mechanism to 
evaluate trust. In evaluating trust, the TrustMech compares expectation of the 
trustor-agent against a score realized after the trustee-agent has executed the 
delegated task. Such feature reflects daily trusting processes undertaken by human-
beings as well as organizations. Additionally, the general-purpose TrustMech is 
worthy to adapt in various domains, other than resource sharing in collaborative 
logistics. Its conception, which foundationally stands on socio-cognition, enriches 
further a phenomenon of real-world in which agents reside. The TrustMech exhibits 
a form of representation that is not only easy to follow but also simple to understand. 
The next task after developing the TrustMech concept is to transform it into a 
computerized instance. Thus, chapter 6 presents an implementation of a vehicle 
(prototype) for proving the proposed concept. 
 89 
 
6 Prototypical Implementation 
During the research parts of the contents have been published in (Daudi et al., 
2016b, 2017b). 
The present chapter provides an implementation (transformation) of the TrustMech 
concept into a computerized form. The implementation begins by specifying 
functional requirements, negotiation algorithm, and subsequently, interactions 
which occur among collaborating agents (section 6.1). Succeeding this specification 
is a description of roles and knowledge ascribed to collaborating agents as well as 
other entities. The description of roles and knowledge is conceived and 
accomplished by using a class diagram (section 6.2). Section 6.3 presents a platform 
that transforms the design and specifications of the TrustMech. This platform exists 
within a virtual realism, facilitated by Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) to simulate trust 
scenarios. Considering that the platform is flexible to accept varied inputs; then 
section 6.4 specifies the design and setups, which are particularly used to carry out 
the simulation. The chapter ends in section 6.5 by providing the summary and 
concluding remarks. 
6.1 Specification of Requirements 
The goal of this section is to furnish specification of requirements relating to agency 
and purpose. First, descriptive domain and agent identification are presented to 
provide functions of the TrustMech. Realization of this purpose counts on employing 
the use-case diagram. Second, sequence diagrams are subsequently used to specify 
roles and tasks performed by collaborating agents (partners). 
6.1.1 Problem Situation 
A simplified view in Figure 20  helps to describe the problem situation to trusting in 
the collaborative sharing of logistics resources. Similar to what Okdinawati et al. 
(2014) describe, the shipper produces goods, which get moved to the receiver (also 
known as a consumer). The warehouse manager stores goods before they move them 
to the consumer. In this context, a corresponding logistical function is to plan, 
implement, and control movement of resources (especially goods) from the point of 
origin to the point of consumption. 
Ability to achieve such logistical function hinges on collaborative sharing of 
information, warehouse, and vehicles (trucks). In this regard, the shipper, carrier, 
receiver, and warehouse manager are key agents involved in the sharing. All these 
partners exhibit a range of behavior under the influence of collaborative logistics 
processes, whose outcome generates a corresponding effect on trust. 
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Figure 20: Problem situation on shareable logistics resources –a simplified view 
Realizing resource sharing in logistics involves many tasks. Such tasks are described 
as functional requirements and modeled by using use-case diagram. In particular, to 
recall, the purpose of the second specific research question (RQ2 in section 1.3) was 
to provide answers relating to trust-based interactions undertaken by collaborating 
partners. For this reason, the output of RQ2 constitutes key inputs to a use-case 
diagram in Figure 21. Equally, the use-cases and their extensions, actors involved, 
and description of each use-case draw from section 4.2. 
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Figure 21: A use-case diagram to describe functional requirements 
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The use-case diagram comprises of main use cases as well as various extensions and 
inclusions. It also comprises of four actors, who correspond to categories of agents 
participating in the resource sharing scenarios. The subsection 4.2.2 presents other 
details on the use case diagram presented in Figure 21. A short description of each 
main use case proceeds as follows: 
 Configure a consortium: Broker-agent set a prospective consortium whose 
realization extends to other use cases. This use case depends also on other 
extensions and inclusions; 
 Set specificities: The broker agent sets up specificities needed for a 
prospective collaborative consortium. Unless that the network is expected to 
exhibit a form of the supply network9, the broker has to specify requirements 
of the network. These requirements concern, for example, planned capacity 
relating to production, storage, carriage, and demand (consumption); 
 Invite partners: Invitation involve sending the already established specificities 
to prospective partners who inspire to go sharing. Along with this, the broker 
communicates the specificities to prospective partners who are interested to 
go sharing; 
 Apply: Interested prospective partners apply for a collaborative resource 
sharing opportunity thereby submitting needed information; 
 Accept/reject proposal: Prospective partners may accept or reject the proposal 
proposed by the broker; 
 Assess submission: The broker assesses proposal submitted by prospective 
partners to figure out if they meet specificities of the consortium. The 
proposals relate to what each willing partner has suggested as its specificity; 
 Get history: All agents access existing records to determine the 
trustworthiness of prospective partners. These beliefs relate to the extents to 
which a targeted partner is consistent and inconsistent in fulfilling agreements. 
The trustor-agent derive such beliefs, for example, from forecast accuracy, 
order fill rate, cost saving, and backorders; 
 Synchronize preferences: Compromising conflicting preferences which may 
result in dilemmas. It includes P1 and P2 preferences as outlined in Table 4; 
 Adjust specificities: The broker adjusts its previous specificities (capacities) 
in the case submitted proposals are unsatisfactory; 
                                                             
9 Difference between supply chain and supply network is highlighted in section 2.2.1 
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 Assess own capacity: The invited agents assess internal capacity according to 
the specificities set. The assessment centers on individual capacities subject 
to the underlying environment;  
 Negotiate on preferences: Similar to synchronize preferences; 
 Engage and forecast orders: Collaborating agents are engaged and requested 
to forecast their orders (also extended to forecast capacity); 
 Extend orders: Communicate more accurate information relating to 
production, carriage, demand, and warehousing capacities; 
 Build initial load: A preliminary building of small loads from various shippers 
for delivery and storage. The broker begins to build possible load and project 
subsequent possibilities; 
 Develop expectation: Developing expectation relating to performance metrics 
used which are forecast accuracy, order fill rate, backorders as a percent of 
total orders, distribution cost as a percent of sales, cost saving, vehicle fill, 
and full truckload; 
 Leverage shipments: A final adjustment in quantities to be shipped and 
ordered. The final shipments are re-checked against the previous forecast 
made to adjust excess or deficiency at the individual level; 
 Configure actual orders: Configuring actual orders, move goods and store 
goods where necessary. At this level, the broker has actual details of the 
operation. The additional task of the broker is to configure orders;  
 Activate accounting: Activating accounting processes to reward partner 
accordingly. In this activity, the broker retrieves records of each partner 
involved in the sharing and starts calculating how much gains/costs to pay. 
6.1.2 Logistics Functions: Roles and Tasks 
The current subsection presents the identification of roles and specification of tasks 
underlying collaborative functions in logistics. Equally, details relating to these roles 
and tasks are depicted and presented in an algorithmic form. The algorithm explains 
negotiations, which occur among collaborating partners, and it rests on the auction-
based negotiation protocol. The algorithm adapts the FIPA Contract Net in (FIPA, 
2002) (Figure 22). 
The following order defines rules of the auction-based negotiation algorithm. That, 
a broker invites collaborating partners who are shippers, carriers, receivers, and 
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warehouse managers thereby issuing a Call For Proposal (CFP). In the CFP, the 
broker set required specificity, including an estimated planned capacity of each 
partner. Upon receiving the CFP, each partner conducts own internal assessment 
about capacity required to fulfill preset requirements. Afterward, each partner replies 
to the broker by proposing or rejecting the CFP. If rejected, the CFP gets terminated. 
If proposed, each partner sends a reply proposal to the broker who assesses the 
proposals against established specificity. 
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Figure 22: Auction-based negotiation algorithm 
Depending on an outcome of the assessment the broker-agent accepts, adjusts or 
rejects the proposals. If the assessment is satisfactory, the broker-agent engages 
partners to forecast orders, compromise conflicting preferences, but also to develop 
expectations. In the end, during the execution, goods are moved and stored (where 
necessary). In this execution, behavior exhibited by partners is observed and 
recorded as well. 
Further identification of roles and specification of tasks is modeled using sequence 
diagrams. The sequence diagrams are primarily used to depict sequential interactions 
of the broker, shippers, carriers, warehouse managers, receivers and other related 
objects. It is worth noting that it is difficult to present all interactions and 
dependencies occurring when collaborating agents interact. It is for this reason that 
the three main-sequence diagrams are devised (modeled) to present macro-level 
trust-based interactions. These sequence diagrams cover three areas. The first area 
denotes the configuration of a consortium and corresponds to a propensity to trusting 
(Figure 23). The second area denotes the engagement and forecasting of orders and 
corresponds to an action to trusting (Figure 24). The third area denotes the execution 
of the transaction and corresponds to the transaction to trusting (Figure 25). 
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Configuring a Consortium 
In order to configure the consortium (setting up specificities), the broker specifies 
the length of collaboration period and planned capacities, which relate to the 
production, carriage, warehousing, and demand (consumption) (task 1 in Figure 23). 
Afterward, the broker invites prospective partners by sending them established 
specificities (task 2). Upon receiving this invitation, prospective partners assess their 
internal capacity before submitting back their proposals to the broker (tasks 3 to 6). 
This assessment employs records related to previous trust experiences (tasks 7 to 
10). Upon retrieving previous trust experiences, each invited member assesses 
further whether it can participate or not (tasks 11 to 13). Additionally, on completing 
the assessment of trust, each prospective partner sends back its reply to the broker. 
Such reply can either be a proposal to agree to collaborate or a rejection that the 
partner is uninterested (tasks 14). 
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Figure 23: Sequence diagram for configuring a consortium 
Upon receiving such replies, the broker assesses the submissions concerning 
specificities it has set before (task 16). Alongside this, results underlying such 
assessments are twofold: satisfactory, or; unsatisfactory. If results are unsatisfactory, 
the broker recommends adjustments (task 17) and brings out another proposal (task 
18) which can be accepted, adjusted, or rejected by partners (tasks 19 to 21). About 
the preferences (P1, P2), prospective partners who have agreed to collaborate, choose 
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their preferred positions (task 22 to 24). Afterward, partners send their acceptance 
or further adjustments (task 25) together with positions they have taken in conflicting 
preferences (task 26). The broker synchronizes these preferences (task 27). In the 
end, the consortium is set and ready to begin operate. 
Engagement and Forecast of Orders 
In the second stage (Figure 24), collaborating partners have more accurate 
information about production, carriage, consumption, and storage. This information 
reflects how much is likely to be produced, moved, consumed, and stored. In this 
stage, the primary activity is to extend order forecasts into shipment forecasts as well 
as compromising conflicting preferences. 
Remaining part of the engagement and forecasting process proceeds as follows. The 
broker engages partners to begin the forecasting process (task 1) thereby informing 
collaborating partners to provide their forecasts (tasks 2 to 5). For a partner to 
accomplish tasks 2 to 5, it has to carry out an internal assessment and provide a 
corresponding reply to the broker. Alongside the provision of forecasting 
information, each partner also communicates a position it has taken on a particular 
preference (P3, P4, and P5) (task 6 to 8). Afterward, the generated forecasts, as well 
as preferred positions, are sent back to the broker. The broker handles the forecast’s 
information and specific positions in preferences (tasks 9 to 10).  
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Figure 24: Sequence diagram for engagement and order forecast 
The broker attempts to synchronize the conflicting preferences and send back results 
to respective partners (task 11). Another process known as developing expectations 
6.1   Specification of Requirements 
96 
succeeds the synchronization process. Each partner develops its expectation by 
referring to performance metrics, relevant to that partner (tasks 12 to 14). The 
established expectations are then communicated to the broker (task 15) to finalize 
the stage of engagement and forecast. 
Execution of Transactions 
In the third stage (Figure 25) the assumption is that orders are precisely known. At 
this moment, the shipper, warehouse manager, receiver, and carrier have 
approximately exact (real) information about transactions they are going to execute. 
The shipper provides the exact amount of shipments it has produced or possesses; 
the carrier provides its actual carriage capacity; the receiver provides actual demand 
of goods to consume, and; the warehouse manager communicates actual space 
available at the warehouse (tasks 2 to 5). The information relating to the actual orders 
from each collaborating partner gets communicated to the broker (task 6). Upon 
receiving this information, the broker has to configure the actual orders (task 7). At 
this sub-stage, the broker has a role in coordinating transaction execution (a virtual 
movement and storage of goods), and after this execution, it activates the accounting 
process (task 8). 
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Figure 25: Sequence diagram for transaction execution 
In the accounting process, the broker-agent performs three main activities. It 
evaluates the individual-based trust level as well as system-based trust level. Next, 
it processes vital records partners may need as well as other necessary records. 
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Lastly, the trust levels and records are stored in the database as well as sent to 
respective partners for future reference (tasks 10 to 13). 
6.2 Description of Agent Roles and Knowledge 
The purpose of this section is to describe roles and knowledge ascribed to 
collaborating agents and other entities. Such description is realized using a class 
diagram. Concordant to Cossentino and Potts (2002), the class diagram (Figure 26) 
is primarily used to describe involved agents, their knowledge, and their 
communication relationships. The class diagram has been abstracted not only to 
reduce details but also simplify an overall presentation. 
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Figure 26: Roles and knowledge in the form of a class diagram10 
As depicted on the diagram, the chief agent (broker) has a role in managing other 
agents, namely: shipper, carrier, receiver, and warehouse manager. In its 
management (coordination) role, the broker requests the shipper, carrier, receiver, 
and warehouse manager agents to provide their interests and capacities (offers to 
satisfy specificities of the consortium). Such offers are necessary for carrying out 
collaboration scenarios aimed to share logistics resources. Specific requests and 
                                                             
10 It has to be noted that many tasks to be accomplished in a perspective of this class diagram were 
established previously in subsection 4.2.2, Figure 23, Figure 24, and Figure 25 
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involved communication exchanges vary depending on requirements of the 
particular stage during collaborative sharing. 
Besides agents, there are other entities whose role is to facilitate functions of agents. 
Such entities are not agents in themselves. They are ordinary (external) classes, 
which assume the internal role to serve agents’ internal computational processing. 
The external classes play the role of simplifying the computational task that may 
have been undertaken by the individual agents themselves. To this effect, in their 
implementation, such classes are regular object-oriented classes, which do not carry 
characteristics of agents (functionalities). In due of this and with an exception of the 
warehouse manager who does not delegate its internal processing to external classes; 
assessment by remaining agents involves external processing. Even though, the 
warehouse manager does not use external processing because it does not handle 
many tasks as compared to remaining agents. 
The illustration on how agents delegate their tasks to external classes employs the 
shipper-agent, as an example. In the selection and front-end agreement stage, the 
shipper is engaged by the broker to conduct planning. This planning, among others, 
is concerned with: how much it can produce; what are her choices on conflicting 
preferences, and; whether it needs adjustments in pre-configured specificities. To 
accomplish these issues, the shipper agent delegates its respective task to a planning 
manager. The planning manager scrutinizes its production history (if it exists) or 
provides necessary assumed plans (in the case of an initial run) and communicates 
the same to the broker. Equally, in the order forecast and physical distribution stages, 
the shipper engages forecasting and operational manager, respectively. Remaining 
agents follow similar arrangements. 
Once the broker receives all information, it also delegates its processing tasks to its 
coordination manager who handles the selection, forecast, and executions tasks. In 
the end, the broker handles collected information (trust parameters) to its external 
processing for assessing and evaluating trust. Evaluation of trust takes place at the 
agent’s level as well as system level. The system-level trust measures an extent to 
which the entire collaboration network of sharing may be trustworthy. 
6.3 Simulation Platform 
There are many MAS simulation platforms (tools). According to a survey by Kravari 
and Bassiliades (2015), the majority of these platforms are primarily designed to 
solve problems whose domains are generic. Kravari and Bassiliades add that fewer 
of these platforms (like JADE, Jadex, JACK, and EMERALD) comply with the 
FIPA11 standards while others are either partially or entirely incompliant. In a context 
of a research problem at hand, what is needed is a platform whose primary domain 
                                                             
11 http://www.fipa.org/specifications/index.html 
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is specific instead of generic one. Besides a long list, Kravari and Bassiliades (2015) 
provide, PlaSMA remains a popular platform dedicated to the domain of logistics 
functions, and, which is also FIPA compliant. It is an event-driven simulation system 
designed to solve and evaluate scenarios of the logistics domain12 (Figure 27). 
 
Figure 27: View of the simulation scenario in PlaSMA 
In its current form, PlaSMA can hardly be used to simulate the trust mechanism in 
the collaborative sharing of logistics resources. Due to this limitation, an extension 
of the PlaSMA platform involves implementing missing classes and functionality. 
Substantially, this implementation extends existing base classes in PlaSMA, but 
other classes in JADE13. The implementation employs virtual shareable 
infrastructures like vehicles and warehouses, as well as virtual organizational and 
individual entities that undertake trusting decisions (Figure 28). 
Specifically, shippers, carriers, receivers, and warehouse managers (agents) gather 
information, adapt the environment, act autonomously, and care for utility. After 
acquiring such information, the agents change their behavior depending upon the 
experience, and undertake decisions using acquired knowledge (beliefs) without 
continuous user inputs. Furthermore, these agents are programmable as utility-based 
agents than goal-based ones. In their utility function, agents predict a utility value 
and compare it with others and select the action associated with that highest value 
(Matsumoto, Matsumoto, & Abe, 2006). Corresponding to a present context, 
employed agents develop trust and expectation by selecting the action associated 
with highest rewarding past experiences. 
The operational TrustMech (in Figure 28) requires specifying (entering) values 
related to design and setup before initiating the simulation. The purpose of 
                                                             
12 http://plasma.informatik.uni-bremen.de/ 
13 http://jade.tilab.com/ 
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employing adjustable design and settings is to allow flexibility than relying on hard-
coded design and settings.  
 
Figure 28: A user interface for setting simulation parameters 
In addition, for each cycle of the simulation run, the resulting performance and trust 
level data for individual entities (agents) and system as a whole is stored. The 
relational tables managed by PostgreSQL DBMS store such data. However, 
frequently adjustable data is stored in text files to simplify access by the read and 
write functions. Moreover, after each experiment, all data (including several 
replications) is filtered and subsequently migrated to other database tables for further 
analysis. 
6.4 Design and Setup of the Logistics Network 
The present section specifies design and setup of a logistics network. It also 
addresses issues related to replication of experiments, predictor variables and their 
respective levels (design). Subsequently, the section presents specific settings to use 
in simulation experiments. 
6.4.1 Benchmark Values to Performance Metrics 
As previously discussed, trust can be measured and assessed using standard 
deviation technique or industry benchmark values. Currently, the present work 
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utilizes benchmark technique than the standard deviation. This inclination towards 
industrial benchmark values is purposely meant to unveil trustworthiness that 
underlies industrial practices. In achieving this, the benchmark technique requires 
obtaining industrial benchmark values in prior. These values may be the best-in-
class or average ones. Following this requirement, a survey of the literature is 
conducted to obtain these benchmark values. 
The literature survey involves conducting a thorough search of relevant industrial 
reports that detail industrial benchmark values. After carrying out this survey, it 
appears that it is difficult to obtain unique standard benchmark values that fit all. 
Instead, benchmarks values in use differ in some companies, although they correlate 
in other companies. Despite a challenge that obtaining standard benchmark values 
is difficult, values discussed in a subsequent paragraph, and later in Table 10 satisfy 
the present goal and objectives. Additionally, to accommodate this challenge, even 
the TrustMech is both devised and designed flexibly to accept adjustable benchmark 
values. 
About response variables specified already, subsection 5.2.2 has outlined seven 
benchmark values. Respective specification proceeds as follows. Firstly, while many 
techniques to measure forecast accuracy exist, the Supply Chain Consortium (2011) 
observes that common measures used are the MAPE and percentage error. Many 
stakeholders prefer the MAPE than the percentage error, and they forecast own sales 
averagely at an error of 32.5%. Secondly, the order fill rate has two benchmarks 
values: “95%” (Supply Chain Consortium, 2011) and “93.6%” (Butner & Iglesias, 
2010). Since these values are close, this dissertation advances on the 95% to 
streamline measurement of trust. Thirdly, the cost saving is commonly mentioned to 
range between 10 to 15% (Tseng et al., 2013). Fourthly, the distribution cost as a 
percentage of sales and backorders as a percentage of total orders are benchmarked 
to 4% and 1.5%, respectively (Manrodt et al., 2011). Fifthly, the Full Truck Load 
(FTL) according to (VICS, 2004) is usually 95%. Finally, one can derive vehicle fill 
by building from the benchmark value of the FTL. In this situation, the vehicle fill 
takes the same benchmark value as the FTL (95%).  
6.4.2 Design 
The adequately designed experiment(s) provides maximum information with the 
minimum number of experiments (Jain, 1991). Parallel to Jain’s argument, the 
design of experiments in this work targets to minimize the number of experimental 
runs thereby considering three issues. The first consideration involves replicating 
the experiments. A prototype of the TrustMech is implemented in a way that a single 
run of experiment yields four rounds of outputs. Therefore, to satisfy requirements 
of statistical tests, each run is replicated two times to yield eight observations using 
the same seed value. It is worthy to note that each experimental set is performed 
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sequentially using five distinct seeds. Under this design, therefore, in the end, every 
single experiment is expected to generate a total of 40 samples of observations. 
The second consideration entails combining all predictor variables to study their 
combinatorial effect on trust. This design is complicated because it involves all three 
predictor variables and their varying levels, at once. The predictor variables: 
information accuracy, sharing scheme, and decision synchronization have three, 
four, and five levels, respectively. If a full factorial design is applied, it will yield 45 
(31 x 31 x 51) experiments. Recalling that each experiment is set to yield 40 samples 
of observations then a total of 1800 (40 x 45) samples are expected. This number is 
too large and may complicate the analysis of recorded results. One can overcome 
this problem (reduce the number of experiments) by applying a screening technique. 
This screening is realized using tools for designing experiments (the JPM14 and 
Minitab15). After this screening, the number of experiments drops from 45 to 9 
(experiment number 1 to 9, in Table 9).  
Table 9: Design of experiments for combinatorial and singleton effects 
Experiment 
Number 
Information 
Accuracy Sharing Scheme 
Conflicting 
Preference 
Combinatorial effects 
1 Neutral accuracy Number of Customers P2 
2 Positive accuracy Distance Travelled P3 
3 Neutral accuracy Distance Travelled P1 
4 Positive accuracy Total Load Shipped P2 
5 Positive accuracy Number of Customers P4 
6 Negative accuracy Distance Travelled P4 
7 Negative accuracy Number of Customers P1 
8 Negative accuracy Total Load Shipped P5 
9 Neutral accuracy Total Load Shipped P3 
Singleton effects 
10 Positive accuracy General P3 
11 Neutral accuracy General P3 
12 Negative accuracy General P3 
13 Neutral accuracy Distance Travelled P3 
14 Neutral accuracy Number of Customers P3 
15 Neutral accuracy Total Load Shipped P3 
16 Neutral accuracy General P1 
17 Neutral accuracy General P2 
18 Neutral accuracy General P3 
19 Neutral accuracy General P4 
20 Neutral accuracy General P5 
                                                             
14 https://www.jmp.com/en_us/software.html 
15 https://www.minitab.com/en-us/products/minitab/ 
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The screened design yields 360 (9 x 40) samples of observations which generate an 
effect equivalent to that of the 1800 samples. 
The third consideration emphasizes on studying the effect of behavioral-process 
reinforcement on trust in isolated manner. This design requires manipulating one 
predictor variable while holding fixed remaining variables. This design is relatively 
easy as it involves 11 experiments (experiment 10 to 20, in Table 9) and is expected 
to generate 440 (11 x40) samples of observations. In the overall, the design for all 
experiments (combined and singleton effects) is expected to generate 800 (360 + 
440) samples of observations. 
6.4.3 Setups 
Parameters used in a simulation scenario require prior settings. There are five 
categories of settings: (1) benchmark values for measuring and assessing trust; (2) 
trust meter; (3) awards and penalties on persuasion and rejection of dilemmas; (4) 
information accuracy, and; (5) structure of a collaborative logistics network. 
The first category of parameters refers to response variables used to measure and 
assess trust. Subsection 6.4.1 presented parameters derived already from benchmark 
values. The benchmark values are refined and specified under the Likert scale of size 
5 (Table 10). Furthermore, four response variables, namely: forecast accuracy, order 
fill rate, full truck load, and vehicle fill have an interval of two units spanning on 
both sides of the benchmark value. The backorders as a percent of total orders uses 
the interval of 0.5 units, which spans on both sides as well. The cost saving and 
distribution cost as percent of sales use an interval of one unit that spans on both 
sides of the benchmark value. 
Table 10: Measurement and assessment of trust (5 Likert scales) 
Response variables Benchmark 
value 
Lower value 
(Lv) 
Upper value 
(Uv) 
Width 
(w) 
Forecast accuracy (sales) 32.5% 27.5% 37.5% 2 
Order Fill Rate 95% 90% 100% 2 
Cost saving 10 to 15% 10% 15% 1 
Distribution cost as percent of sales 4% 2% 6% 1 
Backorders as a percent of total orders 1.5% 0.5% 2.5% 0.5 
Full Truck Load (FTL) 95% 90% 100% 2 
Vehicle fill 95% 90% 100% 2 
Note: These parametric values, are derived from subsection 6.4.1 
Resulting from the lower and upper specifications of the benchmark values (Table 
10), the measurement and assessment of trust proceed as follows. Partner develops 
own expectation to be compared with the benchmark value after execution. A result 
from this comparison falls into one of the five scales (even beyond) as defined in the 
trust meter (Table 11).  
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It is worthy to note that definition of the trust meter for the forecast accuracy and 
backorders go in reverse order. A reason to set up the trust meter in the reverse order 
backups from a fact that, usually, the forecast accuracy and backorders become 
trustworthy when observed outcomes are smaller. Moreover, the trust meter maps 
the quantitative value to respective qualitative (attitudinal) values, for both the 
system and individual levels of trust. 
Table 11: The trust meter 
Range Quantitative value Qualitative value 
Lv <= score <  (Lv + w) 1 Least trustworthy16 
(Lv + w) <= score < (Lv +2w) 2 Less trustworthy 
(Lv + 2w) <= score < (Lv +3w) 3 Trustworthy 
(Lv + 3w) <= score <  (Lv +4w) 4 More trustworthy 
(Lv + 4w) <= score < Uv 5 Most trustworthy17 
 
Succeeding the trust meter is synchronization of conflicting preferences. Settings 
under decision synchronization are concerned with awards for the preference 
persuaded or penalties for the preference rejected. Provision of the awards 
(incentives) occurs in case conflicting preferences are persuaded. Unlike the 
persuasion, charging of penalty (punishment) occurs in case the particular preference 
is rejected (Appendix I).  
Besides providing setups to response variables, settings under information sharing, 
as the predictor variable, proceeds as follows. First, the preceding provisions in 
subsection 4.3.1 are adopted. Alongside this adoption, information accuracy gets 
subjected to manipulation under the negative, neutral, and positive aspects of 
affection (Table 12). The affection uses a continuum of variables ranging from -0.45 
to 0.45. This range also accommodates a parameter of certainty, {0}, although slight 
deviations, {-0.05, 0.05} have been introduced to allow flexibility. This allowance 
enriches a reality on the beliefs about the world, that, it is uneasy to predict the world 
rationally. 
  
                                                             
16 If a score is less than Lv the trust level is also assessed as the least trustworthy 
17 If a score is greater than Uv the trust level is also assessed as the most trustworthy 
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Table 12: Type of affection and elements used to affect information accuracy 
* It has to be noted that this affection extends the previous discussion in subsection 4.3.1 
Final settings are related to a topological structure of the collaborative logistics 
network. The logistics network employed in this study correlates partly to that used 
in (Zolfagharinia & Haughton, 2012). In particular, the network comprises 15 
shippers and 15 receivers (to simplify interactions), and five carriers. One shipper 
serves only one receiver but with multiple orders. Each carrier owns one vehicle 
truck, which constitutes a pool of trucks, and the carrier cannot choose whom the 
customer to serve. This number of collaborating partners was explicitly set to ensure 
the prototype executes appropriately. It has to be noted that, previous attempt to 
increase the number of partners resulted in improper runs (errors and bugs) due to 
computational capacity of the desktop machine used. 
6.4.4 Validity of Data 
Data validation is a process of determining that the data used in building and 
validating the simulation model is sufficiently accurate (Love & Back, 2000). To 
fulfill requirements of validity of a model (mechanism) and its application, 
simulation (controlled) experiments have to rely primarily on using historical data. 
Historical data is the data collected on a system (Sargent, 2013), with the condition 
that the system is observable, and that it is possible to collect data about it. The 
system data may originate from an operational system or specific experiments such 
as laboratory and field experiments (Xiang, Kennedy, & Madey, 2005). 
Unlike the historical data, another source of data that may be used to establish 
validity and demonstrate the application of the model (mechanism) is the model data. 
The model data get in use when a system under investigation is partially observable 
or entirely non-observable. Usually, the best data is the historical data, obtained 
(collected) especially from operational systems such as real functioning logistical 
systems. 
Type of 
affection 
Elements used in 
affection 
Description 
Negative 
information 
accuracy (γ) 
{-0.45, -0.40, -0.35, -
0.30, -0.25, -0.20, -
0.15, -0.10} 
A partner who exhibits this behavior is considered untrustworthy and 
acts in a manner of maximizing individual payoff. Such partner 
exchanges information that is underestimated but also that affects 
needed accuracy negatively 
Neutral 
information 
accuracy (α) 
{-0.05, 0, 0.05} A partner who affects logistics elements using this factor is considered 
honest, congruent, and can certainly be relied upon. In particular, if a 
chosen factor is zero, then the partner is absolutely honest and reports 
the true information. Otherwise, it is a normal honest partner 
Positive 
information 
accuracy (ß) 
{0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 
0.30, 0.35, 0.40, 0.45} 
Partner who exhibits this behavior is still considered untrustworthy 
(similar to the negative information accuracy). He instead exchanges 
overestimated information 
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As addressed further in subsection 7.1.2, the system data collected from the industry-
based collaborations in sharing logistics resources is insufficient and incomplete. 
One of the reason is that data used especially in the trucking industry is primarily 
proprietary due to the potential interest of protecting privacy (Hernández & Peeta, 
2014). Secondly, collaborative scenarios in sharing logistics resources, which 
exhibit realism to nature of this study are limited. To overcome this problem, 
therefore, the present validation uses model data estimated on account of industry 
reports and related literature in (Cruijssen, Borm, Fleuren, & Hamers, 2010; 
Department for Transport statistics, 2017; Hernández & Peeta, 2014; Zolfagharinia 
& Haughton, 2012). Therefore, generation of model data relies on adapting trends 
(patterns) of data from the mentioned literature (see subsection 7.1.2 for further 
details). Upon obtaining such patterns, generation of actual data advances by 
employing random number (linear-congruential) generators. Afterward, the chi-
square test is applied to scrutinize and ensure that generated model data exhibits a 
uniform distribution.  
6.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The current chapter has presented details to implement TrustMech’s prototype. The 
prototype plays a primary role as a vehicle, which is very necessary in proving the 
proposed concept. The implementation consists of transforming the TrustMech 
concept into a computerized instance. The transformation has employed the UML 
techniques to specify software requirements, interactions, and design. The coding 
has involved extending base classes of the PlaSMA and JADE to build a new 
prototype. The new prototype addresses the trust problem in collaborative sharing 
of logistics resources. About the design and setups, the chapter has specified a 
logistics network that comprises an equal number of shippers and receivers, while 
carriers are one-third of shippers (or receivers). Provided settings also include 
benchmark values that are used to develop the expectation and trust meter. The 
simulation experiments advance on the model than system data. The model data is 
generated based on industrial practices, and its standard distribution is validated 
using chi-square test. Afterward, simulation experimentation begins as specified, 
while results obtained are accordingly analyzed, presented, and discussed in chapter 
1. 
In regard to concluding remarks, the following are stated. Trusting outcomes in 
resource sharing networks, usually, result from multiple interactions of individual 
partners. Quantifying such outcomes using the equation-based modeling denies an 
ability to observe such individual interactions, whose effect aggregates to generate 
outcomes of a whole system. In this respect, it is more appropriate to prove the 
TrustMech concept by relying on benefits offered by the ABM and MAS. For this 
reason, the ABM has guided specifications and designs of the TrustMech concept. 
Correspondingly, the MAS has provided guidance in coding such specifications and 
designs. In the end, the realized prototype allows individual and adjustable agents 
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(in categories of shippers, carriers, receivers, and warehouse managers) to interact 
within computational settings. Such agents generate trusting outcomes, which 
resembles (ideally) the outcome which human beings may generate. 
Chapter 1 succeeds the current chapter. It addresses the validation as well as the 
application of the TrustMech concept. In addition, it presents results and discussion 
in a viewpoint of the usefulness of the TrustMech, but also the hypotheses tested.  
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7 Validation and Application 
During the research parts of the contents have been published in (Daudi et al., 
2016b, 2017b). 
The present chapter deals with two issues concurrently, namely: validation and 
demonstrative application of the proposed concept. The goal of the former is to 
assess and establish the usefulness of the TrustMech. The goal of the latter is to 
demonstrate how the TrustMech can be applied to serve its purpose. This 
demonstration succeeds the hypotheses’ testing, derived already in section 5.3. The 
validation and demonstrative application appear in the following sequence. An 
approach to validation is analyzed and discussed by providing the background, 
validation objects, as well as comparative standard (section 7.1). Whereas section 
7.2 presents the analysis of results obtained from simulation experiments, section 
7.3 provides a corresponding discussion. The chapter ends by providing limitations 
(section 7.4) as well as summary and conclusion (section 7.5). 
7.1 Validation Approach 
Previous chapters addressed issues concerning the environmental factors, causal 
mechanism, and its computerized instance. Succeeding this establishment is an 
approach to validate the TrustMech concept. To this effect, this section presents a 
background on validation approach, and later it presents discussions about a 
methodology used to establish both the conceptual and operational validity. 
7.1.1 Background 
There are many categories and criteria to use to figure out how a model is beneficial 
and valuable. Out of multiple categories proposed by Sargent (1981), this 
dissertation draws on a validation category that is constituted by the conceptual and 
operational validity. The conceptual and operational validities are validation objects 
used throughout this dissertation to establish the credibility and reasonableness of 
the TrustMech concept. These objects are employed to establish credibility in the 
MAS models, instead of the ISO 9126 Software Quality Characteristics18 that are 
used to evaluate software systems. An interesting question is why putting both 
validation objects to use? The use of both objects backups from the fact that each 
validity object furnishes limitations on the other. In elaborating this, Heath, Hill, and 
Ciarallo (2009) observe that if the model is only conceptually valid, it is unknown if 
it will produce correct output results. Correspondingly, authors add that if the model 
                                                             
18 http://www.sqa.net/iso9126.html 
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is only operationally valid, it is unknown whether that model stands on any 
appropriate representation of reality. 
7.1.2 Conceptual and Operational Validity 
In a standpoint of intelligent systems, validation is as a process set to ensure that 
outputs of the intelligent system are equivalent to those of human experts when given 
same inputs (Gonzalez & Barr, 2000). The validation of agent-based models 
involves two aspects: a piece of the simulation model under validation (the 
conceptual model and simulation output), and; techniques used to validate each piece 
of the simulation model (statistical and non-statistical) (Heath et al., 2009). The 
conceptual validity is set to determine that theories and assumptions underlying the 
conceptual model are correct (Sargent, 2013). Sargent emphasizes that the 
operational validity is purported to determine that the model’s output behavior has a 
satisfactory range of accuracy for the model’s intended purpose. 
The decision about which validation techniques to apply depends on whether a 
simulated system is observable (historical data exist) or not. Collaboration in sharing 
logistics resources is partially observable. By partial observations, it means that there 
are few collaborative practices that entail a realm of resource sharing in logistics. In 
a standpoint of the present situational context, the operational validity may proceed 
by comparing the simulation (model) to (Sargent, 2013): 
a) Other existing models with or without statistical tests, and; 
b) A system with or without statistical tests. 
By referring to a context of the outlined comparisons, the simulation model means a 
model that undergoes validation. Under the present settings, the TrustMech is the 
model that gets validated. By other existing models, it means models of trust 
available in the literature which relate to the TrustMech, and which are not only 
already validated but also well-known. In clarifying further, the system refers to a 
set of real and historical data collected, for example, on a particular entity, which is 
operationally functional. 
Currently, establishing the operational validity on the basis of the system data is 
difficult. Of course, there is system data (secondary data) collected from the 
literature. The secondary data originated from few projects such as the 
“Collaboration Concepts for Co-modality19 –CO3”. One limitation of secondary data 
that is obtained from the literature is that it is insufficient and undetailed to suit needs 
of logistics scenarios being simulated. Another problem is that the literature data is 
even incomplete because some of the predictor variables have been missing entries. 
As far as the available system data is insufficient, this dissertation, therefore, 
                                                             
19 http://www.co3-project.eu/ 
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advances on the other comparison approach. The approach requires establishing the 
operational validity by comparing the TrustMech to other existing models. 
In regard to the conceptual validity, its establishment stands on assessment of the 
internal consistency of the TrustMech concept. On the whole, Table 13 presents a 
generalized summary of the methodology used to validate the TrustMech concept.  
Table 13: Validation methodology 
The discussion on validation methodology continues as follows. Model data is used 
not only to validate the TrustMech but also demonstrate its potential applications. 
The model data is generated by specific models to suit and mimic the desired 
problem situation. Such data has to satisfy statistical requirements (see subsection 
6.4.4) and be valid as well. The establishment of the conceptual validity succeeds 
the data validity. In determining data validity, assessment of the internal stochastic 
variability of the TrustMech relies on comparing output behavior using the GD and 
statistical tests. To attain the operational validity the output behavior of the 
TrustMech is compared to the output behavior of another valid model objectively 
(using statistical tests) and subjectively (using GD) (Sargent, 2013). As a result, the 
present context and settings engage comparing the TrustMech to the FIRE model.  
Before establishing the operational and conceptual validity, criteria that guide 
decisions on whether particular output behavior suffices needed validity or not, have 
to be formalized. In the light of this, Jain (1991) proposes decisive guidelines to 
compare two alternatives based on a Confidence Interval (CI) technique. According 
to Jain, if CIs overlap considerably such that the mean of one falls in an interval of 
the other, then the two alternatives are equal with the desired level of confidence. If 
the CIs do not overlap considerably, the two alternatives are significantly different. 
Context Goal Procedures 
 
 
I. Data 
validity 
 
 
To ensure data is factually  realistic and 
unbiased 
1. Obtain industrial benchmarks reports 
2. Use linear-congruential generators to establish 
the independence of data  
3. Assign each predictor own seed value to avoid 
wrong correlation 
4. Use the chi-square test to ensure data is 
uniformly distributed  
 
II. Conceptual 
validity 
To establish that theories and 
assumptions underlying TrustMech are 
correct and that the TrustMech’s 
representation of the problem entity is 
reasonable 
5. Use Graphical Displays (GD) to show patterns 
(trends) 
6. Apply the CI technique to determine the internal 
validity 
 
III. Operational 
validity 
 
To assess whether output behavior to the 
TrustMech has the accuracy needed 
7. Use GD to compare output behavior of the 
TrustMech and FIRE trust model 
8. Use statistical tests to compare output behavior 
of the TrustMech and FIRE trust model 
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Besides the statistical tests, the accuracy of the operational validity is also 
established using GD. The accuracy succeeding this validity is a similarity in 
patterns of output behavior, which the pairs under comparison generate.  
7.1.3 Benchmarking the TrustMech to the FIRE Model 
As stated previously, the operational validation of the TrustMech is achievable by 
comparing output behavior of the TrustMech and FIRE. FIRE is one of the well-
known integrated trust and reputation model for open multi-agent systems(Huynh et 
al., 2006). It uses four types of sources to provide trust-related information (see 
subsection 4.6.1). Even though, the present validation uses only the direct experience 
as the source of trust information. The direct experience is preferred because, under 
the context of the present scenario and settings, attaining other sources of 
information appears to be difficult. Additionally, although the FIRE model has many 
components, the present validation employs only one component, known as the 
Interaction Trust (IT). This component, the IT, is selected because it corresponds 
better to features of the TrustMech. The short description of the IT component used 
to validate the TrustMech is as follows (Huynh et al., 2006): 
 Under direct experience as a source of trust information, the evaluator uses its 
previous experiences in interacting with the target agent to determine its 
trustworthiness (Interaction Trust –IT). The IT is captured by using rating. 
Rating is the evaluation of an agent’s performance given by its partner in an 
interaction occurring between them. To emphasize this, each agent rates its 
partner’s performance after every transaction and stores its ratings in a local 
rating database. Ratings appear in a form of tuples such that the rating r is 
given by = (a, b, c, i, v), where a and b are agents that participate in the 
interaction i, v is the rating value agent a gives to agent b in a context c (like 
quality, honesty) 
 To calculate the trust value of the target agent the IT component of the FIRE 
collects relevant ratings about that agent’s past behavior. After that, 
calculation of trust value incorporates the sum of all the available ratings 
weighted by the rating relevance, and which become normalized afterward. 
In accomplishing this comparison, evaluation of trust is carried out using both the 
TrustMech and FIRE –IT, concurrently. The FIRE –IT requires one category of a 
partner to evaluate (rate) performance of another category. The evaluation of 
performance depends on how the evaluator is satisfied with a service provided by 
service providers. In respect of this, for each interaction, evaluator rates the service 
provider as its trading partner. 
Afterward, a next step is to compare output behavior generated by both the 
TrustMech and FIRE–IT. Since the TrustMech and FIRE–IT uses distinct evaluation 
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approaches, measurement of resulting output behavior stands on unpaired 
observations. 
7.2 Results 
The MAS simulation was carried out to validate the proposed TrustMech concept 
and confirm or reject derived hypotheses, on the one hand. On the other hand, 
obtained results were analyzed to enrich the discussion in section 7.3. On account of 
the simulation experiments carried out, results presented in this section appear in 
categories of the: conceptual validity; operational validity; hypothesis 1; hypothesis 
2; hypothesis 3; hypothesis 4; hypothesis 5, as well as; trustworthiness and general 
behavior of the network. 
Conceptual Validity 
The first category of results is related to a conceptual validity of the TrustMech. 
Realization of the conceptual validity relied on assessing a stochastic degree of 
internal variability of the TrustMech. A goal of this assessment was to reveal an 
extent to which the TrustMech is internally consistent or inconsistent. In realizing 
this, a one-way analysis of means trust level of all 20 experiments was carried out. 
Each experiment had more than 35 samples of observations. Analysis of results 
involved comparing 190 (20C2) outputs (see Appendix II) using the Tukey 
comparison method at a 95% CI. Results obtained were twofold: interval plots and 
statistical tests. Concerning the interval plots, Figure 29 portrays plots that depict 
the internal variations of the TruchMech, after subjecting the TrustMech to 20 
distinct treatments.  
 
Figure 29: Internal variability of the TrustMech 
In regard to the statistical tests, analysis of outputs (Appendix II) shows that not all 
means trust levels were equal. This inequality signifies that the TrustMech carries 
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some variances. In particular, out of 190 comparisons: 
 175 comparisons (92.1%) had an adjusted P-Value that was greater than a 
significance level (α = 0.05) and their 95% CI included a null value, and; 
 15 comparisons (7.9%) had the adjusted P-Value that was less than a 
significance level (α = 0.05) and their 95% CI excluded a null value. 
Operational Validity 
Establishment of the operational validity involved a comparative analysis of output 
behavior of both the TrustMech and FIRE. The comparison was carried out in a 
standpoint of the graphical displays, proportionality, and statistical tests. This 
analysis employed data recorded under experiments 1 to 20 (see Table 9). Each 
experiment involved recording an average trust level for every eight consecutive 
samples. Such recording resulted in five mean trust levels for each experiment. This 
recording ended up by generating 100 (5 x 20) samples of observations. Figure 30 
shows the comparative performances of the TrustMech and FIRE (based on the 
unpaired observation of samples). In regard to the proportionality, out of 646 
recorded samples, the TrustMech outperformed the FIRE by 73.53%, and; 
performed equally to the FIRE by 26.47%. As well, the statistical test (t-test at 95% 
CI) that employs unpaired observations was carried out. The statistical test of the 
FIRE against TrustMech yielded sample means of 3.34 and 3.81 trust levels, 
respectively (Appendix III). Further t-test yielded a mean difference (FIRE – 
TrustMech) of -0.4727 trust level, with the 95% CI for the difference in trust levels 
ranging between -0.6617 and -0.2837. 
 
Figure 30: Comparative performances of the TrustMech against FIRE 
Hypothesis 1 
In regard to the information sharing, the goal behind was to assess whether the 
negatively exaggerated, neutrally (unexaggerated) and positively exaggerated 
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first hand, the subjective comparison that employs GD (Figure 31) was used to 
compare such information accuracies. It presents comparatively the effect of the 
positively, neutrally, and negatively manipulated information (accuracies) on trust. 
 
Figure 31: Comparison of information accuracies 
The patterns resulting from graphical displays are, however, difficult to distinguish, 
and subsequently draw a subjective decision. For this reason, the depicted, graphical 
patterns remain inconclusive to decide whether effects generated are distinct or not. 
Due to this difficult, the statistical test was carried out to provide alternative 
evidence. It employed a 95% CI to achieve an objective decision (Table 14). The 
comparison was three-fold: neutral versus positive information accuracy; negative 
versus positive information accuracy, and; negative versus neutral information 
accuracy. The difference between pairs compared appears to range between -0.3 to 
0.6 trust level. 
Table 14: Comparative effect of information accuracies on trust 
Hypothesis 2 
In regard to the proportional sharing methods, the goal was to assess whether 
distributing gains based upon the number of customers served, distance traveled, and 
total load shipped results in distinct trust levels. Figure 32 presents comparatively 
the graphical patterns of the sharing methods. Similar to the previous results (Figure 
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31), the graphical displays provide an output which is difficult to subjectively judge 
(inconclusive).  
 
Figure 32: Comparison of proportional sharing methods 
In overcoming this challenge, the statistical test at 95% CI was carried out (Table 
15). All the three pairs compared had CIs which include a null value. The inclusion 
or exclusion of the null value provides an objective decision on judging whether 
pairs compared differ significantly or not. Owing to this, section 7.3 provides the 
corresponding deliberation to required judgment. 
Table 15: Comparative effect of sharing methods on trust 
Additional results were concerned with the level of trustworthy each method 
generates when employed to divide costs and gains. Results analyzed (at 95% CI) 
indicated that dividing gains based on the: 
 Distance traveled yielded 2.55 mean trust level and interval of {2.36, 2.75} 
trust level;  
 Number of customers served yielded 2.48 mean trust level and interval of 
{2.29, 2.67} trust level, and;  
 Total load shipped yielded 2.70 mean trust level and interval of (2.51, 2.89) 
trust level.  
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Difference of levels Mean difference 95% CI 
Number of customers - Distance travelled -0.072 (-0.396, 0.253) 
Total load shipped - Distance travelled 0.148 (-0.182, 0.479) 
Total load shipped - Number of customers 0.220 (-0.104, 0.544) 
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Hypothesis 3 
In regard to the conflicting preferences, each preference was compared to other 
preferences to determine whether effect it generated was distinct. There was a total 
of 10 (10C2) comparisons. It was, however, difficult to deduce any meaningful 
correlation or difference in graphical patterns generated, and that is why a 
corresponding graph has been complicated to present. Following this difficulty, 
again, the statistical test was conducted to yield results as indicated in Table 16. With 
a 95% confidence, results showed that each pair compared contained a null value. 
Furthermore, the CI in difference ranges roughly between -0.4 to 0.4 trust level. 
Table 16: Comparative effect of conflicting preferences on trust 
Hypothesis 4 
Results presented in this paragraph were concerned with a degree to which the 
persuaded and rejected dilemmas affect trust. One limitation of this comparison is 
that some pairs carried the potential difference in some samples compared. For 
example, under the full truck or not (P5) preference, there were no occurrences by 
which the respective preference appears persuaded. For this reason, no comparison 
test was carried out on this preference. Again, as far as graphical displays provided 
an inconclusive decision, then the statistical test was carried out to yield results 
indicated in Table 17.  
Table 17: Impact of the persuaded and rejected preferences on trust 
Difference of levels Mean difference   95% CI 
P2 - P1 0.101 (-0.203, 0.405) 
P3 - P1 0.165 (-0.140, 0.469) 
P4 - P1 0.098 (-0.211, 0.406) 
P5 - P1 0.017 (-0.284, 0.318) 
P3 - P2 0.064 (-0.245, 0.372) 
P4 - P2 -0.003 (-0.315, 0.309) 
P5 - P2 -0.084 (-0.388, 0.220) 
P4 - P3 -0.067 (-0.379, 0.245) 
P5 - P3 -0.147 (-0.452, 0.157) 
P5 - P4 -0.081 (-0.389, 0.228) 
 
Preference 
N Mean trust level  
95% CI 
Adjusted 
P-value Per Rej Per Rej 
P1 36 6 2.44 2.36 (-0.267, 0.444) 0.338 
P2 16 14 2.63 2.6 (-0.358, 0.404) 0.460 
P3 19 21 2.72 2.48 (-0.066, 0.541) 0.098 
P4 14 24 2.69 2.43 (0.000, 0.498) 0.039 
Key: “Per” means Persuasion, and “Rej” means Rejection 
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Hypothesis 5 
Another test was concerned with how the primary predictor variables, namely: 
information sharing, proportional sharing scheme, and decision synchronization, 
rank, in effect they generated on trust. Realization of this ranking relied on applying 
the one-way analysis of variance using a Hsu MCB method at 95% CI (Figure 33 
and Appendix IV). 
 
Figure 33: Ranked sensitivity of main response variables 
Emergent Trustworthy Behavior 
The final set of results was concerned with emergent trustworthy behaviors of the 
sharing network and collaborating partners. This set comprised of emerging 
behavior, which was unpredicted. Since there may have been many kinds of this 
behavior, those analyzed and reported are unexhausted. They are instead used to 
demonstrate the further application of the TrustMech on hidden events to help 
logistics managers acquire a far-reaching understanding. In view of this, results on 
the emergent trustworthy behavior are four-folds: degree of persuasions and 
rejections; frequency of trust levels; information distortion, and; the trend of trust in 
operational cycles. Additionally, it is worthy to note that results reported under 
emerging phenomena were generated from experiments  designed to offer 
combinatorial effect on trust (see Table 9). 
The first category of results concerned a degree to which persuaded or rejected 
dilemmas affect levels of trust. Figure 34 shows results of this behavior. The figure 
presents also comparatively frequencies of persuasions and rejections at different 
levels of trust.  
Conflicting PreferencesSharing schemeInformation sharing
2.9
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.5
2.4
T
ru
st
 l
e
v
e
l
7   Validation and Application 
119 
 
Figure 34: Frequency of persuasion and rejection at different trust levels 
The second category concerned frequency to which the four trust levels, namely: 
less trustworthy; trustworthy; more trustworthy, and; most trustworthy appeared. 
Analyzed results indicate that: less trustworthy occurred 55 times (15.15%); 
trustworthy occurred 166 times (45.73%); more trustworthy occurred 122 times 
(33.61%), and; most trustworthy occurred 20 times (5.51%). In relation to this, 
another new phenomenon under consideration concerned a trust level, which the 
simulated logistics network can exhibit once implemented operationally. By using 
363 samples, results analyzed indicate that the mean trust level and 95% CI of such 
network are 2.81 and {2.73, 2.88}, respectively. 
The third category concerned a degree to which collaborating partners distort the 
accuracy of the information they exchange. Such degree of information distortion 
links further to a trust level in which it occurred. Since there were 19 factors 
(elements) of information affection, results presented in Appendix V include only 
top five factors. By top factors, it means factors of information accuracy, which were 
mostly used by partners to affect information accuracy. The presentation of top five 
factors of information affection goes in hand with four levels of trust levels in which 
they featured. The levels of trust are less trustworthy, trustworthy, more trustworthy, 
and most trustworthy. In regard to which factors were frequently used to distort the 
accuracy of shared information, results analyzed reveal the following. In descending 
order the frequency of usage was: {"0.00", "-0.40" , "0.40", "0.45", "-0.45", "0.20", 
"-0.20", "0.25", "-0.25", "0.30", "-0.35", "-0.30", "0.35", "0.05", "-0.05"}. The most-
used factor is“0.00” while the least used factor is “-0.05”. Moreover, in reporting 
information, partners were: exactly honest by 36.36% (exchanging unexaggerated 
information), and; cheating by distorting (exaggerating) information by 68.64%. 
The fourth category was concerned with depicting trends of trust, at a moment when 
collaborative sharing got repeated before resetting strategic planning (front-end 
agreement) and forecast (engagement) (Figure 35).  
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Figure 35: Trend of trust under repetitive cycles 
A goal behind this was to understand how trust was being affected as result of 
reciprocal feedback encountered by partners when they were interacting. There were 
four cycles (repetitions) that were replicated twice to yield eight cycles. After 
obtaining eight cycles then the history (previous trust experience) was removed and 
correspondingly resetting the front-end agreement and engagement. 
7.3 Discussion 
Discussion in this section succeeds results presented already in section 7.2. The goal 
of this section is to draw useful meaning from such results and provide 
corresponding interpretations and implications. This discussion is guided, among 
others, by criteria to evaluate what the experiments told us, as stipulated by Cohen 
and Howe (1988) in a sequence (aspect) of:  
 How did the TrustMech perform compared to its selected standard such as 
other programs, people, and normative behavior? 
 Did the TrustMech perform differently from predictions of how it supposed 
to perform? 
 Did the TrustMech demonstrate good performance? 
 What lesson was learned from the TrustMech and conducted experiments? 
 What were limitations of the TrustMech? 
While considering the outlined guidelines, the subsequent discussion pursues the 
following sequence: validity of the TrustMech (subsection 7.3.1); research questions 
and hypotheses (subsection 7.3.2), and; emergent trustworthy behavior (subsection 
7.3.3). 
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7.3.1 The Validity of the TrustMech 
The present work has proposed the TrustMech as a useful concept to estimate 
(predict/forecast) outcomes (consequences) of trusting process. The TrustMech 
concept propagates a three stage of the human trusting process. Its development has 
involved extending well-known models of trust and reputation. In this extension, the 
limitations identified in previous models have been addressed, while; adapting the 
appropriate strengths. After developing the TrustMech concept, the next goal was to 
establish its accuracy (validation). In establishing the validity of the TrustMech, the 
first task focused on ensuring that fundamental assumptions and theories underlying 
the TrustMech are correct and reasonable (conceptual validity). This assurance 
relied on assessing an internal stochastic variability of the TrustMech. 
The assessment of the internal stochastic variability was guided by the subjective 
and objective decision approaches. On account of the former, the subjective decision 
drawable from the interval plot shows that internal variations among most of the 
experiments remain bearable. An exceptional case that signifies inconsistent 
variability appeared under experiment number 4. In this experiment, the mean trust 
level and confidence interval were relatively higher than the remaining 19 
experiments. Following the observed slight variations, and concordant to the 
subjective decision approach, a concluding remark is that the TrustMech is 
conceptually valid. 
Further revelation can hinge on considering the objective decision. Equally, the 
statistical results unveil that the TrustMech is internally consistent. This observation 
is backed up by the internal stochastic variability of the TrustMech in Appendix II. 
The observed variability was not only assessed to be very low (less than eight 
percent) but also insignificant. Therefore, following the subjective and objective 
results, it is concluded that the TrustMech is internally consistent and conceptually 
valid. Consequently, the fundamental assumptions and theories on which the 
TrustMech stands on are appraised to be reasonably accurate and credible. It is 
essential also to note that the established accuracy and credibility refer to the purpose 
to which the TrustMech serves. 
Succeeding the conceptual validity is the operational validity. Assessment of the 
operational validity of the TrustMech relied on comparing its performance against 
the FIRE trust model. Before discussing this comparison, it is essential to recall how 
the two evaluate trust briefly: 
 TrustMech: evaluates trust by comparing developed expectation against a 
score realized after executing a transaction to a task delegated; 
 FIRE –IT: evaluate trust by calculating the sum of all the available ratings 
weighted by their rating relevance. 
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About the subjective decision, results indicate that the TrustMech performs in a 
manner that is similar to that of the FIRE, on the one hand. The closeness in 
performance originates from graphical displays (Figure 30), which reveal some 
similarity in patterns of output behavior. In this respect, the subjective extent to 
which output behavior of the TrustMech resembles that of the FIRE signifies 
credibility of the TrustMech. Thus, on account of the subjective decision, the 
TrustMech is appraised to be operationally credible and reasonably accurate for 
purposes it serves. 
On the other hand, the proportional comparison (percentage-wise) and statistical 
tests unveil that performances of the TrustMech and FIRE differ significantly. At a 
95% confidence, a range for the difference in performances of the TrustMech and 
FIRE excludes a null value. Exclusion of the null value conveys one significant 
implication. That, performances of the TrustMech and FIRE are statistically 
unequal. Since performances are unequal, one crucial question is: which 
model/mechanism performs better than the other? Answers to this question can 
depend on comparing mean trust levels of the two. Alongside this comparison, the 
model/mechanism with higher mean trust level usually is the better one. Results 
indicate (Appendix III) that the TrustMech scores higher mean trust level than the 
FIRE. This difference in score unveils that the TrustMech performs better than the 
FIRE. To this end, and in a viewpoint of the operational validity, it is sufficient to 
conclude that the TrustMech: is operationally credible and reasonably accurate to a 
purpose it was intended for, and; generates an improved evaluation of trust than its 
rivals. 
Moreover, the model to model validation of the TrustMech provides other useful 
implications. One crucial implication may align with a theoretical perspective that 
emphasizes to conceive trust on the foundation of human trusting process and notion 
of belief. Although both the C&F and BDI+Repage models stand on cognitive 
conception, still the approach to evaluate trust in TrustMech appears better and 
improved. The approach is simple, easy to describe and represent. 
However, one limitation of the current operational validity is that the TrustMech 
compared only to the FIRE model. The model to model comparison left out other 
models such as the C&F and BDI+Repage. Attempts to compare the TrustMech 
against the C&F and BDI+Repage suffered the following difficulties. First, the 
difficulty in comparing the TrustMech against the C&F arose from two areas: an 
evaluation approach of the C&F that seems implicit, and; Likert scale size that 
appears unclearly established. These two limitations might have contradicted the 
needed comparison. Attempts to unfold these difficulties require establishing 
additional assumptions beyond those of the original model. Introducing new further 
assumptions might have again increased uncertainty in previous (base) conception 
of the C&F model. 
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Second, the difficulty concerning belief weights appeared when attempting to 
compare the TrustMech against BDI+Repage. According to mechanics of the 
BDI+Repage, sources of beliefs have to be weighted. As argued before, realizing 
belief weights in real-world settings is challenging, and remains an uneasy 
phenomenon. Additionally, transforming a calculus of the BDI+Repage into 
computational settings was even more difficult. In the overall, there is a need in 
future, to rework on the mentioned impediments (detailed discussion in section 4.6). 
After re-working, comparisons can be carried out to unveil how the TrustMech 
compares to the C&F and BDI+Repage models. 
7.3.2 Reflection on Research Question and Hypotheses 
The present work has proposed the TrustMech as a fundamental logical process 
responsible to account for trusting actions, reactions, and decisions of collaborating 
partners. The TrustMech helps logistics stakeholders to acquire a far-reaching 
understanding about the trustworthiness of networks they configure. These networks 
are configured to achieve benefits of collaboration in sharing logistics resources. The 
sharing enables partners to reduce costs, increase utilization of assets, and mitigate 
other logistics inefficiencies. On account of this, subsequent paragraphs present 
discussion that answers the central and specific research questions. The discussion 
articulates also about how research objectives have been achieved, as well as 
outcomes to hypotheses testing.  
This dissertation was primarily set to answer the following central research question: 
how can collaborating partners acquire a far-reaching understanding about the 
trustworthiness of prospective networks of sharing they configure? In responding to 
this question, the following statements constitute the answers. One way to mitigate 
trust problem in collaborative logistics and respective resource sharing is to 
empower collaborating partners; with an ability to understand deeply how 
trustworthiness of logistics networks may become once those networks are taken to 
an implementation stage. This understanding is unveiled, among others, by 
estimating outcomes of the trusting process, as reinforced by partner behavior under 
the influence of collaborative logistics processes. This estimation stands on: 
identifying environmental factors; specifying trust-based interactions of partners; 
building a fundamental causality (apparatus), and; observing resulting outcomes 
(consequences). On account of this foundation and in reply to this central research 
question, the present dissertation has proposed the TrustMech concept. The concept 
facilitates the realization of the needs raised already in sections 1.2 and 2.5. Detailed 
demonstrative application of the TrustMech features under the RQ4. 
First Specific Research Question –RQ1 
The first specific research question (answered in section 4.1) was destined to 
identifying behavioral factors which influence trust in collaborative sharing of 
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logistics resources. Answering this question involved paying more attention to 
factors (and respective parameters) that characterize partner behavior in 
collaborative sharing of logistics resources. In the end, results substantiate that four 
behavioral factors influence trust in collaborative logistics and underlying resource 
sharing. The four factors are information sharing; sharing scheme; decision 
synchronization, and; opportunism. The first three factors constitute processes that 
facilitate accomplishment of collaboration in sharing logistics resources, on the one 
hand. On the other hand, such factors can become inhibitors, especially when 
partners act opportunistically thereby exploiting individual benefits on costs of 
others. 
It is vital to note that the validation and demonstrative application of the TrustMech 
did not employ all parameters, which constitute each behavioral factor. To this end, 
the simulation experiments included some behavioral parameters while leaving out 
others. In particular, one parameter of the information sharing, three parameters of 
the sharing scheme, and five parameters of the decision synchronization were set to 
manipulate the TrustMech. Supposedly, one can incorporate in future works, the 
remaining (left out) parameters as well as other parameters that may emerge 
afterward. 
Second Specific Research Question –RQ2 
The second most critical inquiry to this research focused on how collaborating 
partners interact to achieve their goals, especially those related to collaboration in 
sharing logistics resources. The typical interactions to refer to are those inclined to 
trust-based scenarios. To this end, answers to RQ2 were grasped and depicted in the 
form of the conceptual trust-based framework. In particular, this trust-based 
framework has identified and specified vital partnering entities; partner’ trust-based 
characteristics; essential roles and tasks performed by such partners; information 
exchanged by partners, and; emerging preferences in decision rights that are 
incompatible. In highlighting findings related to crucial partnering entities, three 
main categories (types) of collaborating partners were identified and formalized. 
They are shippers, carriers, and receivers. About its role, the trust-based framework 
guides the development of the TrustMech concept. Additionally, this framework can 
be used to guide the design of related collaborative interactions in other similar 
application domains. 
Moving further in details of the trust-based framework, interactions of collaborating 
partners occur at three stages: selection and front-end agreement; engagement and 
order forecast, and; physical distribution. In all stages, interactions involve an 
exchange of information among shippers, carriers, managers of the warehouses, and 
receivers. All those partners negotiate on many issues before advancing to 
subsequent stages. Additionally, each of the three stages consists of one form of 
trusting process, set as follows: intention to trusting in the selection and front-end 
agreement; action to trusting in the engagement and order forecast, and; transaction 
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to trusting in the physical distribution. 
Third Specific Research Question –RQ3 
The third research question was an inquiry on how to devise the TrustMech concept 
and validate it. Being the fundamental logical process, TrustMech has to account for 
interactions as well as reactions of collaborating partners. It has to exhibit bottom-
up interactions of individual partners and accordingly provide estimations of trusting 
outcomes. 
In answering this research question, this dissertation has developed the TrustMech 
concept. Before developing the TrustMech concept, there was a series of general 
research objectives to achieve. At first hand, standard approaches to model trust were 
analyzed and compared to conclude the most suitable one. In regard to this, the 
socio-cognitive modeling approach appeared to be suitable than its rivals such as the 
reputation and game-theoretical approaches. Secondly, existing models of trust were 
analyzed and compared to unveil strengths and limitations. Strengths such as the 
sources of trust information, actor relationships, and Likert scale sizes were adapted. 
Equally, this dissertation addressed many limitations such as the unclear and implicit 
evaluations of trust. In referring to this, TrustMech stands on trust evaluation that 
compares expectation against a score realized after executing a transaction to task 
delegation. About theoretical foundation, the TrustMech rests on principles of the 
transaction cost economics, social exchange and learning, and dilemma analysis. 
Compared with its rivals, the TrustMech exhibits human representation to trusting 
action and decisions. It is conceived to serve general-purposes and subsequently 
operationalized to suit contextual needs of collaboration in sharing logistics 
resources. 
Moreover, the devised mechanism fulfills recommendations and findings of 
previous related works. Huang and Wilkinson (2014) substantiate that trust is 
beneficial when trusting actions take place. In due to this, the TrustMech allows for 
trusting actions and decisions to take place among collaborating partners. The 
trusting process occurs under settings of both certainty and uncertainty 
environments. Moreover, the TrustMech unfolds the challenge identified in (Jones 
et al., 2010) that most companies lack the know-how and ability to develop high 
levels of trust. TrustMech has fulfilled such lack because it provides the needed 
know-how (far-reaching understanding) as well as ability to forecast trust issues in 
prior. 
Fourth Research Question –RQ4 
With reference to the RQ4, the present discussion argues on how an idealized 
network for sharing logistics resources may behave upon its implementation. The 
discussion draws from test results of the hypotheses as well as other exciting 
emergent phenomena, which were unpredicted but still surfaced. 
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Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis was set to predict that the positively and negatively exaggerated 
information accuracy, and neutral (unexaggerated) information accuracy generate 
distinct impacts on trust. Analyzed results confirm this hypothesis. The trust impact 
generated by the neutral (unexaggerated) and positively exaggerated information 
accuracy differ significantly. Further consideration of this difference unveils that the 
positively exaggerated information accuracy yields a higher level of trust than the 
unexaggerated information accuracy. However, it has to be noted that not all 
information accuracies can generate distinct impact on trust. The said exclusion is 
evidenced by results, which indicate that there are no meaningful differences in trust 
impact generated by the positively and negatively exaggerated information 
accuracy. This similarity is substantiated at a 95% confidence to find that the CI for 
difference includes a null value. These findings may lead to the following 
conclusion. That, employing the positively exaggerated information accuracy, in 
networks of sharing whose configurations resemble that of the idealized network, 
may generate higher/equivalent trustworthiness. Besides confirming the first 
hypothesis, additional findings reveal other differences and similarity as discussed 
in subsequent paragraphs. 
In regard to theoretical expectation, findings of the first hypothesis are quite different 
from normal (usual) expectation. Theoretically, the expectation is that neutral 
(unexaggerated) information accuracy might have generated improved (better) trust 
levels than the positively or negatively exaggerated information accuracy. Instead, 
the neutral information accuracy seems to generate a low level of trust than its 
counterparts. Such unexpected results might have originated from assumptions 
underlying a definition of neutral information accuracy. This definition employed 
three factors {-0.05, 0.00, 0.05}. In view of this, redefining this information accuracy 
may provide additional updates. Additionally, it might be necessary to conduct a 
further study that seeks to investigate response variables, which are most sensitive 
to information accuracy, for example, by replicating this study. 
Furthermore, findings of this hypothesis differ and relate to existing works in 
literature as follows. About the difference, first, literature has established that level 
of information quality is positively related to a level of trust (Chen et al., 2011). 
Second, information sharing reduces a level of behavioral uncertainty, and 
consequently, improves the level of trust (Kwon & Suh, 2004). Third, the quality of 
shared information leverages (reduces) supplier’s opportunism (Wang et al., 2014). 
In general, these works seem to focus on relationships and correlations, especially 
between information sharing and trust. However, unlike such literature 
contributions, the present dissertation has looked upon distinct levels of the InfQ as 
well as extents of their impact on trust. The study has gone to a one step further to 
address on quantification of behavioral discontents which underlie information 
sharing. By building on the causal mechanism, this study has unfolded the extent to 
which variations in information accuracy impact system’s and partner’s level of 
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trust. Moreover, as observed, the sharing of quality information appears to improve 
trust. This observation is also concordant with the previous establishment in (Chen 
et al., 2011; Kwon & Suh, 2004; Wang et al., 2014).  
Trust is a reciprocal construct that stands in facets of both the cause and effect. As 
an effect, trust is feedback whose loops affect subsequent engagements. Under this 
reciprocal property, previous works provide many establishments. Firstly, Jeng and 
Mortel (2010) have established that trust is positively related to collaborative 
processes. Although the present study employed three collaborative processes 
(incentive scheme, decision synchronization, and information sharing), discussion 
on the reciprocal property of trust draws only on information sharing. In a standpoint 
of information sharing, the literature has established that level of trust impacts 
directly level and quality of information sharing (Hossain & Ouzrout, 2012), and; 
trust has a strong influence on collaborative behavior (Mlaker Kač et al., 2015). 
Moreover, in contrast to the outlined literature, Madlberger (2008) views that trust 
among the trading partners, does not positively impact operational information 
sharing behavior. This view contradicts with many other works in literature. In the 
overall consideration of the causal facet to the reciprocal property to the trust, 
findings of the present study: coincide with many works in literature, although; they 
differ with that in (Madlberger, 2008). Even though, it is still considered that trust is 
the cause that drives individuals to establish an intention to trusting as well as 
developing actions to trusting. 
The second facet of a reciprocal property, trust as the effect, can be seen after 
collaborating partners have already acquired previous experience. In substantiating 
this, the graphical patterns show that, on average, shippers (Appendix VI) and 
receivers (Appendix VII) distort information more than before as a result of 
experiencing low-level trust. More distortion of information is evident, especially 
during the fifth to eighth cycles of collaboration per each block20 (Figure 35). In 
connection with this argument and concordant to (Jeng & Mortel, 2010; Mlaker Kač 
et al., 2015; Ouzrout et al., 2010), trust appears to impact information sharing 
mostly. One difference to note, against findings in (Madlberger, 2008), is that higher 
trust levels unfold under less distorted information compared to more distorted 
information. 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis cares about how fair and trustworthy the proportional sharing 
methods can be. This study has approached this challenge by deriving a hypothesis 
that tests this fairness (trustworthy). The goal was to establish what may be the 
appropriate method out of those tested. Analyzed results, confirm this hypothesis. 
Results indicate that there are no statistically meaningful differences among pairs 
                                                             
20 Each block is distinct from another one and represents simulation case where trust as effect is 
observed. 
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compared. Additionally, in regard to a degree of fairness and acceptability, it can be 
deduced that all methods seem trustworthy although they bear slight and 
insignificant differences. Counting on such differences in a viewpoint of 
trustworthiness the: total load shipped is ranked the first; distance traveled ranked 
the second, and; the number of customers served ranked the third. To this end, the 
total load shipped appears a proportional method that can somehow distribute gains 
fairly than the remaining. 
In reference to previous works, it seems that there is a lack of literature that addresses 
trust in a perspective of sharing (incentive) scheme. However, related contributions 
may be noted. D’Amours and Rönnqvist (2010) had derived the Equal Profit Method 
(EPM) from other sharing principles such as the Shapley value. Upon applying the 
EPM to the case study, D’Amours and Rönnqvist report that it was still difficult to 
obtain a stable solution. Also, a general framework to design compensation rule in 
horizontal collaboration has been proposed in (Tseng et al., 2013). 
Hypothesis 3 
The purpose of this hypothesis was to disclose how the five conflicting preferences 
can affect trust. It was explicitly set to test whether one preference affects trust in 
magnitude that differs from that of others. Analyzed results confirm this hypothesis. 
The distinct affection of trust substantiates from a confidence interval of each pair 
that includes a null value and thus signifying that there is no statistically meaningful 
difference between any pair. These results imply that logistics stakeholders may not 
need to put distinct care into conflicting preferences. They also signify that, when 
designing logistics networks, managers may treat effects of different conflicting 
preferences in equal magnitudes.  
Hypothesis 4 
The fourth hypothesis was set to address impacts of persuaded and rejected 
conflicting preferences (dilemmas) on trust. The prediction was that compromising 
conflicting preferences may be a better strategy that can lead to improved trust levels 
than uncompromised ones. This hypothesis is neither confirmed nor rejected. 
Analyzed results show that among the four conflicting preferences tested, three of 
them reject the hypothesis while a remaining one confirms it. This contradiction 
originates from a small number of sample sizes (less than 30) used in the statistical 
tests. For example, the comparison between the persuaded and rejected conflicting 
preference on the demand model (P1) is even biased. This bias arises because of a 
significant difference in sample sizes (36 by 6). Likewise, even for other preferences, 
the samples sizes do not satisfy statistical requirements (30 ≥ samples). This 
imbalance was out of control of researcher because the TrustMech is designed 
stochastic and autonomous. Meaning that under the present settings no way number 
of persuasions and rejections might have been externally influenced. Even though, 
it seems that persuaded conflicting preferences can generate improved trust levels 
than those rejected. This suggestion, however, needs further substantiation. 
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Besides the present simulation scenario, previous work related to this dissertation 
has already established that irrespective of the degree to which preferences are 
synchronized, a magnitude of the generated effect on trust also depends on other 
factors21. Such work adds that, under similar conditional settings, the persuaded 
preferences are better than rejected ones. Such findings relate to literature as follows. 
Kwon and Suh (2004) report that decision-making uncertainty seems to influence 
trust in a partner negatively. The decision-making uncertainty may as well be 
equivalent to the rejected dilemma. As such, under rejected dilemmas collaborating 
partners are involved in decision-making that may cost others. Advancing on an 
argument that persuaded dilemmas are better than the rejected ones, results of the 
present work seem to correlate to that in (Kwon & Suh, 2004).  
Hypothesis 5 
The purpose of the fifth hypothesis was to determine the most influential predictor 
variables. The goal is to inform logistics stakeholders and managers about which 
response variable they have to care more. Results analyzed indicate that this 
hypothesis is confirmed. That information sharing is ranked the highest compared to 
the sharing scheme and decision synchronization. In particular, the sharing scheme 
ranks the second, while the decision synchronization ranks the lowest. Findings of 
this hypothesis relate mostly to expectation. That, information sharing is a critical 
factor to collaborations including those aimed at sharing logistics resources. These 
findings also correlate with many works in literature such as those in (Wu et al., 
2014). Generally, the literature has established that information sharing is the most 
critical factor to collaborative logistics, and supply chain integration. 
7.3.3 Emergent Trustworthy Behavior 
As previously discussed, the agent-based models and resulting simulation outputs 
provide a room to capture the emergent behavior of partners. The micro-interactions 
of individual partners, which aggregate to whole system output enable this capture. 
Upon analysis, part of such behavior may generate patterns, which provide 
headlights information about the system being investigated. Some of the emergent 
behavior may be predicted in advance (as in section 5.3) while remaining one is 
difficult to predict because it surfaces unexpectedly during experimentation. 
Henceforth, the present discussion addresses the unpredicted trustworthy behavior 
of the logistics networks and categories of collaborating agents. The emergent 
trustworthy behavior is discussed in viewpoints of the: decision synchronization 
(degree of persuasion and rejection); frequency of trust levels; information 
distortion, and; the trend of trust in operational cycles.  
In regard to decision synchronization, usually, dilemmas of the conflict model ought 
                                                             
21 Refer to publications used directly in this dissertation 
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to be compromised prior advancing to the next stage of collaboration. Due to settings 
used, this study advanced on two dilemmas of conflict mode (persuasion and 
rejection). Correspondingly, two terms: extreme-scores22 and mid-scores23 are 
introduced to support clarification of the present discussion. Results analyzed show 
that there is a notable difference between the degree of persuasion and rejection 
under the extreme-scores and mid-scores. Under the extreme-scores, the degree of 
rejection was relatively higher compared to that under the mid-scores. In contrast, 
under the mid-score, the degree of persuasion was relatively higher than it was under 
the extreme-scores. Beyond considering contexts of the extreme-scores and mid-
scores, generally, partners prefer to persuade than reject dilemmas. 
Although these observations infer many implications, at present, the discussion 
involves two of them. First, as highlighted before, persuading dilemmas seems to be 
better strategy compared to rejecting it. This is because mid-scores are mostly 
achievable when persuasion takes place. Second, compromising dilemmas to the 
rejection appear to offer the equal probability of success and failure. Meaning that 
choosing to reject the dilemma may lead to payoffs, although those payoffs are 
unguaranteed. Although trust effect generated by the persuaded and rejected 
dilemmas is statistically indifferent, yet persuaded dilemmas to seem to increase the 
level of trust. 
The second emergent behavior concerned the frequency with which trust levels 
surfaced. Four trust levels were involved and ranked in respect of frequency (from 
highest to lowest) as follows: trustworthy ranked the first; more trustworthy ranked 
the second; less trustworthy ranked the third, and; most trustworthy ranked the 
fourth. This ranking may imply that, upon implementing this logistics network, there 
is a more possibility that the network will behave either trustworthily or more 
trustworthily. Narrowing a space further and drawing from the confidence interval 
already presented, out of two trust levels (trustworthy and more trustworthy), there 
is a high possibility that the network exhibits the level “trustworthy”, which is the 
highest ranked trust level. However, if managers desire a logistics network that is 
more or most trustworthy, they may need to redesign the network and adjust 
parametric settings. 
The third emergent behavior is concerned with an unbalanced usage of factors used 
to affect information accuracy. In general, partners exhibited more opportunistic 
behavior by reporting exaggerated information. When cheating, partners preferred 
to impose distortions (uncertainties) in the range of ±0.20 to ±0.45. Furthermore, 
under three trust levels: less trustworthy, trustworthy, and more trustworthy, 
receivers imposed more information uncertainties compared to those imposed by 
shippers. Under the trust level, the most trustworthy, receivers and shippers imposed 
                                                             
22 Composed of trust levels: less trustworthy and most trustworthy 
23 Composed of trust levels: trustworthy and more trustworthy 
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equivalent information uncertainties. 
The final emergent behavior was concerned with a trend of trust levels within 
repetitive cycles of a single experiment. The trend illustrates that when collaborative 
sharing begins, trust levels are relatively higher. However, trust levels become low 
in subsequent cycles. Trust levels arise again (at fifth and sixth cycles) although they 
become slightly lower than it was in the first cycle. In the last two cycles, trust levels 
drop abruptly. With this behavior, trust in the configured network decreases as 
partners continue to share logistics resources collaboratively. Such decrease may 
imply that opportunistic behavior of partners increases as some collaborative 
engagement increases. 
7.4 Limitations 
Although the present dissertation has successfully fulfilled its objectives, tested 
hypotheses, and answered the research question, yet there are limitations to unfold. 
The first limitation concerns a negotiation algorithm. Efforts to establish validation 
and application of the TrustMech stood on the auction-based negotiation protocol. 
Accordingly, its implementation relied on the contract net negotiation protocol, 
which requires partners (agents) to negotiate through a third-party, for example, the 
broker. The broker has to be a neutral trustee to all collaborating partners, and its 
role is to coordinate activities of the consortium (alliance). In this respect, the 
TrustMech may extend supposedly to an implementation that employs other 
negotiation protocols, including the bargaining-based protocol. Such protocol may, 
for example, permit partners to negotiate among each without central coordination. 
Networks resulting from the bargaining-based negotiation protocol may exhibit 
formations and operations which are less formal. As well, such networks may take 
a form of community ownership (decentralized networks) in which consumer-to-
consumer (peer-to-peer) resource sharing befalls. 
The second limitation relates to the design and setup of the logistics network, as well 
as data used. The design and settings used in simulation experiment relied on a 
theorized logistics network. As well, simulation of resource sharing scenario utilized 
the model data. A lack of enough historical data collected on the system drove the 
use of model data. This limitation supposes to carry out a further investigation that 
can employ system data, obtained from industry logistics networks. The industry 
logistics networks provide real-world design and settings, which the logistics 
manager and other stakeholders may desire. To this end, beyond simulating industry-
based scenarios, further investigation will expectedly update the validity of the 
TrustMech. 
The third limitation may appear on forecasting trustworthiness of the theorized 
logistics network. The forecast (prediction) of trustworthiness of the theorized 
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logistics network relied only on five hypotheses. The purpose of such hypotheses 
was to answer the RQ4, and accordingly, demonstrate the potential application of 
the TrustMech. This implies, therefore, that tested hypotheses remain unexhausted. 
For this reason, further hypotheses may be derived to suit context-specific needs.  
The final limitation may feature in alternatives underlying the simulation 
experiments. As per its conception, the TrustMech is flexible to the extent that it 
allows to adjust the structure, design, and settings of the logistics network. Despite 
rich flexibility inherent in the TrustMech, current experimentation did not 
incorporate all of them. Therefore, re-experimenting a current scenario under 
adjusted settings and design may be useful. 
7.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The present chapter has established the validity and application of the TrustMech. 
In the former, two validation objects, the conceptual and operational validity 
characterize the validity of the TrustMech. The conceptual validity stands on 
assessing an internal variability (consistency) of the TrustMech. Unlike the 
conceptual validity, TrustMech’s operational validity advances on a model to model 
comparison technique. Analyzed results show that the TrustMech, as the stochastic 
mechanism (model) generate outputs, which are to no small extent internally 
consistent. The low level of inconsistencies observed is statistically insignificant. 
The operational validity shows that the TrustMech produces a pattern of output 
behavior that resembles that of the FIRE model. Even though, still there are 
significant differences in performances of the two. 
In a viewpoint of application, the TrustMech has unveiled many insights (headlights) 
that result from a scenario simulated. For example, at first, compared to neutral 
(unexaggerated) information accuracy, the positively exaggerated information 
accuracy appear to yield better levels of trust. Second, there seem to be no significant 
differences about proportioal methods to use in dividing costs and gains. Third, most 
incompatible decisions generate levels of trust which are relatively equivalent. 
Finally, one most interesting headlight is that information sharing affects trust more 
than the sharing scheme and decision synchronization. 
The present chapter has fulfilled its goals. It has presented, in a fruitful manner, the 
validity as well as application of the TrustMech concept. By drawing from both the 
proportional-wise performance and statistical tests, the TrustMech performs better 
than its rival, the FIRE. Such performance leads to a conclusive appraisal, that, the 
TrustMech is conceptually and operationally credible and reasonable to purposes it 
serves. The TrustMech has proved its core application in providing a deeper 
understanding of the trustworthiness of prospective networks of resource sharing, 
before taking them to an implementation stage.  
7   Validation and Application 
133 
The summary and conclusion presented in the current chapter open the last chapter. 
Therefore, the next chapter (chapter 8) presents the recapitulation of this research 
work.  
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8 Recapitulation 
The chapter presents concluding remarks and future open streams. Section 8.1 
revisits the context to the study, existing challenges, as well as the proposed solution. 
The section also provides fewer headlights that result from an exemplified network 
of sharing that has been simulated. The chapter ends with an outlook in section 8.2 
by providing open streams that may be researched on. 
8.1 Conclusion 
In contrast to a sharing in the traditional era, today’s sharing of resources is gradually 
shifting into business models. Particularly in the logistics sector, resource sharing is 
progressively involving the sharing of information, vehicles, warehouses, and 
distribution centers, machinery, cloud infrastructures and services in logistics, as 
well as on-demand staffing. The sharing of logistics resources offers many benefits. 
The sharing enables participant entities to reduce costs; reduce harms to the 
environment; increase utilization of assets, and; improve the efficiency of logistics 
services. Although collaboration in sharing logistics resources is beneficial, its 
uptake has been relatively slow and challenging. 
Many areas attribute to such difficulties. Collaborating entities encounter difficulties 
concerning how to choose a partner; manage and coordinate a configured 
consortium; and mitigate risks. Other difficulties are such as unbalanced power, 
reluctance to change, and low level of trust. The low level of trust is considered a 
critical inhibitor of collaborative logistics, and; it stems from multiple trust 
uncertainties. A large part of these trust uncertainties originates from partner 
behavior under the influence of collaborative logistics processes. To this end, this 
dissertation has contributed to mitigating the trust problem in collaboration, 
especially collaboration, which is aimed to share logistics resources. 
In addressing the outlined research problem, this dissertation has proposed a Trust 
Mechanism (TrustMech) concept. The TrustMech concept succeeded an 
establishment of the conceptual trust-based framework. The goal of this framework 
was to depict and guide interactions of collaborating partners. The goal of the 
TrustMech concept is to forecast (estimate) consequences (outcomes) of trusting 
actions and decisions. This estimation occurs under a hybrid of both the certain and 
uncertain environments. The estimation helps collaborating partners (and other 
logistics stakeholders) to acquire the far-reaching understanding about 
trustworthiness of networks of resource sharing they configure. This understanding 
is unveiled by forecasting how the network of sharing might behave once it is taken 
to an implementation stage. In particular, the TrustMech helps stakeholders to 
understand: 
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 How trustworthy might a configured network of sharing becomes; 
 How trustworthy might the individual collaborating partners become; 
 What sort of pitfalls are expected to emerge in the network, and; 
 What possible strengths to build on are expected. 
Moreover, the proposed TrustMech hinges on the approach of trusting outcomes. 
This approach differs from many works in literature, which rest on a mitigation 
approach that entails a perspective of sources of trust uncertainties.  
Development of the TrustMech has foundationally stood on the socio-cognitive 
principles. Unlike its rivals, the TrustMech uses the expectation and score24 to 
evaluate the level of trust. Validation of the concept has employed collaborative 
logistics scenario that entails sharing of logistics resources. The conceptual and 
operational validity of the TrustMech has relied on carrying out the internal 
variability and model to model comparison, respectively. Results indicate that the 
conceptual and operational validities of the TrustMech are credible and reasonable. 
The credibility and reasonableness are established in reference to the purpose for 
which the TrustMech is intended. In regard to hypotheses testing, some have been 
successful while others remain inconclusive. 
Furthermore, the following establishments highlight on the part of findings achieved 
by this dissertation. For example, resulting from an exemplified network of sharing, 
the trust levels“less trustworthy” (extreme lowest trust level) and “most 
trustworthy” (extreme highest trust level) surface when dilemmas get more 
rejections as compared to when dilemmas get persuaded. As well, out of three 
behavioral factors which influence trust, information sharing generates a highly 
ranked effect than the sharing scheme and decision synchronization. Trust appears 
to decrease continuously as per subsequent collaborative engagements. In the end, 
this research has thrown up open research streams as presented in the next section. 
8.2 Outlook 
Although this research has successfully addressed the problem of low trust to 
collaboration in sharing logistics resources, yet some areas need further 
improvements. For this reason, this outlook presents limitations outlined previously 
in section 7.4, as well as other open streams. These limitations and open streams 
constitute future research works. To this end, proposed future research works fall in 
categories of extending the TrustMech; replicating the study using system data; 
replicating the study using another design and settings; comparing the TrustMech to 
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rival models other than the FIRE –IT; incorporating additional predictor and 
response variables and; investigating trust uncertainties that result from non-
behavioral factors.  
First, the proposed TrustMech advances on the algorithm that employs auction-
based negotiation protocol. Such negotiation protocol uses central coordination 
under the supervision of the neutral trustee. It might be worthy to examine the 
performance of the TrustMech under other negotiations protocols, such as the 
bargaining-based and ABN protocols. Such examination will add value, for 
example, in exploring if there might occur interesting phenomena that result from 
peer-to-peer interactions (decentralized coordination). 
Second, the validation and application of the TrustMech have relied upon the model 
data. A decision to employ the model data came out due to lack of the adequate and 
complete system data. For this reason, the recommendation is, upon obtaining 
system data, this study be replicated to update results and findings reported in this 
dissertation. 
Third, the operational validity of the TrustMech employed the model to model 
comparison technique. In this comparison, TrustMech was only compared to the 
FIRE (IT –component). Subsection 7.3.1 has outlined reasons for why the 
TrustMech was compared to only one rival model. Therefore, further works may 
compare the performance of the TrustMech against, for example, the C&F and 
BDI+Repage. Towards carrying out this comparison, one has to figure out issues 
concerning the implicit procedural dimensions for the C&F as well as the mechanism 
for assigning weight to beliefs in the BDI+Repage model. 
In regard to the operational TrustMech that depicts collaborative sharing of logistics 
resources, further study may build on adding variables. The predictor variables 
(especially for the InfoQ) and response variables used so far are unexhausted. To 
this end, further works may add more variables to observe effects. The design and 
settings may be adjusted for observing if distinct outcomes unfold. 
Finally, the future work may investigate trust uncertainties resulting from non-
behavioral factors which this dissertation did not incorporate. Factors such as the 
commitment, capacity, asset specificity (see Table 1) once studied may add value to 
a body of knowledge. 
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Appendix I: A matrix of preferences, award, and penalty 
Appendix II: Tukey simultaneous tests for differences of means trust level 
Difference of 
Levels 
Difference 
of Means 
SE of 
Difference 95% CI T-Value 
Adjusted 
P-Value 
Exp2 - Exp1 0.452 0.140 (-0.044, 0.948) 3.23 0.128 
Exp3 - Exp1 0.139 0.140 (-0.357, 0.635) 0.99 1.000 
Exp4 - Exp1 0.669 0.140 (0.173, 1.165) 4.78 0.000 
Exp5 - Exp1 0.385 0.141 (-0.114, 0.884) 2.73 0.405 
Exp6 - Exp1 0.085 0.137 (-0.402, 0.572) 0.62 1.000 
Exp7 - Exp1 0.100 0.140 (-0.396, 0.596) 0.72 1.000 
Exp8 - Exp1 0.305 0.141 (-0.194, 0.804) 2.16 0.823 
Exp9 - Exp1 0.345 0.141 (-0.154, 0.844) 2.45 0.625 
Exp10 - Exp1 0.331 0.144 (-0.179, 0.841) 2.30 0.738 
Exp11 - Exp1 0.146 0.138 (-0.344, 0.636) 1.06 1.000 
Exp12 - Exp1 0.167 0.140 (-0.329, 0.662) 1.19 1.000 
Exp13 - Exp1 0.017 0.141 (-0.482, 0.516) 0.12 1.000 
Exp14 - Exp1 -0.054 0.138 (-0.544, 0.435) -0.39 1.000 
Exp15 - Exp1 0.166 0.141 (-0.334, 0.665) 1.17 1.000 
Exp16 - Exp1 -0.103 0.138 (-0.593, 0.387) -0.75 1.000 
Exp17 - Exp1 -0.002 0.140 (-0.498, 0.494) -0.01 1.000 
Exp18 - Exp1 0.062 0.140 (-0.434, 0.557) 0.44 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp1 -0.005 0.142 (-0.508, 0.497) -0.04 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp1 -0.086 0.138 (-0.576, 0.404) -0.62 1.000 
Exp3 - Exp2 -0.314 0.142 (-0.818, 0.191) -2.20 0.801 
Exp4 - Exp2 0.216 0.142 (-0.288, 0.721) 1.52 0.994 
Exp5 - Exp2 -0.068 0.143 (-0.576, 0.440) -0.47 1.000 
Exp6 - Exp2 -0.367 0.140 (-0.863, 0.129) -2.62 0.487 
Exp7 - Exp2 -0.352 0.142 (-0.857, 0.153) -2.47 0.607 
Exp8 - Exp2 -0.148 0.143 (-0.656, 0.360) -1.03 1.000 
Exp9 - Exp2 -0.108 0.143 (-0.616, 0.400) -0.75 1.000 
Exp10 - Exp2 -0.122 0.146 (-0.640, 0.397) -0.83 1.000 
Exp11 - Exp2 -0.306 0.141 (-0.805, 0.192) -2.18 0.816 
Exp12 - Exp2 -0.286 0.142 (-0.791, 0.219) -2.01 0.901 
Exp13 - Exp2 -0.435 0.143 (-0.943, 0.073) -3.04 0.213 
Exp14 - Exp2 -0.507 0.141 (-1.005, -0.008) -3.60 0.042 
Exp15 - Exp2 -0.287 0.143 (-0.795, 0.221) -2.00 0.903 
Exp16 - Exp2 -0.555 0.141 (-1.054, -0.057) -3.94 0.012 
Exp17 - Exp2 -0.454 0.142 (-0.959, 0.051) -3.19 0.144 
Exp18 - Exp2 -0.391 0.142 (-0.896, 0.114) -2.74 0.397 
Exp19 - Exp2 -0.458 0.144 (-0.969, 0.054) -3.17 0.152 
Exp20 - Exp2 -0.538 0.141 (-1.037, -0.039) -3.82 0.019 
Exp4 - Exp3 0.530 0.142 (0.025, 1.035) 3.72 0.028 
Exp5 - Exp3 0.246 0.143 (-0.262, 0.754) 1.72 0.977 
Exp6 - Exp3 -0.054 0.140 (-0.550, 0.442) -0.38 1.000 
Exp7 - Exp3 -0.038 0.142 (-0.543, 0.466) -0.27 1.000 
Exp8 - Exp3 0.166 0.143 (-0.342, 0.674) 1.16 1.000 
Exp9 - Exp3 0.206 0.143 (-0.302, 0.714) 1.44 0.997 
Exp10 - Exp3 0.192 0.146 (-0.327, 0.710) 1.31 0.999 
Exp11 - Exp3 0.007 0.141 (-0.491, 0.506) 0.05 1.000 
Exp12 - Exp3 0.028 0.142 (-0.477, 0.533) 0.19 1.000 
Exp13 - Exp3 -0.122 0.143 (-0.630, 0.386) -0.85 1.000 
Exp14 - Exp3 -0.193 0.141 (-0.692, 0.305) -1.37 0.998 
Exp15 - Exp3 0.027 0.143 (-0.481, 0.535) 0.19 1.000 
Preference Incentive due to persuasion   Penalty due to rejection 
P1 Receiver increases sales (purchased orders to 
shipper) by 4% 
Receiver charges 1.5% of the purchase price 
per pallet in case of back orders 
P2 The carrier pays storage cost of 4 % per pallet 
(in case of undistributed goods) 
For non-FTL goods, carrier charges shipper 
per pallet than per trip 
P3 Shipper pays receiver at 1.5% of the purchase 
price per pallet in case of a backorder 
Shipper charges receiver at 4% per pallet as 
storage cost (in case of inventory) 
P4 Carrier lowers transportation cost by 5 % per 
pallet 
Carrier charge extra 5% of transportation 
cost per pallet 
P5 Carrier lowers transportation cost by 5 % per 
pallet in case of the FTL 
Carrier charges extra 5% of transportation 
cost per pallet in case of non-FTL 
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Difference of 
Levels 
Difference 
of Means 
SE of 
Difference 95% CI T-Value 
Adjusted 
P-Value 
Exp16 - Exp3 -0.242 0.141 (-0.741, 0.257) -1.72 0.977 
Exp17 - Exp3 -0.141 0.142 (-0.646, 0.364) -0.99 1.000 
Exp18 - Exp3 -0.077 0.142 (-0.582, 0.428) -0.54 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp3 -0.144 0.144 (-0.655, 0.367) -1.00 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp3 -0.225 0.141 (-0.723, 0.274) -1.60 0.990 
Exp5 - Exp4 -0.284 0.143 (-0.792, 0.224) -1.98 0.911 
Exp6 - Exp4 -0.584 0.140 (-1.080, -0.088) -4.17 0.005 
Exp7 - Exp4 -0.568 0.142 (-1.073, -0.064) -3.99 0.010 
Exp8 - Exp4 -0.364 0.143 (-0.872, 0.144) -2.54 0.553 
Exp9 - Exp4 -0.324 0.143 (-0.832, 0.184) -2.26 0.763 
Exp10 - Exp4 -0.338 0.146 (-0.857, 0.180) -2.31 0.727 
Exp11 - Exp4 -0.523 0.141 (-1.021, -0.024) -3.71 0.028 
Exp12 - Exp4 -0.502 0.142 (-1.007, 0.003) -3.52 0.053 
Exp13 - Exp4 -0.652 0.143 (-1.160, -0.144) -4.54 0.001 
Exp14 - Exp4 -0.723 0.141 (-1.222, -0.225) -5.14 0.000 
Exp15 - Exp4 -0.503 0.143 (-1.011, 0.005) -3.51 0.056 
Exp16 - Exp4 -0.772 0.141 (-1.271, -0.273) -5.48 0.000 
Exp17 - Exp4 -0.671 0.142 (-1.176, -0.166) -4.71 0.000 
Exp18 - Exp4 -0.607 0.142 (-1.112, -0.102) -4.26 0.003 
Exp19 - Exp4 -0.674 0.144 (-1.185, -0.163) -4.67 0.001 
Exp20 - Exp4 -0.755 0.141 (-1.253, -0.256) -5.36 0.000 
Exp6 - Exp5 -0.300 0.141 (-0.799, 0.200) -2.13 0.843 
Exp7 - Exp5 -0.284 0.143 (-0.792, 0.224) -1.98 0.910 
Exp8 - Exp5 -0.080 0.144 (-0.591, 0.431) -0.55 1.000 
Exp9 - Exp5 -0.040 0.144 (-0.551, 0.471) -0.28 1.000 
Exp10 - Exp5 -0.054 0.147 (-0.576, 0.467) -0.37 1.000 
Exp11 - Exp5 -0.239 0.142 (-0.741, 0.263) -1.68 0.981 
Exp12 - Exp5 -0.218 0.143 (-0.726, 0.290) -1.52 0.994 
Exp13 - Exp5 -0.368 0.144 (-0.879, 0.144) -2.55 0.546 
Exp14 - Exp5 -0.439 0.142 (-0.941, 0.063) -3.10 0.182 
Exp15 - Exp5 -0.219 0.144 (-0.730, 0.292) -1.52 0.994 
Exp16 - Exp5 -0.488 0.142 (-0.990, 0.014) -3.44 0.069 
Exp17 - Exp5 -0.387 0.143 (-0.895, 0.121) -2.70 0.430 
Exp18 - Exp5 -0.323 0.143 (-0.831, 0.185) -2.25 0.766 
Exp19 - Exp5 -0.390 0.145 (-0.905, 0.125) -2.69 0.439 
Exp20 - Exp5 -0.471 0.142 (-0.973, 0.031) -3.32 0.099 
Exp7 - Exp6 0.015 0.140 (-0.481, 0.511) 0.11 1.000 
Exp8 - Exp6 0.220 0.141 (-0.280, 0.719) 1.56 0.992 
Exp9 - Exp6 0.260 0.141 (-0.240, 0.759) 1.84 0.953 
Exp10 - Exp6 0.245 0.144 (-0.265, 0.755) 1.70 0.979 
Exp11 - Exp6 0.061 0.138 (-0.429, 0.551) 0.44 1.000 
Exp12 - Exp6 0.081 0.140 (-0.414, 0.577) 0.58 1.000 
Exp13 - Exp6 -0.068 0.141 (-0.567, 0.431) -0.48 1.000 
Exp14 - Exp6 -0.140 0.138 (-0.629, 0.350) -1.01 1.000 
Exp15 - Exp6 0.080 0.141 (-0.419, 0.580) 0.57 1.000 
Exp16 - Exp6 -0.188 0.138 (-0.678, 0.302) -1.36 0.999 
Exp17 - Exp6 -0.087 0.140 (-0.583, 0.409) -0.62 1.000 
Exp18 - Exp6 -0.024 0.140 (-0.519, 0.472) -0.17 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp6 -0.090 0.142 (-0.593, 0.412) -0.64 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp6 -0.171 0.138 (-0.661, 0.319) -1.24 1.000 
Exp8 - Exp7 0.204 0.143 (-0.304, 0.712) 1.43 0.997 
Exp9 - Exp7 0.244 0.143 (-0.264, 0.752) 1.70 0.979 
Exp10 - Exp7 0.230 0.146 (-0.288, 0.749) 1.57 0.991 
Exp11 - Exp7 0.046 0.141 (-0.453, 0.544) 0.32 1.000 
Exp12 - Exp7 0.066 0.142 (-0.439, 0.571) 0.46 1.000 
Exp13 - Exp7 -0.083 0.143 (-0.591, 0.425) -0.58 1.000 
Exp14 - Exp7 -0.155 0.141 (-0.653, 0.344) -1.10 1.000 
Exp15 - Exp7 0.065 0.143 (-0.443, 0.573) 0.45 1.000 
Exp16 - Exp7 -0.203 0.141 (-0.702, 0.295) -1.44 0.997 
Exp17 - Exp7 -0.102 0.142 (-0.607, 0.403) -0.72 1.000 
Exp18 - Exp7 -0.039 0.142 (-0.544, 0.466) -0.27 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp7 -0.106 0.144 (-0.617, 0.406) -0.73 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp7 -0.186 0.141 (-0.685, 0.313) -1.32 0.999 
Exp9 - Exp8 0.040 0.144 (-0.471, 0.551) 0.28 1.000 
Exp10 - Exp8 0.026 0.147 (-0.496, 0.547) 0.17 1.000 
Exp11 - Exp8 -0.159 0.142 (-0.661, 0.343) -1.12 1.000 
Exp12 - Exp8 -0.138 0.143 (-0.646, 0.370) -0.96 1.000 
Exp13 - Exp8 -0.288 0.144 (-0.799, 0.224) -1.99 0.906 
Exp14 - Exp8 -0.359 0.142 (-0.861, 0.143) -2.53 0.556 
Exp15 - Exp8 -0.139 0.144 (-0.650, 0.372) -0.96 1.000 
Exp16 - Exp8 -0.408 0.142 (-0.910, 0.094) -2.88 0.304 
Exp17 - Exp8 -0.307 0.143 (-0.815, 0.201) -2.14 0.837 
Exp18 - Exp8 -0.243 0.143 (-0.751, 0.265) -1.70 0.980 
Exp19 - Exp8 -0.310 0.145 (-0.825, 0.205) -2.13 0.839 
Exp20 - Exp8 -0.391 0.142 (-0.893, 0.111) -2.76 0.386 
Exp10 - Exp9 -0.014 0.147 (-0.536, 0.507) -0.10 1.000 
Exp11 - Exp9 -0.199 0.142 (-0.701, 0.303) -1.40 0.998 
Exp12 - Exp9 -0.178 0.143 (-0.686, 0.330) -1.24 1.000 
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Difference of 
Levels 
Difference 
of Means 
SE of 
Difference 95% CI T-Value 
Adjusted 
P-Value 
Exp13 - Exp9 -0.328 0.144 (-0.839, 0.184) -2.27 0.755 
Exp14 - Exp9 -0.399 0.142 (-0.901, 0.103) -2.82 0.344 
Exp15 - Exp9 -0.179 0.144 (-0.690, 0.332) -1.24 1.000 
Exp16 - Exp9 -0.448 0.142 (-0.950, 0.054) -3.16 0.155 
Exp17 - Exp9 -0.347 0.143 (-0.855, 0.161) -2.42 0.648 
Exp18 - Exp9 -0.283 0.143 (-0.791, 0.225) -1.98 0.913 
Exp19 - Exp9 -0.350 0.145 (-0.865, 0.165) -2.41 0.654 
Exp20 - Exp9 -0.431 0.142 (-0.933, 0.071) -3.04 0.211 
Exp11 - Exp10 -0.184 0.145 (-0.697, 0.328) -1.27 0.999 
Exp12 - Exp10 -0.164 0.146 (-0.683, 0.355) -1.12 1.000 
Exp13 - Exp10 -0.313 0.147 (-0.835, 0.208) -2.13 0.843 
Exp14 - Exp10 -0.385 0.145 (-0.898, 0.128) -2.66 0.459 
Exp15 - Exp10 -0.165 0.147 (-0.687, 0.357) -1.12 1.000 
Exp16 - Exp10 -0.434 0.145 (-0.946, 0.079) -3.00 0.234 
Exp17 - Exp10 -0.332 0.146 (-0.851, 0.186) -2.27 0.755 
Exp18 - Exp10 -0.269 0.146 (-0.788, 0.250) -1.84 0.955 
Exp19 - Exp10 -0.336 0.148 (-0.861, 0.189) -2.27 0.759 
Exp20 - Exp10 -0.416 0.145 (-0.929, 0.096) -2.88 0.304 
Exp12 - Exp11 0.021 0.141 (-0.478, 0.519) 0.15 1.000 
Exp13 - Exp11 -0.129 0.142 (-0.631, 0.373) -0.91 1.000 
Exp14 - Exp11 -0.200 0.139 (-0.693, 0.292) -1.44 0.997 
Exp15 - Exp11 0.020 0.142 (-0.482, 0.522) 0.14 1.000 
Exp16 - Exp11 -0.249 0.139 (-0.742, 0.244) -1.79 0.965 
Exp17 - Exp11 -0.148 0.141 (-0.647, 0.351) -1.05 1.000 
Exp18 - Exp11 -0.084 0.141 (-0.583, 0.414) -0.60 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp11 -0.151 0.143 (-0.657, 0.354) -1.06 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp11 -0.232 0.139 (-0.725, 0.261) -1.67 0.983 
Exp13 - Exp12 -0.149 0.143 (-0.657, 0.359) -1.04 1.000 
Exp14 - Exp12 -0.221 0.141 (-0.720, 0.278) -1.57 0.992 
Exp15 - Exp12 -0.001 0.143 (-0.509, 0.507) -0.01 1.000 
Exp16 - Exp12 -0.270 0.141 (-0.768, 0.229) -1.91 0.934 
Exp17 - Exp12 -0.169 0.142 (-0.673, 0.336) -1.18 1.000 
Exp18 - Exp12 -0.105 0.142 (-0.610, 0.400) -0.74 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp12 -0.172 0.144 (-0.683, 0.340) -1.19 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp12 -0.252 0.141 (-0.751, 0.246) -1.79 0.964 
Exp14 - Exp13 -0.072 0.142 (-0.574, 0.430) -0.50 1.000 
Exp15 - Exp13 0.148 0.144 (-0.363, 0.660) 1.03 1.000 
Exp16 - Exp13 -0.120 0.142 (-0.622, 0.382) -0.85 1.000 
Exp17 - Exp13 -0.019 0.143 (-0.527, 0.489) -0.13 1.000 
Exp18 - Exp13 0.044 0.143 (-0.464, 0.552) 0.31 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp13 -0.022 0.145 (-0.537, 0.492) -0.15 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp13 -0.103 0.142 (-0.605, 0.399) -0.73 1.000 
Exp15 - Exp14 0.220 0.142 (-0.282, 0.722) 1.55 0.993 
Exp16 - Exp14 -0.049 0.139 (-0.541, 0.444) -0.35 1.000 
Exp17 - Exp14 0.052 0.141 (-0.446, 0.551) 0.37 1.000 
Exp18 - Exp14 0.116 0.141 (-0.383, 0.615) 0.82 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp14 0.049 0.143 (-0.456, 0.555) 0.34 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp14 -0.031 0.139 (-0.524, 0.461) -0.23 1.000 
Exp16 - Exp15 -0.269 0.142 (-0.771, 0.233) -1.90 0.939 
Exp17 - Exp15 -0.167 0.143 (-0.675, 0.341) -1.17 1.000 
Exp18 - Exp15 -0.104 0.143 (-0.612, 0.404) -0.73 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp15 -0.171 0.145 (-0.685, 0.344) -1.18 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp15 -0.251 0.142 (-0.753, 0.251) -1.77 0.968 
Exp17 - Exp16 0.101 0.141 (-0.398, 0.600) 0.72 1.000 
Exp18 - Exp16 0.165 0.141 (-0.334, 0.663) 1.17 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp16 0.098 0.143 (-0.408, 0.603) 0.69 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp16 0.017 0.139 (-0.475, 0.510) 0.12 1.000 
Exp18 - Exp17 0.064 0.142 (-0.441, 0.568) 0.45 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp17 -0.003 0.144 (-0.515, 0.508) -0.02 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp17 -0.084 0.141 (-0.583, 0.415) -0.60 1.000 
Exp19 - Exp18 -0.067 0.144 (-0.578, 0.445) -0.46 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp18 -0.147 0.141 (-0.646, 0.351) -1.05 1.000 
Exp20 - Exp19 -0.081 0.143 (-0.586, 0.425) -0.57 1.000 
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Appendix III: Comparing performances of the TrustMech and FIRE 
Appendix IV: Hsu Simultaneous tests for ranking response variables 
Appendix V: Top most five factors of information affection at different trust levels 
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Two-Sample T-Test and CI: FIRE, TrustMech 
Method 
μ₁: mean of FIRE 
µ₂: mean of TrustMech 
Difference: μ₁ - µ₂ 
Equal variances are assumed for this analysis. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Sample N Mean StDev SE Mean 
FIRE 646 3.34 1.70 0.067 
TrustMech 646 3.81 1.76 0.069 
 
Estimation for Difference 
Difference 
Pooled 
StDev 
95% CI for 
Difference 
-0.4727 1.7315 (-0.6617, -0.2837) 
 
Test 
Null hypothesis H₀: μ₁ - µ₂ = 0 
Alternative hypothesis H₁: μ₁ - µ₂ ≠ 0 
 
T-Value DF P-Value 
-4.91 1290 0.000 
 
Difference of Levels 
Mean 
Difference 95% CI 
Adjusted 
P-Value 
Information sharing  - Sharing scheme 0.1690 (0.0000, 0.3168) 0.026 
Sharing scheme - Information sharing  -0.1690 (-0.3168, 0.0000) 0.026 
Conflicting preference - Information sharing -0.2377 (-0.3698, 0.0000) 0.001 
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Appendix VI: Trend of trust with respect to shipper’s positive information 
accuracy 
 
 
Appendix VII: Trend of trust concerning receiver’s positive information accuracy 
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